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Editorial
The annual award for Excellence in
Dissertation Research in Art Educa-
tion was presented to Carlton W.
Palmer at the National Symposium for
Research in Art Education which was
held at the University of Illinois, Ur-
bana-Champaign campus this past Oc-
tober. His dissertation, entitled "Pic-
tures and Words, Their Differential
Memory and Relationship to Field De-
pendence — Independence," was com-
pleted at New York University. An article
summarizing his dissertation will ap-
pear in a forthcoming issue of the Review.
It is reinforcing to note that applica-
tions for this year's award increased
by approximately 60% over last year.
In all, fifty-three dissertations repre-
senting experimental, philosophical,
historical and methodological ap-
proaches were submitted for consid-
eration.
As was the case last year, the editors
again owe a special note of thanks to
our fellow award committee members,
Edmund B. Feldman, Laura Chapman,
June King McFee and Jessie Lovano-
Kerr for their conscientious reading
and careful evaluation of the large vol-
ume of materials sent to them in the
process of reaching the final award
decision.
Next year's award will be for disser-
tations completed during the 1979
calendar year. Applicants must sub-
mit three copies of their dissertation
abstract and a letter requesting con-
sideration by February 19, 1981.
With this issue, the twice yearly dates
for distributing the Review change
from the usual Winter-Spring dates
to Winter-Fall. We are making this
change in order to comply with the
wishes of the many subscribers who
have expressed preference to receive
the Review during the academic year
rather than during the summer when
many are on vacation. This issue ends
last year's subscription for many read-
ers. Materials for the new subscription
year (Winter 1980 and Fall 1981) are
enclosed. You will note that the price
has not been increased over last year.
We are hopeful that the change in
publication dates will reduce the need
for duplicating our subscription cam-
paign which in the past few years has
been necessitated due to lost or mis-
placed subscription materials result-
ing from summer mailings. Once again,
some concrete demonstration of sup-
port from the readers will be most
appreciated.
GWH/TZ
AFFIRMATION AND STUDY: PHENOMENOLOGY IN DOCTORAL RESEARCH
Marilyn Zurmuehlen
The University of Iowa
The Ph.D. program in Art Education
at Concordia University, Montreal, Can-
ada, sponsored a series of symposia.
Presentations on Research in Art
Education. The second of these,
"Phenomenological Description: Po-
tential for Research in Art Education,"
was held in April, 1978. Professor Hel-
mut Wagner interpreted the work of
phenomenological sociologist, Alfred
Schutz, as the basis for a phenomenol-
ogy of art; Professor Ted Aoki pre-
sented curriculum research in a new
key: the situation-interpretive and the
critical inquiry modes; and Professor
Kenneth Beittel gave an account of
his development as a researcher in a
qualitative description of the art pro-
cess. The papers, responses, and a
transcript of the discussion were pub-
lished by the organizers (Victoria &
Sacca, 1978). The conference is evi-
dence of some interest in phenomenol-
ogy as an approach to research in art
education. A member of the audience
suggested a condition which may ac-
count, at least in part, for the search-
ing in this direction when he remarked
that, "Art education literature is
mainly characterized by inspirational
generalizations out of which the par-
ticular is very difficult to formulate"
(p. 155).
Mindful of Husserl's admonition to
go to the things themselves, I decided
to examine a research application of
phenomenology by studying the doc-
toral dissertations identified with it. A
search of Dissertation Abstracts In-
ternational for the two years from
November, 1977 through October,
1979 revealed a total of 56 disserta-
tions indexed under either Phenome-
nological or Phenomenology. These
were written at 37 different institu-
tions. Not surprisingly, 16 of the dis-
sertations were in the field of philos-
ophy; however, it is interesting to note
that 18 were listed under some cate-
gory of education. Michigan State Uni-
versity, the University of Pittsburgh,
and the University of Southern Cali-
fornia each produced four disserta-
tions, and a total of 13 schools were
responsible for more than one in the
Phenomenological or Phenomenology
classifications. The distribution by
subject matter and by institutions is
summarized in Table I.
The strategy of using the index to
discover phenomenological disserta-
tions has an obvious limitation: unless
the authors chose to use one of the
words in their titles the works were
not disclosed in this search. However,
it may be argued that those to whom
the methodology was of great impor-
tance were likely to include a reference
to it in their titles.
Several of these students elected to
give some definition of phenomenol-
ogy in their abstracts. It is instructive
to examine not only the concepts, but
also the language they use for express-
ing these ideas:
Briefly defined, phenomenology is the
examination and description of experi-
ence as that experience is in its own
terms. Through a process usually called
the phenomenological reduction, the
phenomenologist works to free him-
self from various prejudices, feelings,
a priori conceptions and theories which
might hide or discolor the phenomenon
he studies. (Seamon, 1977, p. 3726-A)
Seamon continued by stating that his
study in social geography "attempts a
phenomenology of everyday environ-
mental experience — the sum total of
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Marilyn Zurmuehlen
a person's firsthand involvements with
the everyday places, spaces, and envi-
ronments in which he typically lives"
(p. 3726-A).
A phenomenological method seeks to
understand any phenomenon as it is
experienced, without preconceived con-
ceptualizations which might distort or
distance that experience. It is a descrip-
tive method, attempting to reveal the
"is-ness" of phenomena. It tries, fur-
thermore, to see as comprehensively
as possible man's interrelationships and
intentionalities being manifested in ex-
perience. (Brown, 1977, p. 541 2-A)
Spinnell (1977), in his analysis of three
kinds of understanding that have peda-
gogical significance for teachers, as-
serted: "The phenomenological ac-
count claims that understanding is a
particular act of consciousness that
grasps the meaning or essence of an
object" (p. 5328-A). Norris (1978)
studied the phenomenology of per-
ceptual experience in Keats and Ste-
vens. She defined phenomenology as
unfolding "how things come to mean
for the perceiver" (p. 4281-A).
It is related to poetry in that the text
generates a world, and the way the
poet experiences the world around
him structures and is embodied in the
world of the text. In the act of reading,
the reader grasps the texture of being
which the poet lays bare for him. . . .
For Merleau-Ponty, the mobile body
touring and turning the object is the
vehicle which unfolds the world-as-
meaning because "the world is not
what I think, but what I live through."
... By examining some phenomenologi-
cal concepts — intentionality, bracket-
ing, reduction, and constitution — in
their philosophic context, we come to
understand them as they operate in
the world of the poem. Bracketing in
phenomenology is a suspension of all
theoretical knowledge (for example,
27rr of the circle), so that the object can
be experienced in its physiognomy
(here, its roundness), its appearing to
us as we commingle with it. This self-
emptying is an openness, readiness
for experience. ... In the temporal.
creative and perceptual process, which
is the unfolding of the poem, the poet/
perceiver, and incarnate unconscious-
ness characterized by a motor inten-
tionality, seizes the particulars around
him; and in his search for meaning as
that meaning comes to be, he "sings"
the world, (p. 4281-A)
The language of these definitions
represents something of the attitude
taken by researchers of a phenomeno-
logical orientation. Attitude is used
here in the phenomenological sense
as defined by Wagner (1970): "A gen-
eral posture or stance taken toward
larger spheres of life and interest, in-
cluding a particular style' of thinking,
for example: the common-sense atti-
tude; the scientific attitude" (p. 316).
In addition, these quotations introduce
some of the terms often favored by
phenomenologists, and, in some cases,
redefined by them. Their special use
of language has been so troublesome
to many readers that Wagner (1970)
appended a Glossary of Selected
Terms to his work on Alfred Schutz.
A few may be helpful to readers of
this paper:
Intentionality. The most basic charac-
teristic of consciousness: it is always
the consciousness of something; it is
directed toward something, (p. 318)
Eidetic approach. The main level of
phenomenological inquiry. It serves the
establishment of the "essential" fea-
tures and characteristics of concrete
objects of apperception. Eidetic fea-
tures of thought objects consist of gen-
eral meanings as constituted by cogni-
tive processes, (p. 317)
Phenomenological reduction. The
basic procedure of phenomenological
method. Through "bracketing" of all
judgments about the ontological na-
ture of the perceived objects, etc., and
by disregarding their uniqueness, that
which is given in cognitive experience
is reduced to the "essentials" of its
form. (p. 321)
Experience. The basic starting point
of all phenomenological considerations
is the essential actual, or immediately
vivid, experience, that is, the subjective.
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spontaneously flowing stream of ex-
perience in which the individual lives
and which, as a stream of conscious-
ness, carries with it spontaneous link-
ages, memory traces, etc., of other, prior,
experiences, (p. 318)
Meaning. The meaning of an experi-
ence is established, in retrospect,
through interpretation, (p. 320)
Constitution. The term refers to the
constitution of thought objects and
indicates the processes of clarification
of meaning, establishment of meaning
context, and mobilization of prior
knowledge concerning specific objects
of the ongoing conscious life. It is a
cumulative process in which the cog-
nitive results of repeated experiences
of the "same object" are deposited
("sedimented") in the mind. (p. 317)
Intersubjectivity. A category which,' in
general, refers to what is (especially
cognitively) common to various indi-
viduals. In daily life, a person takes the
existence of others for granted. He
reasons and acts on the self-under-
stood assumption that these others
are basically persons like himself, en-
dowed with consciousness and will,
desires, and emotions. The bulk of
one's ongoing life experiences con-
firms and reinforces the conviction
that, in principle and under "normal"
circumstances, persons in contact with
one another "understand" each other
at least to the degree to which they are
able to deal successfully with one an-
other, (p. 318)
The attitudes, and the language used
by the dissertation writers to express
those attitudes, may be considered to
represent a kind of intersubjectivity. A
likeness which is not surprising since
one of their shared experiences is read-
ing many of the same authors: Husserl,
Heidegger, Scheler, Kierkegaard, Mer-
leau-Ponty. Note the commonality of
orientation which may be observed
among the following four writers
across the diverse subject matters of
natural science, schizophrenia, curric-
ulum evaluation in social studies, and
aesthetics. Rouse (1977) described
observation within the context of re-
search in the natural sciences:
I begin by placing the practice of sci-
ence within the context of the prescien-
tific lifeworld. Science has an ambig-
uous relation to the world: it is an
activity taking place within the world,
but it also attempts to be a rigorous
and accurate description of that world
as a whole. Even this latter aspect of
science presupposes the existence of
the world as we experience it presci-
entifically. The world is experienced
prescientifically as the field within
which we act. I describe this experience
as being intersubjective, and as being
founded upon the experienced unity
of one's own active body. . . . The treat-
ment of observations as aspects of two
distinct concrete wholes, the perceived
world and the world constructed by the
scientific imagination, is the perceptual
manifestation of the ambiguous rela-
tion between science and the world.
The description I have given shows that,
for the scientist, the meaning of what
he observes is imbedded in the con-
text of his theoretical understanding of
the world, (p. 5531-A)
Larkin (1979) developed case studies
of the life-worlds of schizophrenics:
The primary purpose of this disserta-
tion was to bring to light the genesis
of one dimension of the Lebenswelt,
that of the schizophrenic. . . . based
on the assumption that schizophrenics
construct a way-of-being in the world
known as their project and live their
lives as defined by the project. ... A
second purpose was to generate a sub-
stantive theory, grounded in descrip-
tive data, of the schizophrenic's sub-
jective world. Utilizing the approach
of existential-phenomenological inquiry
the author identified and described
the themes of schizophrenia as they
appeared to the schizophrenic. The
core of the evolved theory was primar-
ily grounded in the data from 180 inter-
views with nine subjects. . . . The ques-
tions of what were the characteristics,
themes, and essential structures of
schizophrenia formed the basis for the
initial reflections of the schizophrenics'
descriptions of their Lebenswelt. (p.
7163-A)
Rothe (1979) explored existential phe-
nomenology as an approach to curric-
ulum evaluation in social studies:
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Existential phenomenological inquiry
assumes that individuals assign per-
sonal meanings to different situations
in which they are immersed. Meanings
that are usually hidden or taken-for-
granted by members of the everyday
world are made problematic in this
study. . . . Situational meanings are
grounded in the basic existential phe-
nomenological assumption that when
a teacher or student chooses a project
(seeing an act as complete), he has ex-
plainable reasons for having made a
choice in relation to his project. The
reasons suggest meanings a student
or teacher assigns to a dimension of
social studies. Interpretations based
on "passive, immediate, responsible
and transcendent areas of being" indi-
cate that students and teachers base
their everyday classroom activities on
hidden meanings. Once meanings were
uprooted, described and made avail-
able to teachers and students, both
groups took time to reflect upon them,
(p. 1846-A)
Drasky (1977) examined the existen-
tial and phenomenological aesthetics
of Natanson and Fallico:
Natanson emphasizes art as revelation
or symbol of the metaphysical con-
stants which are the foundation of our
world. Art cuts through the taken-for-
granted familiarity which obscures
everyday reality's limiting structure
and thus raises the metaphysical con-
stants to the sphere of explicit recogni-
tion. Fallico locates the fundamental
nature of art not in the revelation of the
basic truths and limiting constancies
of reality, but in unlimited self-expres-
sion of man's subjective being as un-
limited freedom, spontaneity, per-
sonality, and feeling, (p. 4881-A)
As one reads the writings of phe-
nomenological researchers with their
references to evolving and to begin-
ning with particular and concrete ex-
periences without knowing to what
conclusions those will lead, the way
in which many artists, typically, speak
of their work comes strongly to mind:
"About a year ago this shape began to
appear in my work." "My work started
changing about a month ago." Such
a stance is not restricted to the visual
arts. Witness Fowles' (1979) remarks:
"I do not plan my fiction anymore
than I normally plan woodland walks;
I follow the path that seems most prom-
ising at any given point, not some itin-
erary decided before entry" (p. 62).
Researchers inclined toward ques-
tions about people and their inter-
actions seem especially conscious of
what existentialists refer to as the
mysteries. They want to see the world
whole, but can be engulfed by its
seemingly Infinite vantages. For some
this problem is solved by employing
an observational system as a focus;
indeed, the title under which many of
these systems were compiled — Mir-
rors for Behavior (Simon & Boyer, 1974)
— is an analogy for their characteris-
tic structure. They reflect to the ob-
server those behaviors which occur
within the frame of the system. In
using the phenomenological method
a researcher may be thought of as
looking through a camera lens. The
researcher is responsible for appre-
hending what perceptions will be re-
corded and later for editing so as to
reveal those which are most charac-
teristic. Husserl conceived of his phe-
nomenological method as beginning
with the subjective and particular, but
by means of eidetic reduction, ab-
stracting essences which he believed
to be universal and intersubjective
(another way of saying objective). The
poet, Annie Dillard (1975), voiced this
faith when she advised: "If you can't
see the forest for the trees, then look
at the trees; when you've looked at
enough trees, you've seen a forest"
(p. 131). "Looking at the trees" is, of
course, why phenomenological re-
searchers speak so often of "every-
dayness." Everydayness is a condition
with which, by definition, we all are
very familiar. How we come to know
those trees as a forest can be by means
of the intentional cognitive act of
eidetic reduction.
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Students who have read the philos-
ophy of phenomenology often voice
confusion about how to translate the
method into practice. Again, it may
be helpful to examine some of the
descriptions of methodology which
appear in these abstracts. Perelman
(1977) related his procedures in study-
ing counselors:
The research examined each interview
in order to build a clear description of
the counselor's personal experience
of his counseling practice. First, he
separated the interview material into
meaning units, discrete and indepen-
dent statements which help reveal the
counselor's personal experience of
his counseling practice. From these
meaning units the researcher wrote
descriptions which were situated in
the personally lived experience of these
subjects. Each "situated description"
was shared with the subject for the
purpose of further clarification. Finally,
the researcher determined the under-
lying shared thematic structures within
all of the "situated descriptions" and
wrote a general description of the coun-
selor's personal experience of his coun-
seling, (p. 5258-A)
Seaward (1977) provided an outline
of the steps used in his process of
phenomenological explication:
I. Analysis on the Idiographic Level
A. Preliminary reading of the proto-
cols
B. Structural analysis
C. Fundamental description
D. Fundamental structure
E. Emergence of themes
II. Analysis on the Nomothetic Level
A. Compilation of Emergent Themes
B. Grouping by Intersubjectivity
C. Constituent Theme Development
D. Frequency and Percentage Rank-
ing (p. 6409-A)
Justin (1978) related that "There were
no customary hypotheses; instead the
investigator asked two open-ended
phenomenological questions. . . . From
the purpose of the study five themes
emerged. . . . These themes resulted
in the following interpretations" (p.
1106-A). Seamon (1977) reported:
The primary empirical data for this in-
quiry are a collection of experiential
observations gathered in the context
of four groups of people. . . . The study
attempts to synthesize and interpret
the over one-thousand observations
gathered in these environmental ex-
perience groups. Over time, these re-
ports organized themselves around
three primary themes which the author
has called movement, rest, and en-
counter, (p. 3726-A)
Morehouse (1979) wrote about the
implementor/observer:
The concept of implementor/observer
was developed out of an attempt to
evaluate a project which assisted teach-
ers and administrators in introducing
Gifted Education into schools in rural
Wisconsin. . .
. Strategies from qualita-
tive inquiry were used. . . . Some modi-
fication in the techniques and strate-
gies used by the participant/observer
were made. . . . Phenomenological epis-
temology provides the philosophical
basis for the development of the con-
cept of implementor/observer, as it did
for the development of the participant/
observer. Involvement, commitment,
and personal experience combine with
the specific techniques of observing,
recording, and documentation to en-
lighten intuition by critical reflection,
(p. 217-A)
The last sentence confronts us with
one of the problems in phenomenologi-
cal research. Most of us over a period
of time do feel some confidence
(whether misplaced or not) in assess-
ing such qualities as involvement and
commitment in people we have come
to know well, but how accurately are
we able to do so from someone's writ-
ing? Even more disturbing is the ques-
tion of how we are to separate such
judgments from the skillful presenta-
tion of the writer. In part this is an
aesthetic question and most of us
have learned intuitively that it is ap-
propriate to make distinctions be-
tween art objects and simply well-
made things. In another sense it is a
moral issue, and for those who would
contend that "authenticity" cannot be
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marketed, I ask you to consider Bette
Midler's comment in the current movie,
The Rose. In attempting to persuade
her manager to cut short her tour as a
rock singing star, she says, "I haven't
got the sincerity anymore."
Husserl conceived of an intersub-
jective transcendental community in
which subjective experience is com-
mon to other persons. In this concep-
tion, recognition would appear to be
the touchstone for judging such sub-
jective states. According to Husserl,
we validate judgments by evidential
experience. Sense-perception is one
type of such experience, but he re-
garded this as concerned with empiri-
cal matters of fact; essential or eidetic
intuition is the evidential experience
on which he based his phenomenol-
ogy and he believed this kind of ex-
perience made it possible for us to
know types, structures, and connec-
tions of meaning. (What protects us
from errors in judgment is not so
clear.) Husserl's interest centered on
cognitive experiences, but when Hei-
degger revived Kierkegaard's philos-
ophy into what would become existen-
tial phenomenology, his focus was on
experiences which are expressed in
poetry. Some of the authors of these
56 dissertations appear, in their ab-
stracts, to be following existential
phenomenology, and, perhaps, expect-
ing a poetic evaluation. The most
extreme example is Ashby's (1977)
"Stonehenge: A Phenomenology of
the Imagination." The abstract is a
poetic description of an imagined per-
sonal experience and is indexed under
religion, philosophy. The dilemma for
readers when presented with the ex-
pectation of a poetic evaluation is
that the format and organization of
a dissertation are not fundamentally
aesthetic, and neither is the intention-
ality which we bring to a piece of re-
search an aesthetic one. Indeed, Coles
(1978), in his provocative profile of
Walker Percy, suggested that one of
the reasons Percy began writing nov-
els rather than continuing to write
philosophical essays was that he
wanted to manifest his philosophical
notions in an aesthetic form rather
than to examine them as concepts in
a scholarly format.
Schutz (1970), in his work to syn-
thesize phenomenology and sociol-
ogy, gave considerable importance to
intersubjective understanding. He re-
garded typifications of behavior as
fundamental to our understanding the
actions of individuals. He used the
terms "Thou-orientation" and "We-
relationship" to describe the degree
of concreteness involved in our rela-
tions with others. He wrote, "When I
am They-oriented, I have 'types' for
partners" (p. 227). In this condition
we expect others to behave in definite
ways based on our typifications which
are constructed from our previous ex-
periences. However, in the "face-to-
face" situation of a We-relationship,
"The other is to me, and I am to the
other, not an abstraction, not a mere
instance of typical behavior, but, by
the very reason of our sharing a com-
mon vivid present, this unique in-
dividual personality in this unique
particular situation" (p. 289). It is
this condition which phenomenolo-
gists hope to achieve with those whom
they observe. However, even if it is
attained, readers can only know the
subjects of the studies through the
mediation of the writers, and, thus,
they are for them what Schutz called
"merely contemporaries."
Perhaps the troubling paradox of
intersubjectivity and uniqueness ema-
nates from a confusion between what
Coles (1978) refers to as the "journey"
and the "maps."
The French philosopher Gabriel Marcel
speaks of the need for us to go from
the concrete to the abstract and back
to the concrete: we are in a certain
situation — we want to know who we
are and whither we are going; we use
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our heads to find answers to those
questions, hence ideas get spelled out;
at some moment we find the beginning
of an answer, a direction; then we must
set out, and the journey is not to be
mistaken for the maps, charts, man-
uals, and books that tell us about the
journey, (pp. 68-69)
If this metaphor can be applied to
phenomenological research, it may be
helpful to think of the research experi-
ence as the journey and of the disser-
tation, or article, which grows from it
as the map of that journey. This allows
for the possibility of following these
"maps" when we want to know where
we are going, in a research sense;
however, each journey will have its
unique perambulations. What map can
tell us the speed at which we will
travel, the people we may encounter,
whether it will be raining, or the sun
will be shining? Such a view removes
some of the burden for achieving in-
tersubjectivity between readers and
writers of phenomenological research.
It does not, however, preclude the
possibility of false or poor maps. Ap-
parently, we have to begin the journey,
or to have made a similar journey, in
order to recognize these.
Piaget (1926) observed the remark-
able fluidity of the relationship be-
tween language and conceptions:
In verbal intercourse it would seem
that children do not understand each
other any better than they understand
us. The same phenomenon occurs be-
tween them as between them and us:
the words spoken are not thought of
from the point of view of the person
spoken to, and the latter, instead of
taking them at their face value, selects
them according to his own interest,
and distorts them in favour of previ-
ously formed conceptions. Conversa-
tion between children is therefore not
sufficient at first to take the speakers
out of their ego-centrism, because each
child, whether he is trying to explain
his own thoughts or to understand
those of others, is shut up in his own
point of view. The phenomenon occurs,
it is true, among adults. But these have
had at least some practice in argument
or conversation, and they know their
faults. They make an effort to under-
stand and be understood, unless in-
deed distrust or anger reduces them
to a childish state, because experience
has shown them the appalling density
of the human mind. Children have no
suspicion of all this. They think that
they both understand and are under-
stood, (pp. 98-99)
Piaget, in this passage, seems to share
Husserl's belief in the possibility of
intersubjectivity. I suspect that, even
among adults, understanding is taken
for granted more often than Piaget
suggests. However, quite a few phe-
nomenologists incorporate into the
research structures which they devise,
such procedures as Perelman's (1977)
sharing of his situated descriptions
with his subjects. These methods
strengthen the credibility of their
efforts to understand and be under-
stood.
For most of this century there have
been endeavors to apply the phenome-
nological philosophy in a methodol-
ogy. However, Poole (1972) went so
far as to charge that "Those who en-
gage in phenomenological reading
tend never to re-emerge as practition-
ers" (p. 132). He did make an excep-
tion for R. D. Laing. I suggest Robert
Coles as another exception. Despite
such pessimism, specific research ap-
plications of phenomenological proce-
dures exist in art education. Johnson
(1977) used the theoretical founda-
tions of Husserl, Schutz, and Mead in
her study of the social interaction be-
tween docents and children.
The methodology of the study was
derived from the phenomenological
method and participant observation.
The tape-recorded conversations from
sixteen school tours were transcribed
and edited, and then, described, re-
flected, and reflexively analyzed. These
conversations were examined to ascer-
tain the kinds of art knowledge being
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constructed during the tour. Also
sought were the methods by which the
docents made this knowledge plausible
to the children. Finally, the aesthetic
knowledge in these tours was exam-
ined for taken-for-g ranted assumptions.
(5857-A)
Table II illustrates the structure de-
vised by Godecke (1979) for her study
of learning in color photography. She
modelled the data analysis on Giorgi's
(1975) design. The pre-reflective-re-
flective base and the fundamental
description and fundamental struc-
ture were adapted from Colaizzi (1973);
the stimulated process recall was
adapted from Beittel (1973). Her sub-
jects participated in twelve weekly
thirty minute stimulated process re-
call meetings to which they brought
their contact print sheets and any en-
larged prints which they had made
from the contacts.
Beittel is the art educator most fre-
quently identified with phenomenol-
ogy, although I think he would want
to qualify this as hermeneutic phe-
nomenology. In Alternatives for Art
Education Researcli (1973) he pro-
posed methods which Kaelin (1974)
viewed as:
Procedures by which the bridge be-
tween the subjective and objective
qualities of expressive acts may be
constructed. It is for this reason that
his work is truly phenomenological.
The battery of techniques he suggests
)il is hoped to produce the "Roshomon
effect": if the events are told from
enough different but relevant points
i; of view, then one should be in a posi-
f tion to suspect what the truth of the
? story was. (p. 65)
A number of phenomenologically ori-
ented dissertations have been written
at The Pennsylvania State University as
a result of his influence. Burton (1973),
Folsom (1976), Novosel (1976), Pale-
ologos (1976), and Thompson (1974),
are examples.
For some of those engaged in it.
the promise of phenomenological re-
search is an almost redemptive qual-
ity. Levin's (1975) writing illustrates
this aspect:
The notion of self-evidence dedicates
phenomenology to this task: nothing
less than the dream of reversing that
decadence of meaning which Pinter's
'silences' so eloquently lament, and
regaining for humanity its own good
sense as its own. Through phenomenol-
ogy, we are offered the chance to rec-
ognize what is reflected in and, in
effect, released by, the evidence of our
intended objects: our most primitive
power to mean, our power to bestow
meaning. We are offered the chance,
finally, to re-cognize ourselves, (pp.
76-77)
I am content to rest the value of phe-
nomenology in Elliston's (1975) con-
clusion of his attempt to integrate
the Husserlian and Heideggerian phe-
nomenologies of the other. He ended
"with a plea for a philosophical plural-
ism which respects the Fichtean sense
in which the kind of philosophy one
chooses depends on the kind of man
one is" (p. 6164-A). I would add that
the kind of questions people ask de-
termines the kinds of methodologies
they choose in the sense in which
Coles (1978) argues for the validity
of more than one way of knowing:
Percy also showed how the assertive-
ness of all too many natural scientists
(one cannot even begin to discuss in
the same breath the dogmatism of so-
cial scientists) is derived from an illu-
sion — the illusion of certainty, of
knowledge that is sure. And he tried
to indicate that the "existentialist"
viewpoint
. . . need not be opposed to
the empirical or rational position. For
one thing, we go about trying to affirm
ourselves in ways that can be observed
and studied, (p. 85)
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SCIENCE AND AESTHETICS
Milton H. Snoeyenbos
Georgia State University
Abstract
In this paper nine arguments against
the possibility or plausibility of a viable
program of scientific aesthetics are
critically assessed. Arguments dis-
cussed focus on the following topics:
the status and relevance of low-level
aesthetic generalizations, the com-
plexity of aesthetic phenomena and
simplification inherent in the experi-
mental situation, the plausibility of
developing adequate aesthetic the-
ories, explanation and prediction of
aesthetic reactions and preferences,
and creative activity. I conclude that
the arguments discussed are not logi-
cally persuasive, and that scientific
aesthetics constitutes a viable re-
search program.
Aesthetics and Science
Although considerable effort has been
devoted to the development of scien-
tific aesthetics since the publication
of Fechner's Vorschule der Aesthetik,
this research program has been the
target of numerous criticisms. Some
of the criticisms are of philosophical
origin and aim at establishing that sci-
entific aesthetics is impossible, im-
plausible, or irrelevant to aesthetics
proper (Dickie, 1962; Wittgenstein,
1966; Carmichael, 1976). Other criti-
cisms reflect the current dispute over
psychology's scientific status (Koch,
1971; Gergen, 1973; Finkelman, 1978);
if psychology is not properly classed
as a science, then psychological find-
ings in the domain of aesthetics cannot
be given scientific status. Finally, some
psychologists argue that the findings
of scientific aesthetics are trivial or
insignificant; Lindauer, for example,
claims "the experimental approach
and treatment of the problems of the
arts, conducted in a laboratory setting
where the relevant dimensions are iso-
lated and manipulated under con-
trolled conditions, is unproductive,
trivial, and without significance to the
essential questions and theories of
art" (1973, p. 460). This paper takes
up nine arguments to the conclusion
that a scientific aesthetics is impos-
sible, implausible, or yields trivial re-
sults: (1) specification of a low-level
generalization is necessary for the sci-
entific explanation of an event, but
there are no such aesthetic general-
izations; (2) even if we could attain
low-level aesthetic generalizations it
would be odd to say they explain spe-
cific aesthetic reactions or responses;
(3) prediction is essential to science,
but, in the absence of low-level general-
izations, predictions in the aesthetic
domain cannot be attained; (4) since
there is no homogeneity to the class
of aesthetic reactions or preferences,
any generalization proposed would be
falsified; (5) the complexity of aesthetic
phenomena effectively precludes em-
ployment of the scientific testing tech-
nique in which we vary an independent
variable under controlled conditions
and observe changes in the dependent
variable; (6) the simplification inher-
ent in the controlled experiment re-
sults in focusing on isolated, arbitrary
or trivial aspects of aesthetic phe-
nomena; (7) since there are no estab-
lished low-level aesthetic generaliza-
tions, there is nothing to be accounted
for by a higher level aesthetic theory;
(8) even if we had established low-level
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aesthetic generalizations, it is hard to
imagine what sort of theory could be
said to account for them; (9) although
much of human activity can be under-
stood within a problem-solving frame-
work, artistic creativity is not a species
of problem solving. I argue that none
of these arguments is logically persua-
sive and that scientific aesthetics con-
stitutes a viable research program.
Argument 1
Science is essentially concerned with
the explanation of particular facts or
events. To explain an event is to derive
a statement describing it from other
true empirical statements, at least one
of which must be a low-level general-
ization (LLG). Thus, specification of a
LLG is necessary for the scientific
explanation of an observable event.
However, there are no homogeneous
cross-cultural samples of aesthetic
reactions to objects, e.g., no unanimity
of preferences or aesthetic judgments.
Hence, we cannot attain low-level aes-
thetic generalizations (LLAGs). From
this it follows that aesthetic reactions
cannot be scientifically explained.
This argument can be directed
against either the possibility or plaus-
ibility of establishing LLAGs. If it is
directed against the possibility of es-
tablishing LLAGs, the argument begs
the question or commits the fallacy
of ignorance. Since psychological aes-
thetics has been a somewhat ne-
glected research domain, we cannot
merely assume there are no homoge-
neous cross-cultural samples of aes-
thetic reactions, for doing so begs the
issue against the possibility of es-
tablishing LLAGs. The commonplace
claim that taste reigns in aesthetic
matters is reason for initial skepticism
with respect to scientific aesthetics.
However, if adopted a priori, it makes
an idol of our ignorance. Even if it
were true that no LLAGs have been
established, this might merely reflect
our present inability to establish them.
However, in order to avoid setting up
a straw man against the anti-theorist,
let us assume that his argument is in-
ductive and intended to prove the im-
plausibility of establishing LLAGs, i.e.,
(Pi) Numerous attempts have been
made to establish LLAGs, (P2) No at-
tempt to establish LLAGs has been
successful, hence, (C) It is probable
that LLAGs cannot be established.
The questionable premise here is
P2. If we regard a LLAG as a universal
generalization (ULLAG) expressing
the preference reactions or aesthetic
judgments of people to complex art-
works, then, since there are no cur-
rently accepted ULLAGs with respect
to such objects, P2 seems true. In fact,
there do not seem to be ULLAGs with
respect to preferences for simple stim-
uli such as colors, tones or shapes.
For any proposed ULLAG there seem
to be negative instances. However, this
fact is not sufficient to establish P2, for
it is statistical generalizations (SLLGs)
which one expects to find in the initial
stages of research in any social sci-
ence. Hence, the question is whether
there are significant SLLAGs.
Let us first examine preference ex-
periments dealing with simple stimuli.
H. J. Eysenck's (1940, 1941, 1957, 1968,
1971) research program using simple
polygons, colors and odors provides
strong evidence for the existence of a
general factor and a bipolar factor in
the preference judgments of British
subjects. Eysenck argues that this
general factor extends over all the
sense modalities, is in part dependent
upon objective stimulus properties,
and is independent of teaching and
tradition. He hypothesizes that it is
biologically based and derives from
the nature of the nervous system.
When the influence of the general
factor is eliminated in analysis of the
data, a bipolar factor emerges which
is attributable to personality and/or
learning.
Three important questions emerge
from Eysenck's research based upon
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British subjects and simple stimuli:
(a) Is there transcultural evidence for
such a general factor using simple
stimuli? (b) Is there evidence for a
similar general factor using subjects
from one culture and complex art-
works or aesthetic objects as stimuli?
And if there are general preference
orders for simple and complex stimuli,
how are they related? (c) Is there
transcultural evidence of a general
factor using complex artworks or aes-
thetic objects as stimuli?
With respect to (a), using simple
color patches Eysenck (1941) finds
there is significant agreement among
Whites and Blacks, East Indians, Japa-
nese, Chinese and Mexicans. He also
shows by a re-analysis of previous
data, which seemed to indicate that
there is no order of preference for
colors, that the data actually support
the hypothesis of a biologically based
order of color preference. Recent
transcultural studies using polygons
also support the conclusion that such
a general factor is biologically based.
A comparison of British and Japanese
subjects (Eysenck & Iwawaki, 1971)
reveals that cultural relativity is largely
absent when polygons are used as
stimuli. A study of British and Egyptian
subjects reveals considerable evi-
dence against the hypothesis that
there are large cultural differences
in preferences for polygonal figures
(Soueif & Eysenck, 1971). This type
of data supports Pratt's claim that
"In the field of sensory dimensions —
colors, brightness, pitch, loudness,
odors, tastes, pressures, temperatures,
etc. — the uniformities of judgement,
under controlled conditions of labo-
ratory observation, are so high that
the question as to whether they are
absolute or relative has long since
ceased to exist as a serious problem
in psychophysics. The judgements are
stable, verifiable and repeatable . . ."
(1956, p. 8).
Question (b) is important because
holistic aestheticians often deny that
preference judgments with respect to
simple stimuli are relevant to prefer-
ences for complex artworks. There is
surprisingly scant data with respect
to this issue, but some support for an
atomistic hypothesis. Granger's re-
search (1955a, 1955b, 1955c) indicates
that there is a general order of prefer-
ence for intervals along each dimen-
sion of color: hue, saturation and
brightness. He demonstrates that pref-
erences for quite complex color com-
binations can be accurately predicted
on the basis of component prefer-
ences and the interval between com-
ponents. Furthermore, Granger argues
that scores on such color tests have
predictive value with regard to tests
involving preferences for abstract aes-
thetic designs. Eysenck (1941, 1957)
also finds a positive correlation be-
tween preferences for a set of satu-
rated hues and preferences for repro-
ductions of artworks. Furthermore, in
experimenting with simple polygons,
complex designs, and artworks, he
finds (1940) a general factor in each
of eighteen tests, and argues that the
factors are not test specific, but gen-
eral from test to test. Thus, with re-
spect to British subjects, there is some
evidence for the atomistic hypothesis,
and evidence for a general factor in
preference for complex aesthetic ob-
jects.
Regarding question (c), the data are
scant and the results somewhat mixed.
Early research seemed to point to the
conclusion that preference reactions
to artworks are culturally and not bio-
logically based. McElroy (1952) re-
ported little agreement between Aus-
tralian whites and aborigines, and
Lawlor (1955) found no significant
agreement between African and Brit-
ish subjects. However, Lawlor's sample
was quite small, and Berlyne, Robbins
.and Thompson (1974) have recently
reported significant similarities in the
responses of Ugandan and Canadian
subjects to complex visual patterns.
Similarly, Morris (1956) finds consider-
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able agreement among Indians, Chi-
nese and Americans with respect to
preferences for paintings. Machotka
(1963) reports significant preference
agreement between American and
French children. Using designs, Ey-
senck and Iwawaki (1971) find con-
siderable similarity in the preferences
of British and Japanese subjects. Fi-
nally, Berlyne (1976) reports cross-
cultural similarities in the preference
responses of Indian and Canadian sub-
jects to artworks.
The recent work of Irvin Child also
indicates statistically significant trans-
cultural agreement in aesthetic judg-
ments. Child's research focuses on
the preferences and/or judgments of
art experts or connoisseurs with re-
spect to complex artworks. He argues
that there are personality attributes
that characterize connoisseurs, so that
we have an independent, non-circular
way of specifying this class, and then
investigates whether connoisseurs
agree in aesthetic preference and/or
judgment. Within specific cultures
Child finds that "agreement is demon-
strable by statistical analysis, and is
such that averaging the opinion of a
group of connoisseurs can give, for
works varying widely in merit, an ex-
tremely stable standard" (1969, p. 882).
Child has also conducted extensive
transcultural studies of the aesthetic
reactions of connoisseurs. A study
(Child & Siroto, 1965) using BaKwele
masks revealed statistically significant
agreement among African and Ameri-
can experts. Using artworks, signifi-
cant agreement was also found among
American experts and: Islamic experts
(Anwar & Child, 1972), Japanese pot-
ters (Iwao & Child, 1966; Iwao, Child &
Garcia, 1969), Fijian artisans, and
Greek craftsmen (Ford, Prothro &
Child, 1966).
Thus, there is evidence that prefer-
ence orders with respect to artworks
extend across cultural boundaries. We
have significant transcultural SLLAGs
regarding preferences for both simple
stimuli and complex artworks. The
data are by no means conclusive, but
they are sufficient to undercut the a
priori assertion of many philosophers
that aesthetic preferences are obvi-
ously culture-relative and solely the
result of training. Hence, on the whole,
there seems to be no reason to accept
argument (1) against the program of
scientific aesthetics. Of course, the
SLLAGs obtained could perhaps be
accounted for by the hypothesis that
transcultural preference agreement is
merely the result of cross-cultural in-
fluences. Eysenck (1957, pp. 315-24),
however, finds strong evidence that
preference agreement is biologically
based, a conclusion reinforced by
Peckham (1965; 1969). And Child,
whose research is carefully designed
to avoid the factor of cultural influ-
ence, proposes that the basis for
transcultural agreement is "the inde-
pendent discovery, by people in dif-
fering cultural traditions, of similar
facts about the adequacy of particular
works for satisfying aesthetic inter-
ests" (Iwao & Child, 1966, p. 33). On
the whole, then, there are SLLAGs in
aesthetic preference and judgment,
which undercuts argument (1), and
the available evidence favors the hy-
pothesis that the agreement found is
psychobiologically based.
Argument 2
A particular physical fact is explained
by reference to a LLG of, say, physics
or chemistry. But, even if we could
specify LLAGs, there would be some-
thing odd about the claim that LLAGs
explain aesthetic reactions or prefer-
ences. It would be odd to claim to have
explained a person's reaction of dis-
gust to a painting by stating that all
or most people react to it with disgust.
This argument grants that we do,
or could, have LLAGs, but questions
whether they provide explanations.
Although we do not at present have
16 Milton H. Snoeyenbos
established ULLAGs, let us assume
their availability. Then, if we accept
the standard empiricist law-deduc-
tive model of scientific explanation,
ULLAGs do explain aesthetic reactions.
If all people have aesthetic reaction
X to object O, and P is a person, this
entails that P has reaction X to object
O. On this account, to explain the oc-
currence of an event is simply to de-
rive a statement describing it from
other true empirical statements, in-
cluding a ULLG. In the aesthetic ex-
ample the pattern of explanation is
no different from the deductive deriva-
tion of "This metal contracts when
cooled," from "All metals contract
when cooled," and "This is a metal."
However, there is some plausibility
to the claim of Wittgenstein (1966) and
others that, even if we possessed
ULLAGs, it would be odd to say that
they explained a particular aesthetic
reaction of a particular person. It
would seem odd to say that the fact
that all people prefer 0^ over O2, and
the fact that P is a person, explains
why P prefers 0^ over O2. However,
there is no reason to think that scien-
tific aesthetics differs from physics in
this respect, for some philosophers of
science claim that the explanation of
particular facts plays no role in the-
oretical science. For example, Alston
(1971) argues it would be odd to claim
that, the fact that metals contract
when cooled, and the fact that this is
a metal, explains why this metal con-
tracts when cooled. He allows that
scientists are concerned with particu-
lar facts or events when they test a
ULLG. Thus, "Metals contract when
cooled," is tested by cooling, say, an
iron bar and observing whether it con-
tracts. However, in testing a ULLG, the
scientist does not explain the fact that
this iron bar contracts when cooled;
he only has to observe that it is a metal
and that it contracts when cooled. To
test the ULLG he notes whether the
variables are instantiated; he does not
explain why a particular event oc-
curred.
Although science undoubtedly has
an explanatory role (and we will take
this up in discussing arguments (3),
(4), (6), and (8)) it does not, on
this account, explain particular facts.
Hence, while it would be odd for the
aesthetician to utilize a ULLAG to ex-
plain why a particular person reacted
with disgust to a painting, it would be
equally odd for a chemist to explain
why a particular piece of litmus turned
blue when exposed to ammonia in
terms of the ULLG that all litmus turns
blue when exposed to a base.
The upshot is that, if there are
ULLAGs, the defender of argument
(2) faces a dilemma. Particular facts
are or are not explained by ULLGs.
If we accept the standard empiricist
account of explanation, then ULLAGs
do explain particular aesthetic facts.
On the other hand, if we allow that
ULLGs do not explain particular facts,
then ULLAGs do not explain particu-
lar aesthetic facts. But this does not
preclude the enterprise of scientific
aesthetics unless we wish to allow
that the enterprise of physics is pre-
cluded because the ULLGs of physics
do not explain particular physical
facts.
Let us now consider argument (2)
under the assumption that we possess
SLLAGs, but not ULLAGs. If the claim
is that SLLAGs do not explain (in the
sense of deductively entail) statements
about particular facts, this is, of
course, true. From 'Most people pre-
fer O1 over O2," and "P is a person,"
we cannot deductively derive "P pre-
fers O1 over O2." Statistical syllogisms
confer only inductive probability on
their conclusions. It has been claimed
that such inductive accounts are not
genuine explanations, but if we accept
this alternative we shall have to allow
that the statistical generalizations of
quantum mechanics and statistical
mechanics do not provide us with
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genuine explanations. Furthermore,
SLLGs are predominant in the social
sciences, and it certainly seems rea-
sonable to assert that, say, Durk-
heim's SLLG linking suicide with so-
cial classes and types inductively ex-
plains why a particular person com-
mitted suicide. Again, there seems to
be parity between scientific aesthetics
and other accepted sciences.
Let us also note that, although a
statistical syllogism having a conclu-
sion about a particular fact and a SLLG
as a premise is inductive, there are de-
ductively valid arguments containing
SLLGs as premises. If it is true that 22
percent of all Americans will develop
a cancer, and true that there are 200
million Americans, then it is true that
44 million Americans will develop a
cancer. Of course, it does not follow
that if Jones is an American, he will
develop a cancer. What is deductively
explained is not a particular event, but
rather, what has been called a "mass"
or "aggregate" event. Accordingly,
we could agree with the defender of
argument (2) that SLLAGs do not ex-
plain particular events, but claim that
they do deductively explain aesthetic
aggregate events.
Finally, the defender of argument
(2) might claim that, just as in the case
of ULLAGs, it would be odd to say that
SLLAGs explain either particular or
aggregate aesthetic facts. Again, we
could allow with Alston that SLLAGs
do not explain particular facts, but
claim that scientific aesthetics is on a
par with the other sciences employing
SLLGs. That is, we could allow that
the psychologist is concerned with
particular facts when he tests the
SLLG "Frustration tends to produce
aggression," but acknowledge that,
in testing a SLLG, we do not explain
particular facts.
In short, if we accept the standard
empiricist account of explanation, ac-
cording to which SLLGs enter into the
inductive explanation of paj-ticular
facts, or the deductive explanation of
aggregate facts, then, given that we
have SLLAGs, there is no reason to
think that scientific aesthetic explana-
tions do not fit these patterns. On the
other hand, if the argument is that
SLLAGs do not enter into explanations
of particular facts, it is not because
of the aesthetic character of such
SLLAGs, for the same claim can be
made with respect to any standardly
accepted SLLG in any branch of sci-
ence.
Argument 3
Prediction is essential to science, and
rests on our having LLGs. In the ab-
sence of established LLAGs, prediction
of aesthetic reactions, preferences, or
judgments cannot be attained.
This argument can be met in either
of two ways, depending on whether we
regard prediction as essential to sci-
ence. According to the standard em-
piricist account of scientific method,
prediction is essential to science.
Whenever we test a LLG we make a
prediction based on the law and then
see if the facts turn up as expected.
If what is predicted obtains, the law is
confirmed; if not, it is disconfirmed.
Now if, as I have argued, there are
LLAGs, and if we accept this model
of scientific method, then there is
every reason to think that aesthetic
reactions are predictable. In fact, we
noted that Eysenck and Granger claim
predictive power for their LLAGs.
On the other hand, predictive ade-
quacy is less central to the concep-
tion of scientific methodology that
has recently been advanced by peo-
ple such as Kuhn (1962), Feyerabend
(1962), Sellars (1963), Harman (1965)
and Chomsky (1965). On this view we
can infer, from the fact that a theory
would best explain a LLG, that the
theory is true. That a theory provides
the "best explanation" of a LLG turns
on considerations such as simplicity,
explanatory scope and unifying power.
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Hence, it is LLGs, and not particular
facts, that the scientist seeks to ex-
plain. But theories do not explain
LLGs by entailing them, as the stan-
dard account would have it, for if a
theory is true the LLGs explained are,
strictly speaking, false. Thus, the gen-
eral gas law is false, in the strict sense,
if the kinetic theory is true. Now, if
entailment is not necessary for sci-
entific explanation, then prediction,
which on the standard empiricist ac-
count of science is symmetric with
explanation and also based on entail-
ment, may be somewhat beside the
point. For example, both Uranus and
Mercury were found to deviate from
positions predicted by Newtonian me-
chanics. Yet neither case itself led to
a rejection of Newton's theory. In the
case of Uranus, an auxiliary hypothe-
sis was successfully appealed to, and
the deviation explained. In the case
of Mercury such appeals were unsuc-
cessful. However, even this lack of
success did not imperil Newton's the-
ory until a "better" theory was devised,
for, on this conception of scientific
method, any theory fits any set of data
more or less adequately. Thus, the-
ories are supplanted by better theories,
and not simply rejected on the basis
of false predictions. On this account
of scientific method, predictive ade-
quacy is not essential. If we accept this
account, we cannot place a require-
ment on scientific aesthetics that does
not obtain in the case of physics.
Argument 4
The explanation itself constitutes a
test of a scientific LLG. If the event de-
scribed by the explanation occurs un-
der appropriate conditions, the LLG is
confirmed; if not, the LLG is falsified.
Since there is no homogeneity to the
class of aesthetic reactions, prefer-
ences or judgments, any LLAG pro-
posed would be falsified.
A line of reasoning similar to that
deployed against argument (3) is suf-
ficient to undercut argument (4). On
the one hand, if, as psychologists
have argued, there is some homoge-
neity to the class of aesthetic reac-
tions, so that we can devise LLAGs,
and if we accept the standard empiri-
cist account of scientific method, then
certain LLAGs proposed will be con-
firmed and others disconfirmed or fal-
sified. Of course if all we have are
SLLAGs, and our explanations are in-
ductive, then no particular fact will
falsify the SLLAGs. But, if we allow
the deductive explanation of aggre-
gate aesthetic facts, then SLLAGs are
falsifiable. On the other hand, if we
accept the newer account of scientific
method, according to which entail-
ment is not necessary for scientific
explanation, then, strictly speaking,
no data conclusively falsify a theory
of either physics or scientific aes-
thetics. Hence, on either conception
of scientific method, scientific aes-
thetics is on a par with physics.
Argument 5
The complexity of psychological-aes-
thetic phenomena effectively pre-
cludes employment of the scientific
testing technique in which we vary an
independent variable under controlled
conditions and observe changes in the
dependent variable. But this testing
technique is standardly used in the
accepted sciences, and is necessary
for a discipline to be classed as scien-
tific; therefore, "scientific" aesthetics
is not really a science.
It should be noted, however, that
the experimental method is effec-
tively employed in aesthetics; the
work of Eysenck (1940, 1941, 1957,
1968, 1971) and Berlyne (1971), for
example, is based upon employment
of this method. Starting from the study
of simple stimuli, they progress to
more complex situations, with impor-
tant results obtained. So it is false that
the experimental method is inappli-
cable to aesthetic contexts.
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In addition, in discussing this argu-
ment it is important to distinguish
methodological issues from questions
of testing technique. The former per-
tain to the logic of justification, i.e.,
the general basis for acceptance or
rejection of a hypothesis. On the stan-
dard empiricist conception of scien-
tific method, testability is methodo-
logically necessary for a discipline to
be considered scientific; if a hypothe-
sis is in principle untestable, it is not
scientific. But the methodological re-
quirement of testability does not en-
tail that there is just one technique
of observation or one technique of
experimental testing for science. What
works as a testing technique in sub-
atomic physics may not work in as-
tronomy. Of course, where the subject
is amenable to it, the experimental
method is preferred. But astronomy
is not amenable to the controlled
laboratory experiment. Since astron-
omy is a science, experimentation un-
der controlled laboratory conditions
is not necessary for a discipline to be
scientific. Furthermore, in cases where
the controlled experiment cannot be
employed, hypotheses involving paral-
lel processing, bidirectional relations,
and feedback loops are now being
widely employed to represent the mul-
tivariate complexity of many psycho-
logical systems, and techniques are
being devised to test such hypotheses
(Campbell, 1969; McGuire, 1973; Cook
and Campbell, 1979). Therefore, al-
though complexity may preclude the
successful employment of simple test-
ing techniques, it does not preclude
testability. Thus, testability is neces-
sary for a discipline to be scientific,
but no particular testing technique is
necessary and hence, if some areas of
psychological aesthetics require test-
ing techniques more complex than
the traditional experiment, it does not
follow that the discipline lacks scien-
tific status.
Argument 6
The simplification inherent in the ex-
perimental situation results in a focus
on isolated, arbitrary or trivial aspects
of aesthetic phenomena. LLAGs may
result, but they are insignificant. |
Again, this criticism unwarrantedly '
assumes that science is restricted to
simple linear process hypotheses and
simple testing techniques involving
manipulation of an independent vari-
able. But it is also important to note
that use of such techniques does not
itself entail insignificance. In one
sense a term is scientifically signifi-
cant (or significanti) only if its refer-
ent is connected in a law-like way with
other facts (Spence, 1948; Rudner,
1966, pp. 79-83; Brodbeck, 1968, pp.
6-9). Since we cannot determine a
priori whether terms have signifi-
cance!, we must test hypotheses con-
taining them, and the traditional labo-
ratory experiment is one of several
testing techniques that may be em-
ployed. To test a hypothesis we must
be able to tell whether its terms apply,
and this requires that they be defined.
Definition does not guarantee signifi-
cance!, but vague or imprecise terms
give us laws that are not adequately
testable. Precision in definition is
necessary, but not sufficient, for sig-
nificance!. Furthermore, precise spec-
ification of scientific terms typically
requires the abstraction of certain fea-
tures from particular events. Laws
mention repeatable features of ob-
jects; particular events are unrepeat-
able. Any sort of testing technique
will, therefore, abstract from, or "sim-
plify," a particular event. But this does
not entail that the phenomena studied
are isolated, arbitrary, or trivial in the
sense of being insignificant!.
Scientists frequently "simplify" by
focusing on molecular rather than
molar phenomena, and the latter are
often thought to be more important,
20 Milton H. Snoeyenbos
meaningful, or valuable (i.e., signifi-
cant2) than the former. In this sense
the critics may be correct in claiming
that some significanti molecular facts
are insignificant2. However, a molecu-
lar approach typically has an explana-
tory aim; the hope is to provide a
"deep" explanation of molar facts or
laws (a molar fact is an observable
fact, a molar law is a LLG) in terms of
molecular laws, as the kinetic theory
explains molar gas behavior. Estab-
lished molecular theories not only
functionally relate significanti molecu-
lar facts, they may enable us to explain
significant2 molar facts. Explanations
based on significanti molecular facts
are themselves significant2 for the
understanding of molar phenomena.
Given significanti facts in the mo-
lecular domain of a discipline, there
is of course no a priori guarantee of
a connection between them and sig-
nificant2 molar facts; and if there is
no connection, the molecular facts
may well be regarded as insignificant2.
There may not even be significanti
facts at the molecular level. The hy-
potheses and testing techniques of
science are not, however, restricted
to the molecular level. Scientists wel-
come laws wherever they find them,
and molar as well as molecular laws
may have significancei. Molar laws
do not enable us to provide the deep
explanations of molar facts that we
get from molecular theories, but, if
successfully established, they do en-
able us to predict molar facts (Alston,
1971), and this is significant2. The
molar gas laws, for example, had pre-
dictive significance2 long before for-
mulation of the kinetic theory. The
theory, connecting significanti molec-
ular facts, eventually provided a sig-
nificant2 explanation of significanti,
2
molar laws.
In conclusion, then, established mo-
lar or molecular laws have signifi-
cancei, molecular laws may have ex-
planatory significance2, and, if we
accept the standard empiricist ac-
count of science, molar laws may have
predictive significance2; and since
the traditional experiment involving
manipulation of an independent vari-
able is one way of testing certain types
of hypotheses, it follows that use of
that technique in aesthetic contexts
does not entail "insignificance" in
either sense of the term.
Argument 7
The LLGs of science are themselves
explained in terms of theories or laws
about hypothesized micro-phenom-
ena. Since there are no established
LLAGs, there is nothing to be ac-
counted for by a higher level aes-
thetic theory.
This argument — we can introduce
higher level theories to explain LLAGs
only if there are LLAGs, but there are
no LLAGs; thus, we cannot introduce
higher level aesthetic theories — is
valid but unsound if there are, as the
evidence cited in our discussion of
argument (1) indicates, established
LLAGs.
Argument 8
Eve.n if we have established LLAGs,
what sort of aesthetic theory could be
introduced to explain them? What
sorts of laws about theoretical entities
could be said to account for LLAGs as
the kinetic theory accounts for the
general gas law?
These questions amount to a chal-
lenge rather than a criticism. Given
the establishment of LLAGs it is, of
course, incumbent on theorists to pro-
vide adequate theories. In this con-
text, the following remarks of Chomsky
are relevant to aesthetics as well as
to language: "We must recognize that
even the most familiar phenomena re-
quire explanation and that we have
no privileged access to the underly-
ing mechanisms, no more so than in
physiology or physics. Only the most
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preliminary and tentative hypotheses
can be offered concerning the nature
of language, its use, and its acquisi-
tion. As native speakers, we have a
vast amount of data available to us.
For just this reason it is easy to fall
into the trap of believing that there is
nothing to be explained, that what-
ever organizing principles and under-
lying mechanisms may exist must be
'given' as the data is given. Nothing
could be further from the truth . . ."
(1968, p. 23).
Now, in one sense, we also have a
great amount of aesthetic data avail-
able to us. But the data appear to be
very heterogeneous, since they en-
compass our intercourse with litera-
ture, music, the plastic arts, dance,
etc., as well as natural objects. Hence,
in another sense, the recent establish-
ment of transcultural LLAGs by psy-
chologists such as Eysenck, Berlyne
and Child gives us the first hard data
to work with, that is, the first data that
cannot be attributed solely to cultural
convention and training. Given such
transcultural LLAGs, we can not only
proceed to the development of ex-
planatory theories to account for the
data, we also have a basis for testing
our theories. We can grant that much
of experimental aesthetics to this point
has consisted merely in establishing
that there are data to be theoretically
explained. Given that data, aestheti-
cians can begin to ask the significant
theoretical questions in advance of
further experimentation.
In developing explanatory theories,
we should take into consideration
the fact that aesthetic preference and
judgment data are not the only psycho-
logical data we possess. We noted that
Child finds significant transcultural
agreement in the aesthetic judgments
of connoisseurs. In another important
contribution (1965), he finds signifi-
cant correlations between the aes-
thetic judgment of American connois-
seurs and personality variables such
as tolerance of complexity and ambi-
guity, a tendency toward inclusive em-
ployment of attention, general inde-
pendence of judgment, regression in
service of the ego, an interest in ex-
ploring the possibilities of experience,
and an interest in perceiving an object
rather than assessing it. Furthermore, |
the personality characteristics of "
American connoisseurs are signifi-
cantly similar to those of connoisseurs
from different cultures. Hence, it is
reasonable to conclude that aesthetic
judgment is not culturally based or
merely the result of training, but is to
be accounted for, at least in part, on
the basis of personality theory. One
hypothesis, then, is that there are cer-
tain psychobiological aesthetic needs.
Indeed, Machotka has recently ad-
vanced such an hypothesis: "It seems
to me that there is good reason to sup-
pose a need for good form. On bio-
logical grounds, one needs to recog-
nize that form in the sense of physical
attraction is ubiquitous in the human
psyche..." (1976, p. 115). Machotka
also discusses a number of theoreti-
cal constructs such as indirect need
discharge, symbolic need satisfaction,
ego-defense support, and the need for
varied experience, as plausible bases
for accounting for aesthetic prefer-
ences. It is along these lines that we
may be able to develop a theoretical
account of aesthetic preference data.
Argument 9
Although various sorts of human ac-
tivity can be regarded as species of
rational problem solving, artistic activ-
ity cannot be understood in this man-
ner. In fact, artistic activity cannot be
scientifically understood; as Carmich-
ael puts it: "on the one side [i.e., the
scientific] everything is open, prede-
terminate, exactly repeatable; on the
other [the artistic], everything is purely
aesthetic: dramatically, lyrically intui-
tive" (1976, p. 404).
The problem here is that artistic
activity can also be fruitfully regarded
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as a species of problem solving. How-
ard Gardner (1971), for example, dis-
tinguishes two aspects of a problem
— conceptualization of relevant fac-
tors and execution in a medium — and
argues that problems associated with
the sciences characteristically empha-
size conceptualization, whereas prob-
lems associated with the arts typically
emphasize execution in a medium.
Rather than dichotomizing scientific
and artistic activity, this account
stresses the continuity among various
sorts of problem solving activities.
Furthermore, the question of why cer-
tain people are artistically creative is
a psychological question. We do know
that creative artists differ from con-
trol groups along a number of person-
ality dimensions (Barron and Welsh,
1952; Child, 1965, 1969, 1972; McWhin-
nie, 1971). Whether certain motives,
interests or needs are common to crea-
tive artists, or creative people in gen-
eral, is an open, but factual, issue.
I conclude that the nine arguments
discussed do not preclude a science
of aesthetics. Arguments (1), (3), (4)
and (7), based on the claim that we
cannot attain LLAGs, are invalid be-
cause we do have LLAGs with respect
to aesthetic preference and aesthetic
judgment. The recent transcultural
findings of Eysenck, Child, and others,
provide strong evidence against the
claim that aesthetic preference and
judgment are solely the products of
training and therefore culturally rela-
tive. Argument (2) does not rule out
scientific aesthetics because, with re-
spect to the issue of explanation, aes-
thetics is on an exact par with physics.
Against argument (5) we found that,
although the complexity of some aes-
thetic phenomena may preclude use
of the traditional experiment, no par-
ticular testing technique is necessary
for a discipline to have scientific sta-
tus. In those cases where the tradi-
tional experiment is applicable, we
argued against argument (6), that its
use does not entail that the results
obtained will be either scientifically
insignificanti or insignificanta in the
sense of being unimportant to us as
humans. Argument (8) is not persua-
sive because we not only have LLAGs
regarding aesthetic preferences, we
also have low-level correlations be-
tween preferences and personality
characteristics. Thus, it is a reason-
able hypothesis that aesthetic prefer-
ences may, in part, be theoretically
explained on the basis of personality
theory. Finally, against argument (9),
we indicated that artistic activity may
be fruitfully regarded as a species of
problem solving activity. And the ques-
tion of why certain people create art-
works is largely a question for person-
ality theory. Thus, scientific aesthetics
constitutes a viable research program.
Of course, it does not follow that aes-
thetics is totally exhausted by the re-
search we have discussed, but any
comprehensive aesthetic theory should
at least be consistent with the grow-
ing body of empirical aesthetic data.
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RESEARCH METHODS IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL AESTHETICS
Merle Flannery
University of Florida
Theory of Mind
The philosophy of phenomenology
was founded by German philosopher,
Edmund Husserl, in 1900 (Husserl,
1900-1). The thoughts Husserl articu-
lated seemed to be "in the atmo-
sphere" in 1900. The ideas on which
phenomenology is based are similar
to thoughts which influenced other
philosophers, psychologists, educa-
tors, and artists all over Europe. We
know that Paul Klee and Vassily Kan-
dinsky worked with similar ideas be-
cause they wrote about them (Herbert,
1964). Klee and Kandinsky, along with
several others, used their ideas as a
basis for the curriculum of the Bau-
haus. Similar ideas spawned a revolu-
tion in the arts and architecture in
Europe.
In working out the structure of phe-
nomenology, Husserl gave these ideas
a scholarly authenticity by measuring
them against a backdrop of philosophi-
cal thought. Thus challenged, his
ideas held up, and other philosophers
recognized that Husserl, in offering
a radical solution to the mind-body
problem, had made a significant con-
tribution which had far-reaching im-
plications. Followers of Husserl re-
fined and extended his thought. Most
notably, these were Martin Heidegger,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean Paul
Sartre. This paper is based mainly on
the works of Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty.
Though phenomenology has had
wide influence in Europe, it has had
only scattered influence in the United
States. The humanistic movements in
psychology and education were influ-
enced by phenomenological theory.
Viktor Lowenfeld, in art education,
was perhaps indirectly influenced by
phenomenological theory as were
Henry Schaffer-Simmern and Florence
Cane.
However, the direct application of
the tenets of phenomenological
thought in education, including art
education, is in its infancy in the
United States. In art education, sig-
nificant contributions in this direc-
tion have been made by Beittel (1979),
Madenfort (1965), and Tsugawa (1968).
The phenomenological research
method is not a widely accepted
method of research in the United
States. The majority of work in United
States educational research is based
on the empirical model of research.
In fact, what I will call the empirical
model of mind, is the dominant model
of mind in the scientific community.
But also, in a watered down form, the
American public in general functions
by the empirical model of mind. The
empirical model of mind is widely
thought of as the only possible model
of mind. Empirical or conceptual
thought is considered to be the only
form of thought deserving to be called
by the name, THOUGHT. The empiri-
cal model of reality is generally con-
sidered to be the only form of reality.
Phenomenology proposes that there
is more than one form of valid reality.
It says that there are two equally valid
forms of reality. Our brain compre-
hends things through two equally
important modes of thought. Each
reality has its own mode of thought,
its own form of truth and its own
means of arriving at the truth.
The empirical mind moves direction-
ally toward a goal. It proceeds in a lin-
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ear, sequential form, and is embodied
in words, numbers, and other symbols.
The other mode of thought is called
phenomenal thought. It produces a
form of truth which is emodied in sen-
sory images. Images are the content
of the imagination. Images are tangi-
ble: they are color, texture, smoke,
smells, fire, motion, orange, and they
are fear, nervousness, frogs in the
throat, and butterflies in the stomach.
Images are feelings in all their shades,
tones, and moods.
The problem with this phenomenal
mode of thought is that it does not
seem to be real. Many scholars think
of it as mystical, religious, or magical.
Feelings are thought to be intangible,
foggy, unstructured, and subjective.
It is not easy to consider that thought
in images is equal to verbal and metri-
cal thought.
Phenomenology proposes that feel-
ing is thought PROPER. This model of
mind is particularly relevant to artistic
creation. Phenomenology offers a phil-
osophically sturdy model which sup-
ports the argument that phenomenal
thinking is thought proper. It also pro-
poses that phenomenological thought
produces truth which is as valid as
any scientific truth. In fact, Husserl
proposed that phenomenology can
form the base of a science. One com-
ponent of that science would be called
the science of esthesia: the study of
feeling.
All of this has direct bearing on the
art teacher in the classroom. One of
the toughest and most frustrating
problems faced by art teachers today
is the constant need to justify the
relevance of their subject. They may
think that art is not considered as
important in the curriculum as are
reading, English, or mathematics. How
many of us have encountered a par-
ent concerned about his child's grade
in our class until he discovers that he
is talking with the art teacher? Or
perhaps when a teacher, upon hearing
that a former student is majoring in
art in college, says, "Why he could
have majored in anything!" These peo-
ple do not intend to be biased and
many probably do not know that they
are biased; they may even voice sup-
port of the teaching of the arts in the
schools. The point is that the belief
that the empirical mind is the only
mind is so deeply ingrained that peo-
ple don't realize they have it.
Phenomenology offers a model of
reality which allows that to be truth
which we do not normally consider
to be truth. For instance, we usually
do not consider imaginary things to be
real (or true). As an example, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty describes a mental pa-
tient who complained continually that
there was talcum powder on her bed.
There was no empirical talcum powder
on her bed. The talcum powder clearly
was "only in the woman's head," or
we might say it was "only in her imagi-
nation." But then listen to what we are
saying. If the talcum powder is "only "
in the woman's head, or "only" in her
imagination, we mean that the talcum
powder she is experiencing is not real.
Yet Merleau-Ponty proposed that the
talcum powder in the woman's head
is as, real as any talcum powder we
shake out of a can. He proposed that
our basic brain accepts as equally real
both empirical data and phenomenal
data (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Thus, the
talcum powder in the woman's head
is as real as the talcum powder sprin-
kled from a can. This is a radical pro-
posal. Yet it is a proposal that can sup-
port arguments that artistic thought is
thought proper and not some soft form
of thought that is inferior.
Husserl further proposed that it is
possible to study phenomenal reality
by methods which he outlined. These
methods sound deceptively simple.
But they are so difficult to apply that
researchers have only begun to learn
to apply them.
Husserl's major watchword was that
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we "must return to the things them-
selves," but before we can do that,
we must learn to free ourselves of the
encrustedness of what Husserl called
the "natural attitude." To free our-
selves, in Husserl's terms, we must
learn to "bracket" the habitual, ordi-
nary world and hold it in abeyance.
Once the habitual world is bracketed
we are able to look with raw vision into
the depth of things, that is, we are
able to return to the primordial level
of things.
Methods of Research
Husserl's research methodology in-
volved three levels. They are as fol-
lows:
Stage I. The Natural Attitude
The notion here is that for the most
part we live in a world of habit, a world
of repetition, of monotony — a pre-
judged world. The habit by which we
live in the world encrusts the world
with what Husserl called "sediment."
Habit sediments our thought the way
barnacles encrust the hull of a ship.
The sediment consists of historical
traditions and rituals which build up
all during our individual lives. All of
us regularly live in the natural attitude
and participate in it in order to get
through each day. We could not sur-
vive unless we were able to form this
sediment. We need it to function prac-
tically. If we were to meet every little
life event of every instant with fresh
"vision," as if we have never seen it
before, we would be overwhelmed and
frightened and would be unable to
function. The natural attitude gives
us security and safety. We find stabil-
ity looking at the world in verbal and
quantitative terms. That is, we mea-
sure our world by answers to such
questions as: how much, how long,
how far, how often. We use clock and
calendar time, which is measured time.
We want to know how tall we are, how
wide we are, how old we are, and so
on. In these verbal and metric param-
eters we find security, constancy, sta-
bility, and orientation. In measurable,
often numerical, identifiable ways of
seeing the world, we, for the sake of
security and safety, bind our world
in pre-ordered limits. Yet these very
safety measures which we so desper-
ately need for our comfort or for our
very survival often obscure and hide
the world from us (Allen, 1979).
The phenomenologist will try to get
out of the natural attitude so the ob-
ject can be freed, and in the freeing
of the object of sediment, we ourselves
are more free as well. But the phe-
nomenologist must endeavor again
and again to release what we can from
its sedimented, prejudice encrusted,
habitual experience. He cannot re-
move the sediment from every object
in the world all at once. One tries (as
when one peels back the layers of an
onion) to free the object very slowly.
But as soon as one perspective is rela-
tively freed, another one is coming up
and so the layers unfold endlessly and
the task of unfolding them is endless.
When we are trying as phenomenol-
ogists to free the objects in our world
of sediment, there are an infinite num-
ber of types of sediment that encrust
so that we can never pull it all out at
once. We can only pull out parts of
the sediment and see different aspects
of the object at different times, in as
many different ways as we can.
Stage II. Eidetic Variation
At the beginning of the stage of eidetic
variation we must perform what is
called an epoche — a bracketing of
the natural attitude. We do that by
looking at as many different views or
aspects of an object at as many dif-
ferent times, in as many different ways
as we can. We find ourselves looking
at what Husserl called the "profiles"
of objects. As the profiles turn before
our "vision" we see myriad "eidetic"
or "imaginative" variations. These vari-
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ations are infinite. They unfold much
as musical variations unfold. There is
a multitude of unfolding profiles which
are criss-crossing and overlapping.
Andy Warhol showed us 24 hours of
the Empire State Building. There
seemed to be nothing happening.
Perhaps we saw more changes when
Monet painted profiles of the Rouen
cathedral in the light of various times
of day from dawn to dark. In this series
of unfolding profiles of light, these
artists showed us what they saw when
they peeled back the opacity of the
natural attitude.
Slow motion photography lets us
see into the intricate happenings of
an event in motion which in natural
time happens too fast for our eye to
see. Time-lapse photography lets us
examine processes that unfold too
slowly for us to see naturally. Both
these photographic techniques bring
to us events which happen outside
the normal constancies of space and
time. When we remove ourselves from
the natural attitude, we no longer
adhere to a constant space and time.
Outside empirical space and time we
may stretch or shrink space and time
at will. For instance, if I am late I tend
to stretch time so that I may be allowed
to complete all my chores and still be
on time. Unfortunately, the clock does
not cooperate. In the natural attitude,
we live in constant space and time.
Outside the natural attitude— in the
realm of the phenomenal — space and
time are elastic.
In attempting to bracket the natural
attitude, one tries to be beside the
quantitative or designating questions
like, "What is the object and why does
such and such happen?" We try to
answer questions about how the ob-
ject is given. We try to study how an
object comes to us rather than asking
what the object is.
As an example of this questioning,
I quote from Merleau-Ponty's essay,
"Eye and Mind" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964).
In this quote, Merleau-Ponty is asking
himself how the body of water, nestled
among the cypress trees, is given to
him. But he is also thinking of the
visual artist and asking what the visual
artist sees before he tries to paint the
water:
... as Klee said, the line no longer imi-
tates the visible; it 'renders visible;' it
is the blueprint of a genesis of things,
(p. 183)
What the light designs upon our eyes,
and thence upon our brain, does not
resemble the visible world ... (p. 171)
Ultimately the painting relates to noth-
ing at all among experienced things un-
less it is first of all autofigurative.' It is
a spectacle of something only by being
a 'spectacle of nothing,' by breaking
the 'skin of things' to show how the
things become things, how the world
becomes world. Apollinaire said that
in a poem there are phrases which do
not appear to have been created, which
seem to have formed themselves. And
Henri Michaus said that sometimes
Klee's colors seem to have been born
slowly upon the canvas, to have ema-
nated from some primordial ground,
exhaled at the right place' like a patina
or a mold. Art is not construction, arti-
fice, meticulous relationship to a space
and a world existing outside. It is truly
the /inarticulate cry,' as Hermes Tris-
megistus said, which seemed to be the
voice of light.' And once it is present it
awakens powers dormant in ordinary
vision, a secret of preexistence. When
through the water's thickness I see the
tiling at the bottom of a pool, I do not
see it despite the water and the reflec-
tions there; I see it through them and
because of them. If there were no dis-
tortions, no ripples of sunlight, if it
were without this flesh that I saw the
geometry of the tiles, then I would cease
to see it as it is and where it is — which
is to say, beyond any identical, specific
place. I cannot say that the water itself
— the aqueous power, the sirupy and
shimmering element— is in space; all
this is not somewhere else either, but
it is not in the pool. It inhabits it, it ma-
terializes itself there, yet it is not con-
tained there; and if I raise my eyes to-
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ward the screen of cypresses where
the web of reflections is playing, I can-
not gainsay the fact that the water visits
it, too, or at least sends into it, upon it,
its active and living essence. This inter-
nal animation, this radiation of the vis-
ible is what the painter seeks under the
name of depth, of space, of color, (p.
181)
At the level of eldetic variations, I
start to free the object from its sedi-
ment by attending to the various per-
spectives or profiles from which the
object is given to me. In this writing
Merleau-Ponty speculates that the
things he sees (a body of water, in this
case) are not given to him already as-
sembled. They come unassembled and
each of us puts his own product to-
gether. Merleau-Ponty says that things
have an internal animation — what we
see is a radiation of the visible. The
water is simply a visual power (light),
an active and living element which is
a web of playing reflections. All this,
he says, lie 'dormant in ordinary vi-
sion, a secret of preexistence that
seems to have emanated from some
primordial ground.' What he sees is
the invisible, the silence, the ground.
It is the "voice of light," "an inarticu-
late cry" which is the secret of the
preexistence of things — a playing, an
animation, a radiation, a shimmering,
an unfolding which is active and liv-
ing. What we see at the level of the
primordial is a physical power. It is
not things, or words; it is a tangible
power which has animation, is play-
ing in random motion and is nondirec-
tional in its movement. The body of
water appearing to Merleau-Ponty is
not identified as a "pond" or mea-
sured. He looks at what is given as
the body of water and he sees the
active and living power of light play-
ing.
At the stage of imaginative variation
we may form what is called a phe-
nomenological description. Sometimes
these descriptions may seem like
streams of consciousness or even like
poetry. Yet, they are neither. They are
between the two because our lan-
guage is very limited and it is very
hard to make good descriptions. It is
hard to rid ourselves of the natural
attitude and see through to the pri-
mordial, but it is also difficult to de-
scribe what I see when I look at the
primordial. In trying to describe what
I see when I look at the primordial, I
am describing my experience as I live
it. What I am seeing and describing
is what phenomenologists call "lived
experience." Lived experience is not
universal except that we live in the
same environment or world and have
similar bodies and sensory organs.
Lived experience is personal and
unique to each person.
Following are examples of phenom-
enological description:
As I walk, my forward movement carries
me into areas inhabited by smell. Each
area has different smells abiding in it.
Certain smells are common to some
adjoining areas, while others form bor-
ders by cutting off quickly as my body
passes a certain point in space. Some
smells form an integrated interface
with adjoining areas, fading out slowly
after the dominant odors creating the
boundaries of an area have cut off, but
disappearing before the odors of the
other space they have entered into have
begun to fade, thus respecting or cre-
ating the sovereignty of the space de-
fined by a dominating odor or set of
odors, which is what I have called an
area. (Russell, 1978, p. 45)
As I walk, the background odor modu-
lates gently, for not all its components
are equally present in all points of
space. The shifting intensity of odors
within this constant mixture gives me
awareness of it far more readily than
when I stand still. (Russell, 1978, p. 45)
Standing still, without wind, a blank
experience of smell eventually emerges.
Leading up to this, a variable consecu-
tive series of appearances and disap-
pearances occurs. When I stop, the odor
of my body and clothing, which has
been trailing behind me, catches up
j
and enters into the area of defining and i
dominating odor. . . . (Russell, 1978, p. I
45) 1
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'Rooms' of odor move over me in the
wind in much the same way I move
through them when I wall<. The density
of crescendos and then decrescendos
and I am once again out of the areas.
A stronger wind appears to move odor
more quickly, so in the space of a sin-
gle intake of a crescendo-decrescendo
cycle may be captured. (Russell, 1978,
p. 48)
There is a definite difference between
the density and the intensity of an odor.
An odor may densely fill a space with-
out being intense. The smell of new-
mown grass is an odor that can fill an
area of space very densely; however, it
will fade from perception fairly quickly,
unlike the intense and dense smell of
gasoline spilled from a lawnmower. The
smell of gasoline is intense even when
its density is very low. (Russell, 1978,
p. 48)
It is true that we experience the differ-
ence in feeling between the glowing
green of a leaf when it is filled with sun-
light, and the ringing of a bell when it
is filled with sound, for we have learned
to differentiate color and sound. But
our body does not only live the differ-
ences between, it also lives the features
in common to both. It feels the bright-
ness in the ringing of the sound as iden-
tical with the brightness in the glowing
of the green. When we say that we see
the greens ringing with the afternoon
sun, we mean that we have learned to
live the similarities in feeling between
color and sound as our body lives them.
(Madenfort, 1967, p. 82)
Gazing up at the leaves on a warm
sunny afternoon while walking through
an avenue of elm trees, we see the
leaves as structures upon structures
of greens. Translucent yellow greens,
ringing with the afternoon sun, burst
forth from dark, deep, blue greens and
warm, reddish orange greens. Forming
a series of planes and floating between
flickering, cool, reflected blues they
recede into the distance. (Madenfort,
1967, p. 78)
Looking out upon the greens of leaves
on a warm summer evening when the
sun is very low has a quite different
expression from the greens in the after-
noon when the sun is high. Gone are
the ringing, translucent yellow greens
bursting forth from dark, shadowed
blue greens, for in its place are deli-
cately suspended greens burning
quietly with an inner, cool, yellow glow
undisturbed by a deep hollow of crisp
blue and lime green planes whisper-
ing through each other. As the mo-
ments pass, the cool, yellow, inner
glows slowly merge into hushed milky
greens modulating from greyed tones
to almost black. The whispering lime
greens can no longer be heard, for the
silent darkness pervades. (Madenfort,
1967, p. 80)
First of all, as if far away, barely audi-
ble quiet drummings like beginning
intermittent raindrops pitter-pattering
unobtrusively evoke an atmosphere of
uneasiness, a disturbing stillness, a
feeling of something impending. Then
delicately light and mysteriously bright,
they steal in and about a muttering
underlay of raspy metallic brushing and
restless sliding. We are moved by the
subtlety and variability of the percus-
sive clusterings, the many finely woven
textures of differing rhythms and tonal
effects. And, as their quiet, still incon-
spicuous manner diminishes and the
drummings begin to quicken and be-
come more agitated and build with a
punctuated urgency, we too rouse
steadily and blend with their impelling
force.
We are involved, thoroughly fused, at
one with the vibrancy and energy of the
sound dance, moving as we are moved.
We are twisting excitedly with its ka-
leidoscopic turnings, its exalting reso-
nance and rhythmical radiance — erupt-
ing, breaking forth, letting loose,
crescendoing, wrenching the tempt,
screwing-up the tonality — banging
nobly away. Brisk, brassy, bouncy, flip—
sharp whacks, staccato cracks, lus-
trous flashes, lightening speed smashes,
whopping crashes, cacophonous clashes
— a roaring exhilarating "yea." (Mad-
enfort, 1978, p. 11)
Painting:
When we see the space of the painting
as the space of time moving presently
and continuously whole, we are seeing
space moving presently while seeing
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space futuring and space passing past
simultaneously. We are seeing blue
space. We are seeing space blueing.
We are seeing as we are being seen.
We are seeing blue and blue is seeing
us, and we are seeing blue blueing us.
We are being and becoming blue. We
are blueing. We are the blueing pres-
ent, blueing presently, presently futur-
ing blue presently blueing past. We are
blues blueing, blueing blue blueing
blues green, blue greens blueing greens
greening blues blue green. Out of the
blueing present, future blues appear
blinking, twinkling, widening, intensify-
ing, spreading, extending — presently
blueing past, presently futuring a new
future blue. A cerulean blue gliding
wide, gliding widening blue cerulean
wide, blueing a dancing. We are blues
dancing the whole of the painting
wholly blue.
In dancing blue, in blueing spatially
and temporally, in feeling ourselves
continuing wholly and openly blue, we
are forming blue. We are forming the
sensuous life of the painting. (Maden-
fort, 1976, p. 12)
When you have a phenomenological
description, you have something very
different from what you have in the
natural attitude. Now you are taking
all your experiences of an object —
the contents of a multitude of unfold-
ing profiles — and criss-crossing them.
Husserl called It overlapping or pair-
ing of the experiences. His notion Is:
you have the blueing and the sparkling
and all the shimmering, unfolding pro-
files; you do not have just one experi-
ence of an object because all the pro-
files Interweave, as Merleau-Ponty put
It. It Is a sort of synaesthesla. It Is a
whole interweaving of perspectives of
profiles of sensory experience. As you
overlap or criss-cross these experi-
ences, which come to you In an over-
lapping way, the past, present, and
future blend. Once you are within the
attitude of eldetic or imaginative vari-
ation, there Is a sense In which It Is
only there that the object can truly
take on Its fullness and depth. It is
only at this level that the object can
become alive, and that It can fully pre-
sent Itself to us. (Allen, 1979)
Stage III. Transcendental Analysis
This Is the stage where the phenome-
nologlst looks back over what he per-
formed for the epochs. This is the
analysis, the critique, where one looks
at what was done, how well It was done,
what was missed and so on. At this
time we analyze whether what we saw
In the epoche matches any pre-order-
Ing Idea. It should not have followed
a pre-deslgned pattern. In the epoche
we do not want to Infer our experience
or to experience what we expect to
experience; otherwise the bracketing
of the natural attitude would not have
been complete. If when we are study-
ing smell at the primordial level, we
discover that smell fills space, we may
experience this because we expected
It. If the bracketing Is complete, our
sensing comes to us randomly with-
out pre-deslgn.
The Phenomenological Aesthetic
In the phenomenological scheme of
things there are two modes of aesthetic
thought. The first aesthetic thought
Is linear; the other Is random.
Linear aesthetic thought Is con-
cerned with art products, history, criti-
cism, and education In the arts. This
aesthetic Is an Indispenslble tool for
arts professionals. It forms the basis
for making judgments In art. We want
to be able to judge what Is and is not
art, what is good or bad in art, and what
Is beautiful or ugly In art. The linear
aesthetic systematizes art products
Into series, categories, and values. It
gives a body of knowledge which is
not available to us by any other means,
and it Is knowledge we need to have.
It is an Indispenslble way of knowing
in the arts. There Is no need to choose
between the two aesthetics. Each has
its own function. We need both.
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The phenomenological aesthetic is
not concerned with art products. Its
concern is with what happens before
the product comes into being. The
questions asked by the artist are about
how the world is given. The artist cul-
tivates access to what phenomenolo-
gists call the primoridal world. This
world is not a world of "things." It is
a world of living experience — of the
radiation of turning profiles in a web
of random motion. The artist is the
genius of the phenomenal world. He
is able to jump into it. His art work,
according to Madenfort, is the embodi-
ment of the phenomenal (Madenfort,
1967).
According to American philosopher
Albert Tsugawa, the phenomenologi-
cal aesthetic has the nature of that
which would be the opposite of anaes-
thesia (Tsugawa, 1967, p. 14). Anaes-
thetic and anaesthesia are common
terms in our language. We understand
the terms to mean a loss of feeling. In
a state of anaesthesia we are numb or
unconscious. When the anaesthesia
wears off, feeling returns.
But it seems odd to use the term
"esthesia"; yet, esthesia is feeling,
and the phenomenal aesthetic is the
science of esthesia. The phenome-
nologist, and especially the artist as
natural phenomenologist, study the
esthesic in consciousness. Artists have
told us that we are living in a perpetual,
fluxing esthesic bath which is present
with us every instant we live. Kandin-
sky tells us about the esthesic bath in
which he lived:
On my palette sit high, round raindrops,
puckishly flirting with each other, sway-
ing and trembling. Unexpectedly they
unite and suddenly become thin sly
threads which disappear in amongst
the colors, and roguishly skip about
and creep up the sleeves of my coat. . .
.
(Werner, 1961, p. 71)
As a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old boy
I bought a box of oii-colors with pennies
slowly and painfully saved. To this very
day I can still see these colors coming
out of the tubes. One press of my fin-
gers and jubilantly, festively, or grave
and dreamy, or turned thoughtfully
within themselves, the colors came
forth. Or wild with sportiveness, with
a deep sigh of liberation, with the deep
tone of sorrow, with splendid strength
and fortitude, with yielding softness
and resignation, with stubborn self-
mastery, with delicate uncertainty of
mood — out they came, these curious,
lovely things that are called colors.
(Werner, 1961, p. 71)
Other artists have written about the
aliveness of the things around them
when they cease to be things and be-
come living, flickering light, and color.
Paul Klee said that he stood in the
forest and looked at the trees; even-
tually the trees came alive and looked
back at him (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p.
167). Mondrian was so affected by the
forms of trees that he could not eat a
meal facing the window. To Van Gogh
the trees came alive, moved, swirled,
and writhed. The lights in the cafe and
the stars in the sky gave off circles of
pulsing light.
It is when we give simultaneous no-
tice to the figure and the ground that
we notice the unfolding, and with the
vision of their unfolding, we also get
their randomly, radiating, shimmering
aliveness. We are taught to pay atten-
tion to the figure and ignore the
ground. Visual arts students often
must learn the painful lesson of notic-
ing equally the positive and negative
spaces in their art works. They are
habitually accustomed to thinking of
the ground as nothing.
But the artist and the aesthetician
do not think of the ground as nothing.
It is an important force in their work.
They call it ground, silence, and the
invisible. In the following work by
Gertrude Stein the spaces between the
words are as important as the words
themselves:
It was tomorrow which was yester-
day and it was exciting, it was the first
time I had ever been present when any-
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thing of mine had been played for the
first time and I was not nervous but it
was exciting, it went so very well.
English dancers when they dance with
freshness and agility and they know
what drama is, they like to dance and
they do know what drama is, it all went
so very well, each time a musician does
something with the words it makes it
do what they never did do, this time it
made them do as if the last word had
heard the next word and the next word
had heard not the last word but the next
word.
After all why not.
I like anything that a word can do. And
words do do all they do and then they
can do what they never do do. (Stein,
1937)
The artist's task is to maintain access
to the primordial in experience. Yet,
this may be painful. Kierkegaard said
of the artist:
A poet is an unhappy being whose heart
is torn by secret sufferings, but whose
lips are so strangely formed that when
the sighs and the cries escape them,
they sound like beautiful music.
And men crowd about the poet and say
to him: 'Sing for us again;' that is as
much as to say: 'May new sufferings
torment your soul, but may your lips
be formed as before; for the cries
would only frighten us, but the music
is delicious. (Kierkegaard, 1946)
Maintaining access to raw feeling
means that the artist must resist habitu-
ation in perception. The artist main-
tains access to raw vision of experi-
ence, and tells us about it in his art
works. British aesthetician, R. G. Col-
lingwood says that the artist, by telling
us the secrets of his heart, tells us the
secrets of our own hearts (Colling-
wood, 1958). The artist helps us per-
form the bracketing the phenomenolo-
gists speak of.
The truth the artist tells is his own.
It may reveal us to ourselves. The ar-
tist's truth is true in the way Edna St.
Vincent Millay described it:
I know what I know.
The sun is hot on my neck and I observe
The spikes of the crocus.
The smell of the earth is good.
It is apparent there is no death.
(Millay, p. 53)
Phenomenology and Art Education
Hiram Williams, professor of art at the
University of Florida, wrote a book
about teaching art in which he said
that teaching art doesn't travel in a
straight line. You may tell a student
something and he will not change his
artistic behavior at all then, but five
years later something happens to him
and he will say, "THAT'S WHAT HIRAM
MEANT!" (Stephens, 1978).
This idea of teaching art as being
something not directly In the art teach-
er's control Is not consistent with the
prevailing model of mind which as-
sumes that the student will directly
understand and be able to apply what
the teacher teaches. Education In this
light is based on the idea of a sort of
2 + 2 = 4 model of mind where the
student directly learns and applies
what the teacher teaches.
This prevailing model of mind is
what I have mentioned as the mechani-
cal or medical model which has two
branches: Idealism and empiricism.
Both of these skip over the phenome-
nal in their model of mind. They do
not deal with the phenomenal at all.
They Ignore its existence.
As art teachers, paying attention to
phenomenal consciousness In our art
teaching means that we help the stu-
dents look at the Invisible, the ground,
the silence. We help them look at the
random In the properties of materials,
and in human behavior. For Instance,
many children unconsciously make
motions and sounds as they draw.
What the child is drawing has come
alive to him and he is living the experi-
ence of It as It comes out of the end of
his pen. He makes the sounds of air-
planes, cars, guns, and explosions. He
jumps and squirms In the action that
swirls around him in his art work. Pi-
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casso said that when you step into the
picture you leave (the world) behind
you. You live in the world — the real-
ity, space, and time of the picture.
For the last 10 years at the Univer-
sity of Florida I have been teaching a
course called "Aesthetic Experience,"
in which I have asked students to rec-
ognize the phenomenal in their experi-
ence, to write phenomenological de-
scriptions of what they see, and to
explore phenomenal experience for-
mally in class.
The students in this class work with
learning to sound shape and shape
sound both with their bodies and
voices. They are encouraged to ex-
plore the relatipnship between vision
and motion. They observe how the
phenomenal shapes of their bodies
change as they are depressed or
happy, when they have a head cold
or when they feel fat or tired or hungry.
They are asked to observe their non-
linear thinking as it naturally mani-
fests itself in life. Does their body
seem to expand when they feel angry?
Do other people seem larger when
they are yelling at you? Do you feel
small and shrinking when you are
sick? We study synaesthesia — how
the senses correspond as when we
say there is a "sour blue sky." Or we
bite a stinging sweet pickle just when
there is a sharp, stinging sound of
metal being struck in a work of music.
The most impressive thing I have heard
said about the class is that it is an "eye-
opener."
Just before he died of cancer in the
early 60's, Aldous Huxley wrote a novel
called Island. In this book, he de-
scribes an advanced society which has
learned to educate the phenomenal
mentality as well as the conceptual
mentality. In the school curriculum
children study exactly what they study
now. They learn to read, write, spell,
and count. They learn history and
geography, biology, physics, and
chemistry. But they also study their
own ability for feeling. They explore
and expand on their abilities for mo-
tion, seeing, touching, sounding, and
so on.
These nonlinear studies comprise
one-half of the school curriculum. And
that is not surprising. If there are two
modes of knowing which are equally
valid, then why not give them equal
time in the education of a human
being?
References
Allen, J. Unpublished lecture on phenome-
nology. University of Florida, 1979.
Beittel, K. Toward an art education theory
on qualitative responding to art. Review of
Research in Visual Arts Education, 1979,
10, 33-40.
Collingwood, R. The principles of art. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1958.
Husserl, E. Logical investigation (J. Find-
lay, trans.). New York: Humanities Press,
1970. (Originally published (Vol. I), 1900;
(Vol. II), 1901).
Kandinsky, V. Reminiscences. In R. Herbert
(Ed.), Modern artists on art. Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
Kierkegaard, S. Either/or. In R. Bretall
(Ed.), A Kierkegaard anthology. New
York: Random House, 1946.
Klee, P. On modern art. In R. Herbert (Ed.),
Modern artists on art. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
Madenfort, D. Our humanity and the arts:
Dance, painting, opera. Art Education,
1976, 29(8), 8-14.
Madenfort, D. Creating out of nothing. Un-
published manuscript, 1978.
Madenfort, W. J. A phenomenology of the
esthetic and art education. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, the Pennsylvania
State University, 1965.
Merleau-Ponty, M. Phenomenology of per-
ception (C. Smith, trans.). New York: The
Humanities Press, 1962. (Originally pub-
lished, 1945.)
Merleau-Ponty, M. Eye and mind. In M. Edie
(Ed.), The primary of perception. Evans-
ton: Northwestern University Press, 1964.
Millay, E. Collected poems. In N. Millay (Ed.),
Collected poems. New York: Harper &
Row, 1917-1956.
Research Methods in Phenomenological Aesthetics 35
Russell, C. Toward a phenomenology of
smell. Unpublished master's thesis, Uni-
versity of Florida, 1978.
Stein, G. Everybody's autobiography. New
York: Random House, Inc., 1937.
Stephens, W. B. Hiram Williams: Exploring
the sources of his expression. Memphis,
Tennessee: Memphis State University
Press, 1978.
Tsugawa, A. The nature of the aesthetic and
human values. Art Education, 1968, 21(8),
11-20.
Werner, H. A comparative psychology of
mental development. New York: Science
Editions, Inc., 1961.
Merle Flannery
College of Education
University of Florida
Gainsville, Florida 32601
36 Merle Flannery
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
David Burton
Virginia Commonwealth University
Cognitive psychology is becoming in-
creasingly popular with school sys-
tems as a theoretical foundation for
their curricula. Challenges made by
the public and the courts, as to just
what is the purpose of the schools,
provide a strong incentive for school
boards to find explanations of how
learning takes place. Cognitive psy-
chology seems to fill the bill nicely.
It describes the nature and processes
of cognition; whatever else the schools
do, they are in the business of develop-
ing cognition.
In a nutshell, cognitive psychology
describes the mental processes by
which the child approaches and un-
derstands the world. Initially these
approaches are largely experiential
and are carried out in the most direct
perceptual and psychomotor ways pos-
sible. Eventually the child develops to
a stage when he is a largely rational
being — analytic, abstract, logical —
the true scientist. The intervening
stages describe the significant steps
the child makes in progressing from
the experiential stage to the objective
stage. Consequently there is a ten-
dency for the schools to focus on the
objective "concrete" and "formal op-
erations" stages, which happen, in
fact, to be most compatible with the
schools' curricular goals. It is to the
credit of many cognitive psychologists
that they continually bring attention
to the importance of the early experi-
ential stages. The later objective stages
are not likely to be fully realized if the
early stages have not been fully ex-
perienced.
Cognitive psychology is a develop-
mental psychology especially devoted
to cognitive processes within the child.
It makes the same assumption all de-
velopmental theories do: that the sub-
stantive changes in the child — in this
case, changes in cognitive processes
— occur normally and naturally, with-
out the need of any outside imposi-
tions. Consequently, the drive that
carries this development forward must
come from within. Cognitive psychol-
ogists readily acknowledge the need
for some kind of inner drive to fire the
cognitive machine at every stage. It is
to this particular aspect that I wish to
direct my remarks. My remarks are
predicated on philosophical constructs
and are therefore not intended to be
a criticism of this psychological the-
ory. Rather, I hope my approach from
a different angle will shed some light
on a corner that may have been over-
looked.
To understand the nature of the
motivation underlying cognitive pro-
cesses would reveal a great deal about
the nature of the cognitive processes
themselves. The child's cognitive pro-
cesses clearly change from a projec-
tive stance radiating out from his
egocentricity, to the acceptance of
the basic primacy of the external world.
Cognitive psychologists are aware of
this shift of mind. I think however
that they see it simply as a change
from one kind of cognitive process
to another. I believe there is a more
fundamental change, particularly in
the motive forces that underlie the
cognitive processes.
If you will allow me a philosophical
excursion — cognitive psychology is
of course concerned with epistemo-
logical questions — questions dealing
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with the nature of knowledge and the
processes of knowing. Epistemology
falls under the general rubric of ontol-
ogy, the concern for what is real, for
what already exists in fact. We assume
in asking what is known and knowable
that we are referring to real things —
real objects, real events, real ideas. A
characteristic of external reality is its
prior existence. Consequently, cog-
nitive psychologists assume that all
cognitive processes are directed to-
ward the disclosure of a reality that
already exists. This involves uncover-
ing the perceptible properties (phe-
nomena) of real things to the mind in
the form of concepts. The motive force
behind disclosure is intention. This
all makes sense as long as we have a
preexisting reality to work with.
But let us suppose for a moment that
reality is not out there waiting for us
to uncover it. If it is not there, it can-
not be disclosed to the mind. Likewise,
there is then no point of an intentional
mechanism to make disclosure pos-
sible.
This condition is not as extraordi-
nary as it sounds. It is found in the
creative act. Things that are created,
by definition, do not exist prior to
their creation. They do not even exist
as ideas or visions. Thus, for a person
who is primarily involved in intending
and disclosing a reality he expects
already exists, creating art is a frus-
trating if not pointless activity.
It is here cognitive psychology suf-
fers a paradigm failure. Because of
their epistemological and ontological
orientations, cognitive psychologists
assume that all cognitive processes
are directed toward intention and dis-
closure in one form or another. They
attempt to explain intention and dis-
closure as cognitive and motivational
processes. However, up until the time
the child accepts the primacy of the
external world, I believe he operates
on an entirely different basis.
The young child, that is the child at
the experiential stage, is not at all
concerned with what is real. His world
is predicated on what is important to
him. Philosophically speaking, his out-
look is axiological. He deals with mat-
ters of value and importance, rather
than with reality and knowledge.
The "cognitive processes" open to
the young child are projective. He
pushes into the world with imagina-
tion, spontaneity, fantasy and caprice.
Most importantly, he creates. He brings
into existence things which did not
exist prior to his creation of them. The
world is his raw material, mutable and
manipulatable. He approaches it as
any good artist approaches his ma-
terials: in terms of what it could be
instead of what it is.
Specifically, the things the young
child creates are meanings. They are
meanings in the sense of import and
value, not definitions or explanations.
They are immediately and directly ex-
perienced through the sensory and
psychomotor body. Experience and
object are one. The young child does
not perceive his meanings apart from
the object or event itself. There is no
phenomena and no mental construct.
There is no intention.
The young child cannot draw upon
a preexisting source for the substance
of his creations. He must fall back
upon a source within himself. This is
where an axiological base proves es-
sential. The motive force behind his
creative act is literally what is impor-
tant to him. The meanings he creates
confirm and reinforce these feelings
of import much the way objects in the
external world disclose the intentions
directed toward them to the older child.
Given this view, it is easy to see why
the young child is so successful as an
artist — it is his natural state of being.
Gardner believes the emotional and
affective vectors (or what I'm calling
the axiological base) can be retained
into the objective cognitive stages. I
would agree.
We need to see what happens as the
child creates in order to understand
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how his axiology might be retained.
The young child does not concern
himself with whether or not he is cre-
ating art. The question never comes
up because what he is creating is never
at issue. The experience and the ob-
ject are too synonymous to ask such
an objective and reflective question.
What is important to him is that he is
creating, and this is done with abso-
lute confidence and self-possession.
The meaning he creates fulfills his axi-
ological need to attend to that which
conveys import.
The young child is as matter of fact
in his art as he is in his other transac-
tions with the world. He grasps com-
pletely the fact of art, the conviction
that what he is doing has meaning for
him. It is the fact of art that is often
lost when the child passes into the ob-
jective cognitive stage. In accepting
the primacy of the external world, he
surrenders his axiological conviction.
And it is the fact of art that must be
retained in the objective cognitive
stage if creating art is to remain a
viable activity.
In conclusion, there is nothing con-
tradictory or exclusive about these
two perspectives. After all, not all
children stop creating art when they
reach the age of seven or eight. Those
who continue to be creative share two
characteristics: they have developed a
personal axiological base within them-
selves, and they continue to give im-
port to their experience. They are thus
able to create meanings that have no
prior existence, even though their cog-
nitive processes have become largely
dependent on a preexisting world. We,
seeing only the outward appearance,
call it art.
Children must inevitably turn the
corner from an axiological world to an
epistemological world. The cognitive
processes must inevitably become di-
rected toward disclosure of an exter-
nal reality. The particular value of a
strong axiological base is that it al-
lows the child to take up a much more
intuitive and essential position, a
position based on personal, essential
values. Such an intuitively held posi-
tion gives intention an assertive au-
thority — an emotional and affective
vector, if you will — that cannot be
derived from the external world.
David Burton
Art Education Department
Virginia Commonwealth University
Riciimond, Virginia 23284
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THE AESTHETIC RESPONSE TO NONREPRESENTATIONAL ART:
A SUGGESTED MODEL
Sonja K. Foss
Norfolk State University
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Abstract
The Aesthetic Response to
Nonrepresentational Art:
A Suggested Model
This essay is an attempt to develop a
rhetorical theory of the aesthetic ex-
perience of nonrepresentational art.
Suggested steps in the process of this
aesthetic experience include: (1) crea-
tion of a special reality by the art ob-
ject, (2) vitalization of the special real-
ity by the audience, and (3) creation
of identification between artist and
viewer that enables the vitalization to
occur. The essay concludes with im-
plications of the model for art educa-
tors, artists, and baffled viewers.
The typical visitor to a museum or
gallery displaying nonrepresentational
art^ often has difficulty understanding
and appreciating the works in the ex-
hibition. Responses to a painting that
consists of streaks of color on a can-
vas are likely to be, "Even I can do that
— why is that considered good art?"
or "What's the message? What is it
supposed to be?" The visitor may be
inclined to agree with the response
of English diplomat Wilfred S. Blunt
after he viewed an exhibition of Post-
Impressionist paintings in 1910: "The
exhibition is either an extremely bad
joke or a swindle. "^
The root of the problem seems to lie
in the fact that artists live in a world
of images they experience empatheti-
cally and organize intuitively, while
the general public lives in a world of
symbols where verbal meaning or prac-
tical application is attached to almost
everything. Art has been assigned in
the minds of most people the function
of presenting a representation of the
natural world as we perceive it with
our eyes. Nonrepresentational art that
does not perform this function is in-
comprehensible to much of the gen-
eral public. As a result, the typical
viewer of nonrepresentational art is
likely to become frustrated and retreat
from these works of art.
A better understanding of how non-
representational art functions may be
gained by applying notions of rhetoric
to theories of art. By rhetoric we mean
communication, or the study of how
symbols evoke a response. Although
scholars in the field of rhetoric tend
to confine themselves to the study of
verbal symbols, rhetoric as a disci-
pline is also applicable to nonverbal
symbol systems such as art. As Burke
points out, symbolization includes not
only talk, but "all other human symbol
systems, such as mathematics, music,
sculpture, painting, dance, architec-
tural styles, and so on."^ Duncan ar-
gues that to study communication in
society, we "must study art, for the
highest (because most complete) in-
corporation of natural forces and oper-
ations in experience is found in art.'"*
Others, too, have recognized that art
is a language and that it should be
described in linguistic terms. Kaelin,
an aesthetics theorist, points out that
if "the arts can truly be said to com-
pose a language, then one ought to
be able to describe that language, both
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generically and specifically."^ Add to
the notion that art can be studied as
a language the contemporary trend in
which the scope of rhetoric has been
expanded to encompass all of the ways
in which symbols of any sort influence,^
and the inevitable conclusion seems
to be that we ought to attempt to study
the visual arts as we do the verbal ones.
This essay is an initial attempt to
develop a rhetorical model of the aes-
thetic experience of nonrepresenta-
tional art. At the base of the theory is
a rhetorical definition of art — we view
art as the conscious production or ar-
rangement of sounds, colors, forms,
movements, and other elements in a
manner that affects or evokes a re-
sponse. Although aspects of this theory
will be applicable to representational
art, our focus will be on nonrepresen-
tational art because it poses the most
difficulties for understanding the aes-
thetic experience involved.
Justification
The need for a rhetorical theory of
nonrepresentational art can be seen in
the limitations of past theories about
art. These theories do not deal ade-
quately with nonrepresentational art
as seen in a cursory review of them.^
The imitation theory of art, which
can be traced as far back as Plato, de-
fines art as the literal representation
of objects or events in real life. The
goal of art, according to this theory,
is to reproduce the object as nearly
as possible in the manner in which it
appears in nature. This theory, of
course, omits a great deal of art by
stipulating that art must portray liter-
ally an object; the focus of our atten-
tion — nonrepresentational art — is an
obvious omission.
The emotionalist theory, which de-
veloped mainly out of the Romantic
movement in Europe at the end of the
eighteenth century, represented a re-
action against Neoclassicism, which
discouraged emotionality, originality.
and flexibility in art and relied heavily
on Greek and Roman forms and styles.
This theory defines art as an expres-
sion of the artist's emotion or the pre-
sentation of feeling controlled through
some medium. It presents problems,
too, for our purposes, because it at-
tributes one motive to all artists: the
expression of emotion and the com-
munication of that emotion to others.
But artists may have other motives,
such as the creation of an attractive
object or an attempt to solve a techni-
cal problem in a particular medium.
A contemporary theory of art — the
formalist theory — defines art as sig-
nificant form — the elements of line,
color, shape, mass, light, shade, and
tone organized into a formal pattern.
Formalists believe that associations
with persons, objects, or events out-
side of the work of art are irrelevant
because they prevent viewers froifi be-
coming fully involved in the aesthetic
experience of the work itself. The for-
malist theory falls short of explaining
the aesthetic experience of nonrepre-
sentational art in that it does not state
how to tell whether or not a particular
structure or form is significant and
how this structure affects the viewer.
Finally, the theory of the aesthetic
field proposed by Berleant expands a
definition of art into an explanation of
the aesthetic experience. His theory
includes the components of art object,
perceiver, artist; performer, and the
biological, psychological, material and
technological, historical, social and
cultural factors that combine to create
an aesthetic transaction. Although this
theory solves many of the problems en-
countered in earlier theories of art, it
fails to explain how a work of art affects
a viewer; it describes factors that may
affect the response, but not how this
response occurs.
A rhetorical model of nonrepresen-
tational art, then, clearly answers a
need. It can provide an understanding
of the aesthetic process that is in-
volved in an individual's response to a
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nonrepresentational work of art that
current major theories of art do not.
In addition, we believe that the study
of the visual arts as rhetoric will con-
tribute to an understanding of society
as a whole. We see three ways in
which this contribution can occur:
(1) Ours is a visual age — the image
seems to be taking over from the writ-
ten word, perhaps because more in-
formation can be transmitted in less
amount of time through visual rather
than verbal imagery. We are con-
fronted more than ever before with
visuals in our everyday lives — photo-
graphs in the newspaper, posters, pic-
tures on cereal boxes, glossy pam-
phlets in the mail, billboards along the
highway, store window displays, maps,
images on television, and postcards,
to name a few. In short, we are urged
to live by visual sensations. Because
this is the case, we need to clarify how
the visual image functions in our so-
ciety, and the proposed model, which
employs principles of the more tradi-
tional written and oral modes of com-
munication, may assist in this under-
standing.
(2) We tend not to recognize the
more mythical symbol systems such
as religion and art as social facts or
as hard data by which to study society.
Science, in particular, seems to neglect
these areas as legitimate vehicles for
discovering information about society.
Perhaps the study of the visual arts
through the terminable equipment of
an ancient, established medium such
as rhetoric will help to legitimize art
as acceptable data by which to study
society.
(3) Many verbal symbols today have
been stripped of their emotional en-
ergy, and few people respond to these
old symbols. Americans today, for ex-
ample, generally are not stirred by
words that would have stirred our
forebearers such as "liberty" and "jus-
tice." Nonrepresentational art, on the
other hand, forces us to recognize new
images because its symbols are visual,
vivid, and striking; these works of art
usually contain so much energy that
we are forced to pay attention to them.
A study of how nonrepresentational
art functions, then, can help to meet
the need for new symbols to take over
when our verbal language falters.
A rhetorical theory of how nonrepre-
sentational art functions to create an
aesthetic experience, then, will hope-
fully escape limitations of past theories
of art and will help clarify the nature
and function of symbolism in contem-
porary society.
Limitations of the Theory
Before we begin to examine the rhe-
torical process by which an aesthetic
experience occurs, we will first limit
our theory by confining our concerns
to the perceptual rather than the physi-
cal aspect of a work of art. Art theorists
and critics long have recognized the
distinction between the actual physi-
cal art object and the perceptual or
aesthetic object that triggers the aes-
thetic experience. Beardsley, for ex-
ample, suggests that a perceptual ob-
ject is the object open to direct sensory
awareness, while the physical object
or the physical basis of the perceptual
object consists of things and events
describable in the vocabulary of phys-
ics.^ In other words, the physical ob-
ject is what it is, and the aesthetic
object deals with the effects that ob-
ject has on us. As Beardsley explains,
"When a critic, then, says that Titian's
later paintings have a strong atmo-
spheric quality and vividness of color,
he is talking about aesthetic objects.
But when he says that Titian used a
dark reddish underpainting over the
whole canvas, ... he is talking about
physical objects."^ Beardsley's use of
the term "presentation" further clari-
fies this distinction. The physical ob-
ject is not the object experienced by a
viewer; what is experienced is the pre-
sentation of the physical object. ^°
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Lipman also recognizes this two-
fold nature of an art object. He empha-
sizes that the "esthetic entity is not,
either spatially or in any other appro-
priate sense, to be located within the
physical object or event which serves
to present it."" He labels the two as-
pects of a work of art "formal struc-
ture" and "functional structure." For-
mal structure (or what Beardsley calls
the physical object) deals with the way
things are put together, and functional
structure (or Beardsley's aesthetic or
perceptual object) deals with the way
things behave. ''^
This proposed theory will deal only
with the perceptual, aesthetic, or func-
tional object. That is, we will attempt
to discover how nonrepresentational
art functions and the effects it has on
a viewer, rather than analyzing the col-
ors, forms, techniques, or themes of
works themselves. To make the dis-
tinction between the perceptual and
the physical object is not to deny the
importance of the physical elements
involved in the process of painting.
The only way to obtain a perceptual
or aesthetic object is to apply pigments
to canvas or paper. But these elements
have been subject to a great deal of
examination and research by artists
and art historians, and thus they will
not be our concern here. We now will
turn to an examination of the process
involved as a viewer encounters the
perceptual object.
Step 1 : The Art Object Invites
Entrance to a Special Reality
Verbal symbols may function in a num-
ber of ways, including excitation, per-
suasion, or identification. But they
have another possible function as well:
the creation of a special reality for
those who choose to participate. Bor-
mann recognizes this function in his
notion of a "rhetorical vision," a sym-
bolic drama which catches up groups
of people in a particular reality. ''^ Camp-
bell, too, sees rhetoric as a motivating
force for the development of a reality:
"From the point of view of theories of
symbolic behavior, persuasion is a pro-
cess in which the individual creates
his meaning through detecting, iden-
tifying, and interpreting the stimuli
he receives and which is integrated
into and hence influences his percep-
tual framework. "^"^
But verbal or written discourse is
not the only medium that creates a
world or a vision for participants. Most
of our society's activities are evidence
of this kind of perception. We view
many events, disciplines, and ideas as
dramas of some type which contain all
of the necessary elements for the crea-
tion of a special world. For example,
we speak of a "theater of war," "mak-
ing a scene," or "working behind the
scenes." A similar perception was con-
veyed by the black youth who was
asked his attitude about serving in the
Vietnam war. He replied, "Man, they
ain't going to put me in that movie,
even if they make me the star!"''^
In politics, we see the existence of a
dramatic world that functions apart
from the actual administrative func-
tion of government. One writer has ar-
gued that Lyndon Johnson chose not
to run for a second term solely be-
cause his performance was too widely
jeered, although he was adequately
performing his duties.''^ In music, too,
we see rhetorical visions or worlds be-
ing created. Jim Morrison of The Doors
explained the process of a concert in
terms that are surprisingly rhetorical:
"When I sing my songs in public, that's
a dramatic act, but not just acting as
in theatre, but a social act, real action.
A Doors concert is a public meeting
called by us for a special kind of dra-
matic discussion and entertainment.
We make concerts sexual politics. The
sex starts with me, then moves out to
include the charmed circle of musi-
cians on stage. The music we make
goes out to the audience and interacts
with them; they go home and interact
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with the rest of reality, then I get it
all back by interacting with that real-
ity. When we perform, we're partici-
pating in the creation of a world, and
we celebrate that creation with the
audience. "^^
Art, too, creates a particular reality
or world. This world is not a mirror or
duplicate of a world that exists outside
of the painting, but is instead a new
and original world. Numerous critics
and artists have recognized this func-
tion of an art object. Hodin, for exam-
ple, explains it as "an imaginary, a
subconscious, a visionary, a con-
structed, a personal world. . . ."^^
Lipman suggests that "to be a work
means to set up a world, "''^ while
Feibleman argues that a "work of art
leads a life of its own, just as the artist
does; it has its own value arid valid-
ity and engages upon its own adven-
tures. "2° We discover, then, that the
function of art is, as Graham ex-
plains, to "discover new lands" or
new worlds. 2^ A natural corollary to
this notion is that there is not only
one possible world or vision available
to us. Instead of seeing only one world,
our own, we see it — through art —
under multiple forms, and there are
as many worlds at our disposal as
there are original artists. ^^ These
worlds, of course, differ widely from
each other, and there is no assurance
that any one image of the world is
truer than other images.
How does a work of nonrepresenta-
tional art create a world? The process
begins, of course, with the artist. We
may tend to assume that the reality
created by the painting is the con-
scious representation of some idea
which the artist holds and which is
then realized on canvas. Examinations
into the creative processes of artists
have revealed, however, that the oppo-
site is true. Art does not give name to
preexisting objects or concepts as
much as ideas are suggested or im-
posed by works of art. Picasso ex-
plained the process in this way: "One
simply paints — one doesn't paste
one's ideas on a painting. . . . Cer-
tainly, if the painter has ideas, they
come out of how he paints things. "^^
Perhaps the artist John Graham ex-
plained this notion best when he
defined painting as "the Space
articulating"^'* — in other words, the
painting itself communicating rather
than simply reflecting a thought its cre-
ator wished to communicate. Thus, we
see the same process operating with
visual symbols that Bormann and others
suggested was a function of verbal lan-
guage — the creation of a particular
world or reality for those who partici-
pate in the symbolic reality. Art orders
experience in a particular way through
lines, colors, textures, and materials
to create a new name for experience
and, thus, a new reality.
Step 2: The Audience Vitalizes
the Special Reality
Just as the ultimate purpose of verbal
communication is audience response,
so nonrepresentational art relies on an
audience. The audience enables a par-
ticular reality to be created by the work
of art.
Although we have seemed to suggest
thus far that the work of art creates a
special world with no external aid ex-
cept from the artist, this is not the
case. The spectator must receive what-
ever impress the work of art makes
upon him or her in the first step, but
the process does not end here. The
perceiver next must actively work on
the art object, vitalizing it by setting
off its aesthetic potential to help it
create its reality. Dewey explains this
process: "The product of art — tem-
ple, painting, statue, poem — is not
the work of art. The work takes place
when a human being cooperates with
the product so that the outcome is an
experience that is enjoyed because
of its liberating and ordered proper-
ties. "^^ Huyghe's description of the
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process is more poetic; he notes that
a painting tosses a "sumptuous gift
at our feet; it is up to us to bend down
and take it, and to breathe our life
into it. Painting does not explain: it
is, and shows what it is; it is up to us
to experience it. . . ."^^ What we find,
then, is that a nonrepresentational
painting creates its own special world
or reality, but this creation is possible
only through the assistance of the audi-
ence or the perceiver. That is, the paint-
ing lives only through the individual
who is looking at it.
The meaning of an art object, thus,
is not inherent in the work itself.
Rather, it grows out of social interac-
tion that takes place between the ar-
tist and the viewer by means of the
created work. The result is communi-
cation between the artist and the
viewer or an aesthetic experience. For
as the artist and the viewer cooperate,
a community of action is established
in which both the artist and the viewer
respond in similar ways to the visual
symbols. These symbols then take on
a common meaning in the community
in which the artist and viewer cooper-
ate and reside.
The essential role of the audience
in the aesthetic experience not only
allows for the development of mean-
ing in a painting and concomitant com-
munication between artist and audi-
ence, but it also endows an art object
with the potential to be experienced
in various ways by various individuals
and to be enjoyed repeatedly by the
same person. Because each individual
perceiver will view the art object from
a different background of experience
and a different perspective, the art
object will create a reality that is dif-
ferent for each perceiver. Thus, a work
of art cannot have the same meanings
for all people. Rather, each viewer co-
operates in his or her own way with
the artist to create a particular com-
munity of meaning. And because of
this capacity of the art object to inter-
act with the individual framework of
the viewer, he or she can enjoy re-
peatedly one art object and become
involved in an aesthetic experience
as a result of that one object. For each
time that a person views a painting,
his or her perspectives and values will
differ to some extent. With each fresh
new framework that is brought by the
individual to the art object, a different
reality or world and, thus, a new aes-
thetic experience will result.
At this point some are certain to
assert that the artist does not need
an outside or external audience, that
communication need not come into
this process at all. The argument might
be presented that an artist may not
want to show a painting to anyone, but
rather allow it to serve simply as a
focus for his or her personal images.
But this view ignores the fact that the
artist is his or her own audience. And
because a painting has a life of its
own apart from the artist, the artist is
subject to the same processes of com-
munication and interaction with the
work as is the typical spectator. As
Kaelin explains, "the artist learns as
much from his work as does his audi-
ence. The artist is his first appreciator,
. . . the first one surprised to discover
'his' idea. "2'' Thus we see that the audi-
ence is crucial in the creation of a par-
ticular reality by a work of art, whether
this audience is an outside viewer or
the artist.
Step 3: identification Is Created
Between Artist and Viewer
What is left is to explain why some
viewers succeed in vitalizing the vision
offered by a work of art and thus enter
an aesthetic experience and why
others do not. Some individuals are
able to enjoy, appreciate, and enter
into the vision, but to others, as Jung
explains, there "is no welcome, no
visible accord in the cosmos created
by the artist."28 Or as Klee explained,
the "modern work of art ... is a sym-
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bol. The symbol, by its nature, is only
intelligible to the initiated. . . ."^^ But
what accounts for the initiation of
some and not others?
The process of viewing and experi-
encing a work of nonrepresentational
art is naturally a divisive one. The art
object presents a world that is puz-
zling, foreign, and bewildering to the
viewer — a world that is novel and dif-
ferent from that which he or she has
accepted previously and assumed to be
true. This new world offered by the
art object is, in a sense, a type of pro-
test against these established visions
of the world. Thus, the viewer is forced
to confront two conflicting or differ-
ent visions of the world, and the con-
flict must be resolved. The presenta-
tion of the new vision provides the
starting point for communication be-
tween human beings because it de-
mands that a particular vision be sub-
jected to reconsideration, revision, and
adaptation, communication occurs.
The process by which the division
between the artist and the viewer (or
the artist and the art object) is re-
solved is identification. As Fry ex-
plains, "If we take an analogy from
the wireless — the artist is the trans-
mitter, the work of art the medium and
the spectator the receiver. Now for the
message to come through, the re-
ceiver must be more or less in tune
with the transmitter. "^° Division re-
mains unresolved only when the audi-
ence is unable to find a point of iden-
tification that is sufficiently persuasive
to entice it into the reality of the work.
And individuals are persuaded to en-
ter the vision only insofar as the artist
talks their language by speech, ges-
ture, tonality, order, image, attitude,
and idea.^^
Thus, we have in nonrepresenta-
tional art a process that is familiar
to communication theorists. The artist
makes choices on the basis of what
will be most persuasive to the audi-
ence or what will induce the audience
to an acceptance of a particular vision
of the world. The world view of the
artist can be expressed in various ways,
but some of the choices made by the
artist will be more effective than others
in persuading viewers to recognize a
new vision or reality.
The artist must choose from among
canvases which are small or large and
which can be made of linen or cotton.
Paints may be organic or synthetic,
and they may be applied with brushes
of varying thicknesses, a palette knife,
a finger, or a tube. The artist also is
confronted with choices as to method
— whether tonal painting, contrasted
color painting, or painting a prelimi-
nary charcoal sketch. The particular
elements chosen by the artist to ex-
press reality will determine how the
viewer will perceive that reality and
be persuaded by it. If a work of art
does not provide means of identifica-
tion for the viewer with the artist and
a special reality, then the artist's
choices have been inappropriate for
the audience, have assumed values or
capabilities in the viewer that were not
there, or have been directed at another
audience.
Thus, some degree of identification
with the artist is a part of any aesthetic
response to a work of nonrepresenta-
tional art. At the most basic level, the
artist and the viewer must hold some
similar notions about the function of
art, what is quality in art, and what is
pleasing in art. Both must acknowl-
edge the validity of nonrepresenta-
tional art and share some awareness
of the artistic choices available to the
artist from which the work was formed.
But there are some viewers whose
identification with the artist's world
is much greater, who enter fully into
the vision of a world. These viewers
we call connoisseurs; they are per-
haps the ideal audience for the artist
and result from a variety of factors
such as acquaintance with the general
style of the work, cultural background.
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and knowledge of art. In other words,
the viewer, too, makes choices that
will influence the degree to which he
or she can participate in the vision of
a work of art. The process of identifi-
cation, then, allows us to discover the
aesthetic experience less in terms of
minds mysteriously attuned to one an-
other than in terms of people ready
to appreciate each other's choice of
alternatives.^^
Implications of the Model
The process that is involved in the
aesthetic response to nonrepresenta-
tional art, we have seen, can be de-
scribed in rhetorical terms. The viewer
confronts a work which offers a par-
ticular view of reality, and the viewer
vitalizes that reality by identifying with
the artist's choices. This process and
its accompanying definition of art as
conscious production to evoke a re-
sponse have implications for art edu-
cators, artists, and baffled viewers.
Museum directors and art histori-
ans traditionally have emphasized the
learning of names and dates of works
and artists as the proper method for
studying art. Although some degree of
familiarity with particular works, styles,
and schools assists in the understand-
ing of nonrepresentational art, it does
not guarantee that the viewer will be
equipped with the tools necessary to
respond aesthetically to an unfamiliar
work of art. What is needed, accord-
ing to our model, are methods of edu-
cation about art that stress ways of
seeing and a basic knowledge of the
variety of choices available to artists.
These can be implemented through
educational supplements to exhibi-
tions that explain how works — such
as intaglio prints — are produced, the
artist's view of his or her work, or
perhaps — more generally — expla-
nations of various theories about art.
Art educators also need to encourage
visitors to their galleries to talk about
their own responses to works of art.
helping them to understand the
choices they are making in their re-
sponses, rather than simply smiling
at their ignorance as it surfaces in
expressions of bewilderment.
This theory, too, provides a basic
framework in which the artist can
function. The framework that results
from this model can be summarized
best in one question that an artist
might want to consider as he or she
works: How can I expedite the vision
that is emerging in terms of the ma-
terials, techniques, and compostion
I use so that the audience identifies
with the vision? With this focus, the
artist is forced to think of art in terms
of an audience (even if it is only him
or herself), to make deliberate choices
as to how to expedite a vision, and to
allow the work to emerge according
to its own rules rather than according
to any external dictates of a school,
style, or trend. This means, too, that
standards by which art is judged re-
main flexible and evolve as art changes,
and these standards will differ from
work to work. Rather than attempting
to judge all art according to imitation
or formalist standards, it must be
judged according to the rules that are
operating in the particular reality cre-
ated by the work. This is not to say
that there are not certain standards
of competence, technical skill, or orig-
inality that are expected from all works
of art and all serious artists. But the
skills necessary to expedite a particu-
lar vision will vary from work to work,
and what a critic demands in one work
may not be necessary in another if the
vision asks the viewer to enter a very
different reality.
We can offer the untrained viewer
some understanding about nonrepre-
sentational art as a result of this model.
Our interaction with symbols — includ-
ing the visual symbols of nonrepre-
sentational art — helps us understand
ourselves and our society. Thus, if
individuals are puzzled by works of
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art and cannot even recognize them
as art perhaps, they should look at
their own choices regarding art and
how these choices affect their atti-
tudes toward art. For example, they
might ask why they have decided that
one type of art is good and another
bad, they might think about why they
choose not to study art, and they might
want to investigate their reasons for
visiting galleries to view art. Choices
such as these affect how they respond
aesthetically to art, and if viewers
seek a fuller aesthetic experience with
nonrepresentational art, they may want
to examine choices made about art
that might be obstacles to this ex-
perience.
We do not pretend that this applica-
tion of rhetoric to art represents a
definitive and complete theory of how
an aesthetic response results from
nonrepresentational art. Rather, we
see it as a beginning step that hope-
fully will encourage theorists and
scholars — whether they study and
work in visual or verbal modes — to
share visions as they work toward a
full understanding of this process.
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Throughout the history of its phil-
osophical consideration, imagination
has been afforded a fluctuating and
ambivalent status in regard to its sig-
nificance and role as mental faculty.
Edward Casey describes this ambiva-
lence as "denial-cum-acceptance."
Casey defines denial-cum-acceptance
as a paradoxical pattern ". . . in which
an express denigration is accompa-
nied by a covert recognition of the
special utility of imagination in the
process of philosophizing."^ He fur-
ther suggests that this is an outcome
of an unwillingness to acknowledge
imagination as autonomous. Accord-
ing to Casey, the autonomy of imagina-
tion consists in ". . . its independence
from other mental acts, from its sur-
roundings, and from all pressing hu-
man causes," and in ". . . the free-
dom of mind of which imagination is
uniquely capable. "^
To claim autonomy for imagination
does not deny that imagination can-
not or does not ally with other mental
acts. Nor is it to deny that imagination
has application to and use in our lives.
To claim autonomy for imagination is
to acknowledge that capacity of the
imagination to self-generate and to
self-sustain. In this capacity, imagina-
tion has no necessary relationship to
the extraneous. I suggest that it is in
its autonomous state that imagination
presents possibility.
It is not the purpose of this paper
to elaborate on the autonomous na-
ture of imagination. I want to discuss
an aspect of imagination which ap-
pears to be a use-dependent aspect,
although I hope to demonstrate that
it is not, that in this aspect, imagi-
nation acts autonomously. By use-de-
pendent I mean that imagination is
seen to act in a non-autonomous way,
e.g., as dependent on another mental
faculty or act. The particular aspect
to be discussed is the capacity of
imagination to engage in reflection.
This will be explored in terms of its
implications for the creating and ap-
preciating of art.
That imagination in some way reflects
is a claim to be explained in this paper.
I shall attempt to explain it through
discussion of two instances in which
imagination appears to reflect. One
instance might be described as imagi-
nation reflecting on the actual. The
other instance is described as imagi-
nation reflecting on imagination. Both
instances will be exemplified in a later
part of the paper. At present it seems
necessary to discuss the term reflec-
tion.
The term reflection, used in its fa-
miliar sense in reference to a mental
act, is taken to mean the turning back
of consciousness onto a topic in a
concentrated manner. The "turning
back" effort involved in reflection im-
plies that there exists or existed some-
thing to turn back on. That is, the
something which is turned back upon
has been there at least once, or is
there now. It may be present in an
immediate sense or it may be present
in memory. I shall call this something
the "actual" in that it is, or has been.
Reflection may be directed toward that
actual which has been, it may involve
recollecting or remembering, although
remembering or recollecting are not
necessary components of reflection.
One distinction of reflection from re-
membering may be understood in light
of a dimension of reflection. This di-
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mension is the "mood" of reflection.
That is, reflection is undertaken in a
particular mood which is anticipatory
and is indigenous to reflection. This
does not deny that anticipation is in-
volved in remembering. The difference
is that the anticipation in remember-
ing is anticipation of the known,
whereas the anticipation in reflection
is anticipation of the possible.
In remembering, anticipation is di-
rected toward locating the actual
which is in memory and which is al-
ready known. Sartre describes such
events and items as being in retire-
ment. When we recall an item in re-
tirement, Sartre says that it is ". . .
posited as GIVEN-NOW-AS-IN-THE-
PAST.' "3 Further, to remember the
item is to take oneself to it. Anticipa-
tion involved in this situation might
be described as anticipation of arrival
at a destination, one which is known.
When imagination reflects on the
actual it transforms it into the pos-
sible. That is, the actual, that which
we accept as being or having been,
becomes non-actual in the sense that
we are now able to recreate it. It be-
comes possible in the sense that we
do not yet know in what ways or forms
it will be recreated. To claim this is
not to say that the actual no longer
exists as being or having been. It is
to say that we need not view it as such.
Two points need to be considered
here. One is that the actual, when
transformed by imagination into the
possible, may take on a different real-
ity. The other is that there appears to
be some intention involved in reflec-
tion which is different from the inten-
tion involved in remembering.
An example which will serve to dem-
onstrate both points mentioned above
is that of my mother's imagined age.
My mother consistently insists that
her age is four years less than it is.
She claims to have 51 years when, in
fact, she has 55. I do not know the
reasons why my mother chooses to
present her age in this way, but I am
aware of the results of her doing so.
In our society we generally name an
action such as this a lie. However, I
will describe it here as an instance of
imagination reflecting upon the actual.
In this case my mother, in reflecting
upon her age, imagines that it is other
than what it is. In simplest terms I
might say that my mother imagines
she is younger. However, this situa-
tion becomes more complex in my
mother's presentation of possible age
as actual age. The purpose of my
mother's imaginative efforts is to re-
create the actual in order to change
it. This is her intent. Because she is
able to imagine her age to be as it
might be she is also able to imagine
it to exist as it "might be" in some
reality. That is, her possible age exists
as actual age for whoever is willing
to accept it as actual. My mother's lie
can be seen as an effort to sustain
the possible.
It is not my purpose here to discuss
the ethical aspects of this example or
the degree to which my mother's imag-
ined age has become, for her, an ac-
tual age, although such discussion is
tempting. The purpose of this exam-
ple is to illustrate the two points made
previously: that the actual when trans-
formed into the possible may take on
a different reality, and that there is a
particular type of intention involved
in reflection which arises from the
anticipatory mood of reflection.
Unlike the represented age of my
mother, that which is represented in
the work of art, a painting for exam-
ple, need not have an exact correspon-
dent in the world. If my mother claims
to be 51 years old we trust that there
exists evidence, somewhere in the
world, to support this claim. When
we discover that there is no such sup-
portive evidence and that, in fact, evi-
dence to the contrary exists, then we
feel some distress or disappointment
at having been denied the actual. On
the other hand, what is represented
in a painting requires no such corre-
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spondence to the actual. That which
is represented in the painting Is the
possible. If this is true, then what is
created and appreciated in works of
art is the possible. It has been as-
serted that the function of imagina-
tion is to posit possibility. Imagining,
then, must be central to the making
and appreciating of works of art. It
is in light of this statement that I shall
discuss the instance in which imagi-
nation reflects on imagination.
I think that the context in which
imagination reflects on imagination is
most manifest in that of aesthetic ex-
perience. To the extent a work of art
has not been predetermined, the ar-
tist's imagination is active in creation
of the possible. The resultant forms
of these imaginings are presented in
the work as sensuous qualities. Within
the temporal and spatial limits of the
artist's working, it appears that all
possibilities may exist. This sense of
"emerging" possibility is experienced
in viewing works of art also. As with
the artist, the anticipatory mood of the
possible is brought into reflection on
the work by the viewer. This includes
such possibilities as perceiving, not
as yet perceived qualities, or experi-
encing, not as yet felt nuances.
Both the situation of creation and
of appreciation may be experienced
as intense. They require that the indi-
viduals involved "keep an eye on the
target." That is, reflection entails a
fierce attention to what is being made
or looked at. This fierce attention to
the work, or keeping one's eye on the
target is not for the purpose of making
the work appear static. It is to bring
into play the particular intent involved
in reflection: to allow for imagination
to project possibilities. In making and
appreciating, the artist and viewer ex-
perience the feeling that anything may
be possible in the work of art. In re-
spect to this, the work of art conveys
a capacity to emerge or unfold, both
in the process of its creation and in
its consideration by the viewer. The
work of art embodies imagination in
its most autonomous presentation as
pure possibility. When one's imagina-
tion reflects on this embodied imagi-
nation one may experience the event
aesthetically. If it is the possible which
is represented in the work of art, then
this aesthetic experience must be. In
great part, possibility. Such possibil-
ity is seen as an end in itself, both of
the artistic product and the aesthetic
experience with the product. Toward
this end imagination has no regard
for the actual.
In conclusion I want to suggest that
reflection might be seen as an act of
imagination, one which may be more
controlled than spontaneous in re-
spect to the intent of the individual.
This intent, as we have seen, is to
bring to existence the possible. If it
is feasible to regard reflection as I
have suggested then perhaps it is also
feasible to think of imagination re-
flecting on imagination as imagination
imagining itself. Although this is awk-
ward in its use of terms, I suggest that
it is central to the aesthetic experi-
ence. Perhaps more importantly, it is
central to understanding the imagina-
tion as autonomous.
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Imagination has but one function: to
posit possibility. When imagination is
exercised through belief, knowledge,
will, and hard work reality is created
from possibility. I do not mean to say
that everything imagined is realized,
rather, that reality is the result of some
imagination. That claim needs to be
explained, however. To do that I shall
differentiate three major kinds of real-
ity in a metaphysical sense. What I
want to point out in distinguishing
these three kinds of reality is the role
played in each particular one by imagi-
nation. Further, I shall briefly discuss
some implications of this metaphysi-
cal discussion of imagination for art,
artists and art education.
"Scientific" is a term commonly
used to name some descriptions of
our world, so it seems reasonable to
name the first of these kinds of real-
ity "scientific reality." It may be a
somewhat misleading term, however.
A more descriptive term might be
"common sense reality" because sci-
entific knowing derives from a com-
mon sense way of grasping the world.
We know the world by perceiving it
by way of the senses. One problem with
knowing the world through sense or-
gans is that we are so often fooled
by appearances. Let me illustrate the
point.
The sun appears to rise in the east,
move across the sky, and set in the
west. We do, in fact, speak of the ris-
ing and setting of the sun. Long ago
Ptolemy constructed a calendar on that
premise stating that the sun revolved
around the earth. But that assumption
did not explain certain other astro-
nomical observations. Later, Coper-
nicus explained the rising and setting
of the sun by the assumption that the
earth revolved around the sun. His
explanation was a better account than
Ptolemy's explanation of these astro-
nomical observations. In his explana-
tion, Copernicus had to assume that
what appeared to be so, was not in
fact the case. He had to imagine what
might be. Another way of putting this
matter is to entertain the possibility
that what ought to be the case in fact,
is. That kind of imagination often gives
rise to what has been called "theory
construction."
Common sense allows that what we
see of the world, and believe we see,
is true. In science, on the other hand,
it is assumed that perception is sub-
ject to many illusions which the scien-
tist must overcome by being objective
about perception. The scientist must
find ways of seeing that are more fool-
proof than common sense allows. In
science the assumption is also held
that'Certain prior events (in simplistic
terms) are causally connected to cer-
tain subsequent events, and that this
state of affairs allows predictions to
be made as another way of being ob-
jective. Therefore, when imaginative
constructs (theory) permit a predic-
tion, and when further observations
accord with that prediction then,
roughly speaking, "truth" has been
obtained. (Relations between fact and
language will not be discussed here.
Truth is taken in the ordinary sense
of the term.) Through scientific real-
ity, then, the world is perceived in an
objective way to be as it can be imag-
ined to be, as it ought to be.
The second order of reality will be
called "romantic reality." As opposed
to the perceived world of substance
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this one is felt by the self. The effect
of a self is like being encapsulated
within a container, looking out through
sense organs at the world much as a
submariner uses sonar and a peri-
scope. Rage and love, depression and
happiness, desire and repulsion are
experienced as dualities of an inner
life of the self just as trees, chairs
and people are experienced as an
outer one. Within the body this life of
its own carries on, sometimes sucking
the self into it like quicksand, and at
other times overflowing the self like
lava from a volcano. Sometimes the
inner world is experienced exclusive
of the other, outer world. To this ex-
treme we attach the term "madness."
Then, like Alice having eaten the mush-
rooms, the self becomes small enough
to wander, lost in a vast expanse of
that inner space. Usually, though, this
state is experienced in less extreme
fashion and one simply loses himself
momentarily in a world of dreams and
fancy— a necessary release given by
imagination from life's difficulties.'' At
other times, either rage or love may
fill the bodily container to overflowing
and even the outer world is too small
for the effects released. Rage wreaks
violence, and love bestows its favors
on friend and stranger alike.
These polar inner states have ob-
jects toward which they are directed;
sometimes within the body and other
times at the world outside. Even my
own rage can be the object of either
my anger or embarrassment. Unlike
perception which can be in error, how-
ever, the feelings experienced in the
felt world are always veridical. Rage
is always felt as rage and never mis-
takenly held to be love. Although, be-
cause they are dualities, extremes on
a continuum, an object of affection
may suddenly become one of hate; so
fickle are these inner states. Though
veridical, inner states may be mis-
directed. A fetish rather than a lover
may become the object of some de-
sire, or anger may be inappropriately
directed. One more important char-
acteristic of inner states is their need
for some compensatory response from
their object. A lover seeks returned
love; an angry man wants the other to
fight, at least.
Just as the scientific community pro-
poses methods of objectivity in order
to reduce the perceptual error of com-
mon sense, so some control over the
tidal ebb and flow of the inner, felt
world is sought. Three major possibil-
ities have been institutionalized over
the years: knowledge, the result of
scientific objectivity, is proposed by
education as control; the will or self-
restraint is the moral proposal for con-
trol made by religion; and sublima-
tion, redirecting the body's titanic
inner force to socially acceptable
ends, is the proposal made by thera-
peutic institutions. In each of these
three institutions, imagination plays a
leading role. But in all imagination
posits to be what is not, or it posits
not to be what is. Therefore, in roman-
tic reality imagination plays quite an-
other role than in scientific reality
where imagination posits to be what
in fact is. This may be elucidated a
bit more with two examples.
If I love someone and that love is
not returned, given the specific felt
urge of an inner state, my reaction is
that even if no love is returned it cer-
tainly ought to be. That is, what is not
(her love returned) is posited as a pos-
sibility in the act of my "oughting."
Or, in the case of being told by a doc-
tor that I have only six months left to
live, my inner state evokes the imagi-
native response that although this is
the case, it certainly ought not to be.
It is imaginative "oughting" which re-
leases the inner forces to motivate
overt behavior. I seek her love because
it ought to be obtainable; I actively
seek a remedy for imminent death for
it ought to be there to find. In roman-
tic reality the source of valuing is dis-
covered. What I imagine to be that is
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not, is precisely wliat I may choose to
value and, in valuing, to strive actively
toward achieving. Romantic reality cre-
ates aims and goals by virtue of imagi-
nation.
These two states of reality may prop-
erly be distinguished, because not all
that is hoped for can in fact be and
not all that in fact is, is the hoped for.
Because these states are distinct, rela-
tions between them may be made; de-
siring what cannot be had and wishing
away what must be. How is one to cope
with that which is hoped for but can-
not be, and what is it that s/he would
have otherwise? Imagination brings
one to these straits. Can it also resolve
the dilemma?
The third order of reality shall be
named "sentient reality." A more reli-
gious person might satisfy himself
with not naming it, but simply sym-
bolize it in the tetragrammaton. Or,
being bolder, s he might say that one
can be with God in unity. However,
this third state will merely be charac-
terized here with the description that
it is "riding on the wind." Other meta-
phors used by Western men to speak
of the same phenomenon are the Chris-
tian resurrection story, and Plato's
allegory of the sun.
Those familiar with Zen Buddhism
will recognize "riding on the wind" as
a reference to the state of enlighten-
ment of which the authority on Zen,
D. T. Suzuki, says, "The essence of
Zen Buddhism consists in acquiring
a new viewpoint on life and things
generally. . . . This acquirement, how-
ever, is really and naturally the greatest
mental cataclysm one can go through
with in life."^ Lest there be skepti-
cism about what has been character-
ized as mysticism by some, let me
hasten to draw upon other sources
for the facticity of this order of real-
ity. Humanistic psychologists, A. H.
Maslow for example, call it "self-actu-
alization." It has also been character-
ized as the "aha" or "eureka" experi-
ence so often noted in mathematics
and associated with the solution of
problems. Sartre calls it "possession."
It is to own one's self, to acquire a new
viewpoint the consequence of which,
in Sartre's terms allows that "I am
these objects which I possess, but
outside, so-to-speak, facing myself;
I create them as independent of me;
what I possess is mine outside of me,
outside of all subjectivity as an in-
itself which escapes me at each in-
stant and whose creation at each
instant I perpetuate. "^ Even these psy-
chological, existential resources may
be too suspect for some people, how-
ever. So let me draw upon the most
traditional and conservative resource
in the Western world, claiming that in
it also one may find a desire for the
same end sought by these other re-
sources. Albert W. Levi, the noted hu-
manist, represents tradition's version
of this third reality. He says, "A hu-
mane imagination, the forging of a
universal social bond based on sym-
pathy, and the inculcation of a tech-
nique for the realization of values then
becomes the ultimate goals of the lib-
eral arts.'"*
A full discussion of the Age of En-
lightenment as the Western world's
version of Eastern "enlightenment"
must be deferred to another time. How-
ever, it may still be pointed out, and
what is important to note of Levi's
terminology which may suffice to make
the point, is his use of the phrase
"realization of values." I take this lit-
erally to mean that values are made
real; the resolution of scientific and
romantic realities taken conjointly with
the creation of "humane imagination."
The humanistic aim, the existential,
psychological, Buddhist and religious
aims, to one degree or another, all
accept that these first two distinct
states of reality can be resolved and
collapsed into the third kind of being.
In characterizing this state which I
have termed "sentient reality" the
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psychoanalyst, Hubert Benoit likens
the two other orders of reality to a
crossroad intersecting at the center
of one's being. 5 At this metaphorical
crossroad nneet the flowing flux of
perceived and felt life which are seen,
believed, and understood by men usu-
ally to be separate and never to meet
— except, perhaps in some logical,
theoretical way. Though they are "in
one," until one understands s/he does
not experience the connection of the
two dimensions of human existence
which flow, as it were, with life.^
Metaphorically, when one stands fi-
nally, open-eyed at the crossing in the
center of one's being, the wisdom
which is revealed comprehends the
implications of being merged with
choosing, of mind at one with moral-
ity, of reality and value undistin-
guished. Paradoxically, at one and
the same time in losing existence it
is gained. This state of insight is
achieved in an instant after which
the reported sensation, in Suzuki's
words, is "Just like ordinary everyday
experience, except about two inches
off the ground!"'', thus, the compari-
son to "riding on the wind." The wis-
dom gained is a new way of looking
at life which affects one's actions.
Then there exists no happiness be-
cause there is no sadness, no outer
world because there is no inner one,
and because there is no goodness
there is no badness.
This does not mean that such a state
of sentient reality implies either the
immoral or amoral. Scientific and ro-
mantic reality are lived alternately by
most people. That is, one fluctuates
between perceived and felt experience
superimposing one upon the other,
finding values in the perceived world
and existence in the felt world. Bad-
ness, therefore, is a projection out-
ward onto the perceived world of bad-
ness felt. The abhorrence of badness,
the doing of good, is taken to be the
efforts of a self, first to make judg-
ments and then to take corrective ac-
tion. Thus, morality involves acting
out implications of non-veridical per-
ceptions of projections from the felt
world and taking the corrective mea-
sures judged as "doing good."
However, with the reduction of per-
ceived and felt worlds into one, moral-
ity must take on another significance.
No longer can one adhere to some ordi-
nary sense of "the good" which is only
the result of social conditioning any-
way. In living sentient reality one does
not confuse the perceived with the felt;
since, in becoming one, no projection
can be made either from the inside out
or from the outside in. Thus, one sim-
ply acts in manners adaptive to chang-
ing circumstances in ways which may
be continually new. As Benoit says,
one does not check his preference for
the good, but "he accepts this prefer-
ence with the same comprehensive
intellectual neutrality with which he
accepts the whole of his inner life"
without "emotional preference into an
intellectual partiality which would be
in opposition to the establishment of
inner peace. "^
The wisdom which resolves being
and valuing can be understood as a
function of imagination. To grasp this
we must know something of thought
processes leading to sentient reality.
Naming and categorizing perceived
and felt reality both is taken almost
exclusively to be "intellection." One
dimension of intellection is reasoning
or rationality: moving by (logical) rules
from one described situation to an-
other while making connections be-
tween the two and naming relation-
ships. But reasoning only acts out the
implications of having conventionally
named rules of relationship. Time,
space, and causality {pace Kant and
Hume) arise from naming things un-
derstood either as objects or relations.
One plus one equals two, can be
understood in the sense of thing-rela-
tion-thing-relation-thing. As a posited
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reality this meets all the conditions
of time, space and causality, but put
simply it is names strung out in a line.
Intellection as naming objects and
relations in sequence posits reality.
When acted out it becomes the experi-
ence of reasoning. Intellection, to say
it another way, imagines reality. As we
have seen before, however, imagina-
tion functions through a supervening
way in scientific reality to pose as pos-
sible a thing to be discovered which
in fact is. One theory of sentient real-
ity's attainment suggests that when
intellection is carried out to its utmost
extremes the true nature and folly of
its assumptions cannot but be experi-
enced. Thus, one understands finally
the ridiculousness of infinity-plus-one
after seeking logically and long for
insight into that possibility. Put yet
another way, sentient reality results
from imagination seeing through itself.
In reducing the distinction between
scientific and romantic realities wis-
dom acknowledges imagination func-
tions in these ways. What happens
further is that morality has taken on
new significance, such that continu-
ally new adaptive acts are necessary
to maintain the existing inner stabil-
ity achieved. Perhaps this may be
better understood by comparing it
with log rolling, that popular lumber-
man's sport. One must be continu-
ally alert to what is happening while
the other person rolls the log, antici-
pating the other's actions: not to
"dump" the other, or to outwit, or to
outskill the other, but simply to cope
with the other's actions in an effort
to maintain stability. Sentient reality
lived is the state of having the ability
to act in proper anticipation so as not
to be thrown into the "ego condition"
(the water). That state is arrived at by
imagination contemplating itself until
the blinding moment of insight at
which time the self exists not as a self
but as one with everything. In being
one with everything, it is the other's
being and action. In being the other
it understands action toward stability.
Though sentient reality (or some-
thing like it) is a state reportedly par-
ticipated in by some, for others it
remains at best only a hypothesis.
Taking it only in the latter sense some
comments naturally occur: One's exis-
tence without a self is not only un-
thinkable, it is logically impossible;
Why would I want to be more than my-
self?; It is wrong and blasphemous to
do away with morals because God
gives them to us. For the more curi-
ous, questions arise like: How can one
retain his freedom of choice without
a self to choose?; What happens to
existence per se when I am no longer
as I am now?; If my self is lost can
there be such a thing as knowledge?
To these comments and questions,
as well as to others, there are answers.^
For our purposes here, however, other
matters demand attention. Our pur-
pose is to understand some of the
implications of such a view for art,
the artist, and for art education. Since
that topic is so vast it can be treated
in only a sketchy manner here.
First, it would be well to say that
sentient reality suggests not so much
a loss of the entity "self" as the recog-
nition of its illusory nature. Sentient
reality suggests a sense of being much
grander than what any one "self" or
group of "selves " can envision. But
even that is illusory, as Suzuki sug-
gests in his description of the cata-
clysmic event yielding this new insight.
It is simply a new sense of real-
ity. Nor should this be too mystical.
Each of us in our lives has experi-
enced some situation which casts life
in a new way, a way more real than
before. Looking back on childhood
every adult knows how different real-
ity becomes with age. As adults we
think of our lives now as true reality
compared with childhood. There is
little mystery in this. Sentient reality
is on the order of that change of real-
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ity experienced by adults, except of
even a more solid order.
Though each aesthetic theory as-
sumes some different functions for
art, even theories of imitation allow
that art manifests true reality. What is
this true reality which is said to be
represented best in art? In terms of
our previous simile, true reality is
like being able to stay on the log with
another; the accomplishment is very
solid though the experience is pure
kinesis, pure sensation in the here
and now. However "art" may be de-
fined, the concept of aesthetics cen-
ters very much on pure sensation
which captures the eternal now. Only
a glance at the history of aesthetics
allows us the understanding that art
is believed to represent the eternal
verities. Art is that glimpse of the way
things really are; though real, not al-
ways ideal, but certainly those truths
about ourselves and the world which
must be faced. Sentient reality is that
world portrayed in art.
This conclusion about art as seen
in terms of sentient reality is by no
means outside the scope of Western
philosophy. For example, Kant's con-
cept of art was as a resolution of the
object-subject, the is-ought distinc-
tion. "That is beautiful which pleases
in the mere act of judging it," he said.''°
But we must recall that he accepted
the distinction between knower and
known. In sentient reality, since knower
and known are one in pure sensation
of the now, what was a logical prob-
lem (e.g., for Kant and others) be-
comes a psychological problem. How
does one achieve that state of unity
in which true reality is experienced?
Stated that way we seem to be ask-
ing how the artist can make his work
some vision of true reality. The incli-
nation is to assume that artists are
those who have in fact achieved a
state of sentient reality. More than
likely, however, artists are no more
or less human in respect to how they
live life than others. Biographical data
on artists do not seem to lead one to
believe they are a class all of whom
live selfless lives of pure sensation
in the now. Then how is their ability
to express true reality to be explained?
Since artists are taken to be para-
gons of imagination functioning, it
seems plausible that their efforts
called "art" are glimpses caught of
true reality, though without the com-
plete conversion which grasps the
illusory nature of a self. Boccaccio's
version of the artist as portrayed in
his book Decameron would appear to
lend itself to such a view. Having the
ability to "catch glimpses" of such
reality is on the order of claiming
for the artist his "genius" — it has
little explanatory power. But, if it is
true then others may also be allowed
glimpses of true reality, for most every-
one to some degree or other employs
imagination. This conclusion receives
credence if we look at cultures in
which art is not the prerogative of a
special class called "artists," but is
shot throughout every dimension of
the culture. Bali and Japan immedi-
ately come to mind. The Balinese cul-
ture has no need for the term "art"
because everything done in that cul-
ture has as one of its dimensions, art.
In Japan, where Zen is so prevalent,
even archery, sword-play and the tea
ceremony are considered to be artful
endeavors. It would seem no accident
that A. W. Dow and others saw in
Japanese cultural objects the princi-
ples of art making.
But if everyone can use imagination
to catch glimpses, as it were, of true
reality, then it is possible even in the
Western world that aesthetics is more
far-reaching than we may be willing
to concede. Mathematicians under-
stand the beauty of a new formulation.
One criterion of a scientific theory is
unity; a feature generally presented in
definitions of "art." Practitioners of
all occupations can take pride in the
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results of their efforts, and in this
sense what they do has an aesthetic
aspect. Yet, in the Western world,
only painters and poets are awarded
the appellation "artist," (i.e., when
they make art). Perhaps this is only
proper to the degree they concentrate
their imagination not on a new formu-
lation, theory, or job, but on visualiz-
ing the true reality. Perhaps the genius
of the artist is his (genetically) better
right brain power, or his more vivid
cerebral holographic abilities. That
must be for the psychologists and
neurologists to decide. But since the
self is, metaphysically, an imagined
entity, to use imagination to see be-
yond a self would be on the order of
imagination seeing through itself —
a
condition posed here as necessary to
achievement of sentient reality. To the
degree artists employ their imagina-
tion to see through itself (call this,
losing one's self in one's work), their
ability to catch glimpses of true reality
and therefore to portray it is enhanced.
Elsewhere''^ I have suggested that
in the artist we find the most moral
member of society, and that in his
work we find the unification of knowl-
edge and goodness. The term "moral-
ity" used there was intended in a spe-
cial sense. It should be evident now
that the concept, 'morality,' means
something different in sentient real-
ity than in either scientific or romantic
reality. The artist is moral in that spe-
cial sense to the degree that his por-
traits are of sentient reality. In such
portrayals technique and form are sec-
ondary to the content, truth of reality.
Its morality is beauty. Understanding
this should take us some way toward
recognizing the difference between art
and craft. In this, Collingwood and
Croce certainly were farsighted.
If art pictures the true, kinetic nature
of reality, and the artist captures this
by his "visions" or fleeting glimpses
of such reality, then what is the func-
tion of art education? It is tempting
to conceive of art education as that
endeavor, more than others, which
helps humans to achieve the state of
selflessness. Education certainly has
been viewed as the activity whereby
wisdom is achieved. But in our prag-
matic world, a world of individualism,
of "ego boosting," of competition and
free enterprise, an action-oriented
world of industrialism justified on the
basis of an increasingly higher stan-
dard of living for all (ideally), a pro-
posed reduction of the object-subject
distinction most likely would be to spit
into the wind. Though, we must also
remember that Zen is completely ac-
tion-oriented and perhaps even more
pragmatic than Dewey's philosophy.
But even traditional humanism does
not fare too well these days. Voca-
tionalism, learning how to do one job,
seems to be the order of the day. Per-
haps the most to be hoped for is some
examination of art with the aim of
suggesting to students the true real-
ity which art portrays. Ours is a classed
society. Our recognition and accep-
tance of American democratic poten-
tial for upward mobility should be
proof enough of that. As Samuel John-
son said, "Were it not for imagination,
sir, 'a man would be as happy in the
arms of a chambermaid as a duchess."
Imagination is as essential in our so-
ciety as in any other, despite our con-
centration on doing a job to earn
money to live well. Whether it is to
see through itself and achieve a new
state of being, or to simply catch a
glimpse as in a dream of what could
be, art education has an important
contribution to make to culture. If its
job is thought of in some sense similar
to teaching fantasy and science fic-
tion, for example, a vision of possible
pasts and futures, perhaps it will have
done its work as well as may be ex-
pected.
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A REVIEW OF RAWLEY A. SILVER'S "DEVELOPING COGNITIVE
AND CREATIVE SKILLS THROUGH ART"
Hilda Present Lewis
San Francisco State University
The purpose of Rawley A. Silver's
book, Developing Cognitive and Crea-
tive Skills Through Art is threefold:
first, to demonstrate that art activities
are useful in developing cognitive
ability in children with connmunica-
tion disorders or learning disabilities;
second, to identify art techniques that
can be used in evaluating cognitive
and creative ability in children and
adults who cannot communicate ver-
bally; and third, to show that the use
of art in therapy does not do violence
to the aims of art education. She pur-
sues these ends primarily by develop-
ing a rationale for her research studies
and citing their results.
Silver argues that we ought to focus
on the ability of handicapped children
rather than on their impairments. She
points out that some skills can be
developed despite obstacles and that
such obstacles can act as a spur to
the development of compensatory abil-
ities. Children whose impairment lim-
its the usefulness of language as a
mode of expression can find an alter-
native avenue in drawing, painting,
and modeling. Language, she reminds
us, occurs after, rather than before
thought in the developmental process.
The interaction of language and cogni-
tion, she says, is not uni-directional.
Improvement in thinking can stimulate
language, and thinking can be cap-
tured in images as well as by words.
Thus, she reasons, the child who has
difficulty in using language to deal
with reality can represent his ex-
periences by visual means. To test
this proposition empirically, she asks
whether art procedures can bypass
language disorders and provide a ve-
hicle for learning mathematical and
logical concepts. The means for eval-
uating cognitive growth is provided
by a set of Piagetian tasks that assess
concepts of space, sequential order,
and class inclusion, as well as by tests
adapted from experiments by Bruner.
The typical design of the studies is
experimental; that is, an initial assess-
ment is followed by a treatment, the
effects of which are shown in a final
assessment. Some studies are of indi-
vidual children; other studies use ex-
perimental and control groups. In all
cases, significant improvement is re-
ported.
In addition. Silver finds instances in
which drawing provides a stimulus to
language learning. For example, draw-
ings reveal concepts for which labels
are needed; drawings are sometimes
given titles; people in the drawings
speak, as in cartoons. She also claims
that drawing provides an opportunity
to use previous learning in a new situ-
ation (transfer of learning), to engage
in imaginary play with the characters
and situation depicted, to deal with
hypothetical events and abstract ideas,
and to recall experiences.
Silver also notes that art experience
is useful in promoting adjustment.
Through drawing, children who can-
not express themselves in words can
find vicarious fulfillment of wishes,
give vent to feelings, communicate,
solve problems, and deal with disap-
pointments. The release of unwanted
feelings in a constructive way via art
restores inner peace. Success in draw-
ing builds self-esteem. The control
exercised over the production of an
art work generates a sense of power.
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Improved attitudes resulting from ex-
periences in art can carry over into
other curricular areas, resulting in im-
proved learning and behavior.
Art work, Silver claims, is particu-
larly useful as a diagnostic aid in
cases where verbal communication is
difficult. Drawings can show how a
child perceives himself, his interests,
concerns, and concepts. A series of
drawings can reveal growth and
change.
Silver points out that there is very
little knowledge about the creativity
of people with language and hearing
handicaps. Existing studies are based
on verbal responses, and, as one would
expect, conclude that people with
these handicaps are low on creativity.
Silver undertook a series of studies
to determine whether deafness inter-
feres with the development of creativ-
ity. In the first of these studies, twenty-
five handicapped children attended
hour-long sessions each week for
eleven weeks in which they drew from
imagination. The results were evalu-
ated by two panels, one of twenty edu-
cational specialists and the other of
twenty art educators. Educational spe-
cialists were asked whether the art
work offered evidence of opportunity
to imagine, associate and express
thoughts and feelings, and whether
they found evidence useful in assess-
ing interests, abilities, attitudes, and
needs. The answers were overwhelm-
ingly affirmative. The art educators
were asked if they found evidence of
subject matter and technique, to
which the replies were an all but
unanimous "yes." They were then
asked to compare the pictures with
those of average and of talented hear-
ing children. Nine out of seventeen
judges found no differences between
the talented. Seven judges found aver-
age hearing children superior to the
average deaf, two found the opposite,
and eight found no difference.
The study, however, is so poorly de-
signed that it tends to discredit rather
than lend support to Silver's argu-
ment. In the first place, the questions
are so broadly stated, that negative
responses are all but ruled out. It ap-
pears that judges were asked to re-
spond to eleven weeks output as a
body rather than to individual works.
Given such a large number of works
it would be all but impossible to say
that there was no evidence of oppor-
tunity for remembering, generalizing,
expressing ideas, planning, comment-
ing, etc. In addition, judges knew they
were dealing with the work of handi-
capped children. Their compassion
may have led to a more generous
assessment than would have other-
wise been made. Furthermore, there
was no comparison of actual art works
of handicapped and normal; judges
were only asked to compare what they
saw with what they recalled about
drawings of normal children. The study
would have been greatly strengthened
if bias had been eliminated by careful
research design. For example, the
relative quality of drawings by the
handicapped as compared with those
by the normal could have been as-
sessed by blind ratings, that is, ratings
of drawings not identified as those of
normal or impaired children. A finding
of no difference then would not give
rise to skepticism.
A second study was made to com-
pare deaf and hearing populations on
the Torrance Test of Creative Think-
ing. Twelve handicapped students were
asked to integrate a pear shape into a
picture, add lines to ten incomplete
figures, and draw pictures using thirty
pairs of parallel lines. Drawings were
scored for fluency, flexibility, original-
ity, and elaboration. Scores were in-
credibly high, with average scores in
the 99th percentile. However, the test
was administered without a time limit,
but with a record of time consumed
(which was not reported). The results,
therefore, cannot be properly com-
pared with norms derived from time-
limited responses.
62 Hilda P. Lewis
In a more carefully controlled study
three professors of art and education
evaluated unidentified works by twenty-
two students in Silver's experimental
classes, and twenty-two hearing art stu-
dents in public elementary, secondary,
and adult classes. The art work was
judged for sensitivity, originality, and
expressiveness. The findings showed
that average scores of deaf children
and adults were slightly better than
the scores of their hearing counter-
parts, while the scores of the deaf
teenagers were slightly lower.
In yet another study thirteen art edu-
cators made blind judgments of port-
folios of sixteen deaf students in Sil-
ver's experimental classes. Judges were
asked to compare the work with that
of their own students — children, teen-
agers, or adults. The portfolios were
judged for originality, sensitivity and
expressiveness on a five point scale.
Scores ranged from 2.23 to 3.74, with
most scores above 3. If one assumes
that 3 is an average score, the deaf stu-
dents were generally above average.
However, the findings would be more
credible if judges blindly scored works
of normal students too, thereby estab-
lishing a base line for interpreting the
ratings for the deaf.
Additional studies, too numerous to
review in detail, lead Silver to conclude
that deafness does not necessarily im-
pede the development of creative skills
and that art education and art therapy
can be pursued concurrently. She adds,
however, that the findings cannot be
considered conclusive because they
are based on small samples. However,
in my opinion the sample size is not
nearly as great a flaw as the absence
of experimental controls, such as those
discussed above. Better research de-
sign may have led to less spectacular
but more believable findings.
Silver continues by presenting argu-
ments and research findings in sup-
port of the view that art therapy is not
subversive to the goals of art educa-
tion. She takes the position that aes-
thetic value does not reside only in
form. Citing Kris, she contends that
aesthetic value also lies in expressive
or symbolic content.
In the arena of practice, she finds no
conflict between the goals and meth-
ods of art education and art therapy.
She claims that more than one objec-
tive can be pursued at the same time,
that art experience can support cogni-
tive and emotional goals without ne-
glecting art values and skills, and that
lessons can be structured without loss
of spontaneity. To support these views,
Silver undertakes a number of studies
to illuminate the relationship of art ther-
apy and art education.
Silver develops programs directed at
four main objectives: (a) widening the
range of communication, (b) providing
tasks that invite exploratory learning,
(c) providing tasks that are self-reward-
ing, and (d) reinforcing emotional bal-
ance. The first objective is emphasized
with students who have difficulty with
language. For them representation
rather than design is stressed. Demon-
strations are the instructional mode.
With learning-disabled children whose
language seems intact, emphasis is on
forrn rather than content. Their visual-
motor weaknesses are remedied by kin-
esthetic art activities, such as clay mod-
eling and monoprinting in rhythmic
repetitive designs. For people with
both verbal and visual-motor impair-
ment, such as stroke patients, content is
emphasized. With disturbed people, em-
phasis is on building confidence and
reinforcing emotional balance.
Art procedures are utilized to de-
velop cognitive skills believed to be
basic to mathematics and reading.
These skills, identified by Piaget, are
the ability to classify, orient spatially,
and order sequentially. The art proce-
dures selected involve tasks related to
these three cognitive skills. For exam-
ple, drawing from observation involves
the ability to perceive and represent
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spatial relationships. Drawing from
imagination involves selection, combi-
nation and ordering. Predictive draw-
ing, painting or modeling, by which
Silver means using visual representa-
tion in temporal ordering of future
events, requires spatial and sequential
ordering. Through these art activities
children who are deficient in language
are given opportunities to solve prob-
lems and develop concepts. With these
methods and goals in mind Silver de-
veloped art programs and evaluated
cognitive growth.
Tasks were devised to increase and
assess the ability to select, combine,
and represent. For example, in one
study children were given sets of stim-
ulus cards, each containing a picture
of a person, object, animal or scene,
and were asked to draw a story about
the card selected. The drawings were
evaluated for levels of ability to select:
the concrete (lowest) level, the func-
tional (intermediate) level, and the ab-
stract (highest) level. The concrete
level is based on perceptual attributes
such as color or shape. For example,
an apple and an orange are both
round. The functional level refers to
use — they are eaten. The abstract
level classifies them as fruit. In addi-
tion, drawings were rated on five levels
of the ability to combine: (a) objects
are isolated, (b) objects are related by
proximity and separation, (c) objects
are arranged on a baseline, (d) draw-
ing shows some coordination, and (e)
drawing takes into account distances,
proportion, perspective, and dimen-
sions of the paper. In evaluating the
ability to represent, the lowest score
is assigned to copying, an intermediate
score to restructuring, and the highest
score to a highly personal, imaginative
or inventive transformation. Aesthetic
merit, affect, and the picture title were
also rated.
The studies involved pretesting of
impaired and unimpaired children, pro-
viding a program for half of each
group, and post-testing. The account
of the research is the major shortcom-
ing of the book. The studies are usually
described in two different places, once
in the body of the book, and again in
a separate chapter at the end titled
"Statistical Analysis." However in
neither description is there an ade-
quate account of the experimental pro-
gram, the remediation in Silver's ter-
minology. Although the teachers and
students were described, the duration
of the program given, the training of
teacher noted, and the preparation
time per class stated, the crucial ele-
ment was omitted: what happened in
the classes. The wealth of detail in
description of the studies, including
rather superfluous information, such
as the name of the person who ana-
lyzed the data, contrasts sharply with
the absence of information on the pro-
gram that brought about the spectacu-
lar results.
Furthermore, Silver neglects to con-
trol for the Westinghouse effect. As
every graduate student knows, produc-
tion at Westinghouse increased each
time the illumination was increased;
production also increased each time
illumination was decreased. The les-
son is that it is not what you do but
the fact that you do it. Any attention
to a group can be expected to improve
the performance of that group. There-
fore, the control group must be pro-
vided with a program of comparable
dimensions to demonstrate that it was
not the attention but the specific ex-
perimental intervention that made a
difference. Silver fails to make provi-
sion for this and thereby weakens her
case.
Silver continues by developing and
testing art programs designed to in-
crease the ability to order sequentially,
j
predict and conserve. Children were
given tasks devised by Piaget and
Bruner, such as ordering ten sticks
from the longest to the shortest, draw-
ing the surface of the water in a tilted
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bottle, representing the level of a soda
as it is consumed, drawing a house on
a slope, pouring lentils from a wider
to a narrower container and stating if
the amount is the same or different,
and ordering a matrix by height and by
width. The experimental program con-
sisted of ordering color tints, compar-
ing weights of clay, observing water
in a tilted bottle, observing a plumb-
line, and attaching a toy house to a
model hill, followed by a drawing of
what was seen. Again, the experimen-
tal group, consisting of language and
hearing impaired children, who were
inferior to the normal (control) group
in the pretest, equalled or excelled the
unimpaired in the posttest.
The research is marred in several
respects. The major defect is that the
experimental program can hardly be
considered art. The program focuses
on observation. An art program cer-
tainly requires observation, but obser-
vation of itself cannot be considered
art education. A second flaw is the
failure to provide some sort of pro-
gram for the control group. And the
third is seemingly careless and repeti-
tive research reports. For example,
the number of unimpaired children is
given in one instance as 68 and in the
sentence immediately following the
combined impaired and control group
is again given as 68. Reported sample
size varies without adequate explana-
tion in successive references to the
same study. Statements are repeated
needlessly. Furthermore the detailed
descriptions of the studies lack infor-
mation that would enable readers to
scrutinize the research. For example, a
chart titled "Results, predictive draw-
ing test by normal children (N-68)," is
presented, but comparable data for the
impaired are omitted. Furthermore, if
these data are important then pre and
post test data for both groups ought
to be provided, not just pre or post test
data for one group. Studies ought to
have been fully presented in one place
rather than partially presented both in
the body of the book and in a separate
chapter. Perhaps Silver feared some
readers would be mired if reports were
presented in detail in the text. In that
case the reader ought to have been
directed to the pages on which com-
plete reports are given. As it stands
the reader is left to locate the relevant
pages unassisted.
In the program to increase the abil-
ity to perceive and represent concepts
of space through drawing from obser-
vation, the testing and remediation
procedures are particularly question-
able. For example, the child watches
as the therapist slowly and with much
explanation, draws an arrangement of
cylinders. The child then draws it him-
self. Thus one cannot be sure whether
the child is drawing from what he sees
or from his recollection of the thera-
pist's drawing. In another task, the
child is asked to duplicate an arrange-
ment of blocks. This task is considered
an art activity. It may be a useful experi-
ence but it is not art. Other experi-
ences, to which the same objection
applies, are arranging ten matchsticks
in a straight line and placing a doll in
a landscape to match the position of a
doll in an identical landscape. There
are no other activities reported. These
three can hardly be considered an art
program.
Silver describes testing and reme-
diation procedures used with eight
patients who suffered language im-
pairment as a result of a stroke. Im-
provement is noted. However, the
reader is offered no basis for evaluat-
ing the contribution of the program,
as compared to other kinds of pro-
grams or none at all.
By way of summary. Silver points
out the need for greater precision in
identifying the abilities and disabilities
of handicapped children. She claims
that drawing procedures can serve as
instrument for assessing and develop-
ing cognitive abilities such as the abil-
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ity to associate and represent con-
cepts, the ability to order sequentially,
and the ability to perceive and repre-
sent spatial relationships, in those who
cannot communicate verbally. These
abilities, she observes, seem relatively
independent of language impairment
and verbal analytic thinking, and to
some extent even independent of age.
Inability to drav\/ may be attributable
to difficulty in processing spatial in-
formation, a defect frequently ne-
glected in schools which emphasize
verbal-analytic skills. Visual-spatial
ability may be a key to certain types
of cognitive functioning, and as such
provide a basis for instructional group-
ing which is independent of the nature
of the handicap.
It may well be that much of the real
success of the programs is due to an
encouraging and supportive atmo-
sphere. Test score gains may be at-
tributable to the stimulation of curi-
osity and provision of opportunities
to manipulate, observe and reflect. In
this respect Silver's programs would
be of value to normal children too.
Silver urges art education for the
deaf so that they can have an avenue
for expressing thought and feelings.
She believes that the visual arts can
be a major source of enjoyment for
them. Silver minimizes the distinction
between art education and art therapy,
claiming that the same kind of art ex-
perience can serve aesthetic and ther-
apeutic goals. She believes that art
teachers can try to stimulate cognition
and adjustment without abandoning
traditional goals of art teaching, and
art therapists can try to develop art
skills and cognitive skills without de-
stroying spontaneity. However, the art
experiences utilized in her programs
make very little contribution to the aes-
thetic. The pictures that come out of
the programs and illustrate the book
are at the best ordinary.
In sum. Silver argues well for the
value of art experience in the life and
learning of the handicapped. Her re-
search, however, does little to support
her belief and her so-called art pro-
gram turns out to be a misnomer. Bet-
ter designed studies are needed to de-
termine the contribution of the visual
arts to the education of the handi-
capped. Let us hope they will appear.
Pr. Hilda Present Lewis
Education Department
San Francisco State University
San Francisco, California 94100
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UNDERGRADUATE ELEMENTARY EDUCATION MAJORS' ATTITUDE
TOWARDS THE TEACHING OF ART
John Brady Hall, Sr., Ph.D.
The University of Alabama
Abstract
The nnajor purpose of this dissertation
was to assess attitudes of students
majoring in elementary education to-
ward the teaching of art and to make
recommendations for improving prep-
aration programs at the university level
which might help develop a more posi-
tive attitude.
A questionnaire, developed from rel-
evant literature, was used to collect
data for the study. Seventy-five items
were reviewed for content validation
by three noted art educators from dif-
ferent geographic areas of the United
States. Upon the recommendations of
the validators, a revised questionnaire
containing forty items was adminis-
tered for clarity and readability to
twenty-five elementary education ma-
jors enrolled at two private institutions
in Alabama.
The instrument incorporated a five-
point Likert-type scale with choices
ranging from strongly disagree to
strongly agree. The subjects of the
study were asked to rate each state-
ment, indicating the degree of agree-
ment or disagreement based upon their
opinions about the teaching of art.
As a result of the sample study, the
questionnaire was revised. The revised
questionnaire was administered to a
population of 255 elementary educa-
tion majors enrolled at Alabama Agri-
cultural and Mechanical University,
Alabama State University, Auburn Uni-
versity, Jacksonville State University,
The University of Alabama, Troy State
University, the University of North Ala-
bama, and the University of South
Alabama.
After collecting the ratings from each
of the schools, the responses were ana-
lyzed. A computerized item analysis
provided means and standard devia-
tions based on total scores which were
reported by institution and by total
population.
An analysis of the research data pro-
vided the following findings:
1. Responses from two universities
indicated that students were provided
adequate time in the art education
courses to visit and observe in the
classrooms where children are in-
volved in art activities.
2. The students sampled in all uni-
versities indicated by their responses
that they were not provided adequate
materials in art education courses to
enable them to participate effectively
in classroom activities.
3. Responses from all universities
indicated that elementary education
majorg had few activities while en-
rolled in art education courses which
required special drawing skills.
4. Responses from all universities
indicated that present art education
courses should provide more exposure
to films, filmstrips, and prints.
Additional findings are:
1. Responses from four universities
indicated that art education courses
provided enough time for elementary
education majors to work with children
engaged in art activities.
2. Responses from universities indi-
cated that art education courses pro-
vided elementary education majors
with a greater understanding of their
roles as future classroom teachers.
3. Responses from three of the eight
universities indicated that students
felt that art education courses were
inadequate in preparing them to enter
the teaching profession.
4. Responses from all universities
indicated that instructors in art edu-
cation courses did not stress the im-
portance of understanding human
growth and development.
5. Responses from all universities in-
dicated that interaction between stu-
dents and university professors was
insufficient to enhance their profi-
ciency in teaching art.
Based on the study, it was recom-
mended that:
1. Preparation courses for elemen-
tary education majors be designed to
foster positive attitudes toward teach-
ing art by providing environments con-
ducive to learning through art experi-
ences.
2. All elementary majors be pro-
vided experiences in a variety of media
and the use of various art tools.
3. All elementary majors spend time
observing and/or working with teach-
ers and artists who are working with
students.
4. All elementary majors be involved
in artistic experiences for skill devel-
opment.
5. School administrators become ac-
quainted with the importance of art
in the curriculum.
It further was recommended that a
task force be created to assess exist-
ing art programs in the state and make
recommendations for improvement.
Review
Jerry W. Morris
Miami University
Statement of the Problem
The attitudinal research topic of this
dissertation is certainly a credible one,
one which has been typically over-
looked by both those in art education
and general education as well, yet one
which deserves strict and immediate
Jattention. If subscription is given t
attitude theory (i.e., that attitudes ulti-
mately have influence on human be-
havior), it behooves art educators con-
cerned with the training of elementary
teachers to take note of the attitudes
being formulated by these trainees
toward the teaching of art. As Hall
contends (p. 1; p. 5), ineffective ele-
mentary teacher preparation, which
fails to give just attention to proper
art attitude development, runs the very
real risk of creating ineffective class-
room teachers of art at best, or creat-
ing elementary teachers who never
attempt to teach art in their class-
rooms, at worst. Indeed, these are
points well taken in the introductory
\
section of the dissertation. i
Although the introductory section
'
of this dissertation develops a general
.
argument for the study, it does so in a 5
somewhat confusing way. First, the?
researcher confounds the concept of \
an attitude with other concepts such j
as knowledge and understanding (p. 1; •
p. 3; p. 4). Literature in the field of so-;
cial psychology goes to some length ;
in stressing the difference between
i
the unique features of an attitude and.
the related concepts of belief, opinion,
value, etc. (Morris and Stuckhardt,
1977). While attitude, as a concept, is
related to the concepts of knowledge
and understanding, attitude is not sy-
nonymous with these; neither should
these concepts be used interchange-
ably with attitude. To do so detracts
from the sophistication of the study
and confuses the reader.
Second, there is no specific "state-
ment of the problem" to assist the
reader in deciphering the study. Rather,
the reader must read through the intro-
ductory chapter and fit the bits and
pieces together to discover the basic
aspects of the inquiry.
Third, no objectives are specified for
the study, and it is only through two
stated "purposes of the study" that the
reader gains any help from the re-
searcher in particularizing goals for the
study. As presented these are: (a) "to
assess attitudes of students majoring in
elementary education toward the teach-
ing of art" and (b) "to make recommen-
dations for improving preparation pro-
grams which might help to develop a
more positive attitude" (p. 7).
It is the opinion of this reviewer that
these "purposes" need revision in con-
sideration of what the study actually re-
ports. Because "recommendations" are
usually presented in the concluding
phase of a dissertation or any research
report, they might be accepted as a
given, need not be presented as a speci-
fied purpose, and consequently, should
be omitted from coverage at this time.
Since this study does seek to assess atti-
tudes, the first purpose seems credible.
To accomplish this assessment, the re-
searcher developed an attitude scale to
use as a measuring instrument. It ap-
pears, however, that the development of
this attitude scale should be noted as a
purpose of the study as well. Had this
been the case and had the researcher
given more priority to the development
of a valid and reliable scale, perhaps the
researcher would have adhered to ac-
cepted methodological procedure in
construction of the scale. Perhaps,
then, the scale would possess certain
characteristics required of Likert-type
attitude scales. Since neither proper
procedure nor essential characteristics
mark Hall's method or his scale, the re-
sults from the reported study must be
considered questionable at best.
Related Literature
It is this reviewer's opinion that the de-
ficiencies exhibited in the scale and in
its method of construction are a direct
result of an inadequate survey of litera-
ture. The dissertation directs itself
toward three main areas of literature
coverage: (a) "definition of attitudes,
"
(b) "elementary teachers' knowledge
and attitudes about art education," and
(c) "elementary teachers' preparation
for teaching art" (p. 12). The total
number of references covered amounts
to only sixteen, and the majority of these
are contained in the third section. Three
separate references are noted in the
section on attitude definition, and only
one of these is from the field of social
psychology. This is hardly adequate
coverage considering the absolutely
voluminous body of literature which
exists on the subject of attitudes. Totally
missing from the related literature
survey are such areas of direct applica-
tion as the process of attitude develop-
ment or formation, the phenomenon of
attitude change, theory and methods of
attitude alteration, and attitude scaling
methodology.
By its title alone, this dissertation is
heavily invested in the subject of atti-
tudes, a subject which is extremely com-
plex and a subject which is pursued with
sophisticated, yet explicated methods
of inquiry. Certainly, an extensive re-
lated literature survey on attitude and at-
titude-related topics is called for as evi-
dence that the researcher has familiar-
ized himself with the subject of inquiry
and that he has a working grasp of the
topic, problem of study, and research
procedures. Further, the more exten-
sive the coverage of the literature a
dissertation contains, the more
grounded is the research. Because the
survey of literature in Hall's dissertation
is meager at best, it is understandable
why the reported research possesses
appalling deficiencies in method, pre-
sentation and analysis of data, as well as
recommendations.
Methodology
It is in the chapter on methodology
("Design and Procedures") that the
severity of the deficiencies of the study
become apparent. An eight-step pro-
cedure is outlined which is primarily
devoted to the construction of a five-
response-mode, Likert type, attitude
scale. The scale was designed to mea-
sure elementary education majors' atti-
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tude toward the teaching of art. Essen-
tially the following occurred: (a) a
"questionnaire" was developed as a
result of a search of the related literature
and informal observations of students
engaged in art activities (Also, discus-
sions with college educators in art and
with public school supervisors were
used to develop the questionnaire.); (b)
the resulting seventy-five item ques-
tionnaire was evaluated for "content
validity" by three nationally known art
educators; (c) a forty item instrument
was then administered as a pilot test to
thirty-four elementary education majors
enrolled at two private institutions in
Alabama for the purpose of assuring
'clarity and readability"; (d) the instru-
ment was again revised and some items
were restated; and (e) the final form of
the forty item scale was administered to
255 elementary education majors who
were enrolled at eight state-supported
universities in Alabama. Results from
the administration were then tabulated.
The Likert method of attitude scale
construction maintains as its objective
the development of a valid and reliable
instrument which can be used to differ-
entiate between individuals (i.e., groups
of individuals) who hold a positive atti-
tude and individuals who hold a nega-
tive attitude toward some referent
object (in this case the referent object is
the teaching of art). Because of numer-
ous methodological deficiencies, the
scale reported in this dissertation is
neither valid nor reliable — nor does it
seek to differentiate between those who
hold a positive and a negative attitude.
It should be noted that an attempt is
made by Hall to assure the content
validity of the scale by having three "ex-
perts" review it for item ambiguity and
inadequacy. While such a step is sug-
gested by Likert in the development of
scale items, alone it is insufficient to
insure validity.
Also, content validity is partially at-
tended to in the construction of scale
items, as items were reportedly based
upon the literature, interviews, and
classroom obervations. These attempts
to insure validity must be viewed skep-
tically, however, since no reference list
noting the literature search is presented
and no information from the interviews
or the observations is given. Further, the
researcher does not report this step in
procedure as being related to validity.
A check of the items comprising the
scale also casts doubt upon the con-
tent validity of the scale. Scale items
should notexist asdual statements (e.g.,
"students were exposed to exploratory
feelings and activities in this course
resulting in some fun"). Dual statements
allow the subject to react to two dif-
ferent areas of content (e.g., "feeling"
and "activities") thereby confounding
the nature of content covered by the
item. Likert emphasizes the need to
eliminate such items from further con-
sideration.
A check of the reported scale items
also reveals that they cover a range of
subjects (e.g., "creativity," "art educa-
tion programs, ""student's attitude,"
"applied experiences," "college and
university instructors"). Without an at-
tempt on the part of the researcher to
clearly delineate the content domain of
"the teaching of art," an important ini-
tial step is omitted which is deemed
essential to the validity of the scale.
No statistical methods of item analy-
sis were reported as being used in the
study. Neither were checks of the reli-
ability of the scale. Had the researcher
adhered to Likert's method, certain
steps could have been taken to achieve
a sound attitude scale. Let us review
some probable steps (Stuckhardt,
1976).
The initial procedural step in scale
construction outlined by Likert is to
collect a large number of opinion state-
ments about the attitude referent. To
insure the content validity of the scale
being constructed, several important
considerations must be attended to
during this phase (Borhonstedt, 1970).
First, the boundaries of the attitude
domain must be determined; second,
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these boundaries must be clearly de-
lineated; third, statements must be col-
lected which exhaust the content
domain.
The second procedure outlined by
Likert calls for an initial editing of the
collected statements. Here, all state-
ments are reviewed, similar ones are
consolidated, and dual statements are
made into two separate items.
In the third procedure, each item is
further scrutinized and rewritten to
conform to informal writing criteria.
Likert (1967, p. 90-91) stipulated the
following criteria:
1
.
It is essential that all statements be
expressions of desired behavior
and not statements of fact.
2. The second criteria is the necessity
of stating each proposition in
clear, concise, straight-forward
statements.
3. In general, it would seem desirable
to have questions so worded that
the modal reaction to some is more
toward one end of the attitude con-
tinuum and others more in the
middle or toward the other end.
4. It seems desirable to have the dif-
ferent statements so worded that
about one-half of them have one
end of the attitude continuum
corresponding to the . . . upper part
of the reaction alternative and the
other half ... (to the) lower part of
the reaction alternative.
Likert's fourth construction pro-
cedure involves selecting statements
which appear to be best suited for a final
scale. Selected statements should ef-
fectivly differentiate between subjects
in a group who have a favorable attitude
and those who have an unfavorable at-
titude toward a designated referent
(Likert, 1967, pp. 91-93). To check the
differentiating ability of an item, a trial
scale possessing several potential items
should be constructed for administra-
tion to the group or part of the group
whose attitudes are to be measured
(Likert, 1967, p. 91). Again, the purpose
of this fourth procedure is to allow for
checking an item's discriminating abil-
ity through a trial scale. Although Hall
did develop a "pilot test," the purpose
was to check its "clarity" and "read-
abilty, ' and any attempt to verify the
discriminating power of items was ig-
nored.
Selecting items for the trial scale,
from among those collected, is a pro-
cess which may be accomplished in
numerous ways. Stuckhardt (1976)
applied Kerlinger's (1964, pp. 582-586)
Q-sort technique as an objective
method for selecting trial scale items.
The development of "keyword quali-
fiers" may also be used as a technique
for trial scale item selection (Stuck-
hardt & Morris, 1980). This latter tech-
nique is more subjective than the
formerly mentioned one and seeks to
compile the collected statements into
common areas of content. Sample items
are, in turn, selected from each content
area to facilitate representation of the
total content domain.
The fifth procedure in the Likert
method of constructing an attitude
scale is to administer the trial scale and
analyze the returns for the purpose of
selecting items which will comprise the
final form of the scale. Items selected
are those which indicate an ability to
discriminate.
The best known index of item dis-
crimination is the statistically derived
item analysis (Stuckhardt, 1976, p. 79).
Two methods of item analysis consis-
tently appear in attitude research. The
first is what Likert (1 967) has referred to
as the criterion of "internal consis-
tency" (p. 93). In this method, consid-
eration is given to how well an item dis-
tinguishes between a high and a low
criterion group as established by the
total scores calculated for all tested
subjects (usually the top and bottom 27
percent). The second method is to
compute the coefficient between indi-
vidual item scores and the total scores
for all the tests and to select those items
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which correlate highly with the total
scores (Likert, 1976, p. 91; Stuckhardt,
1976, p. 79). Those items which gener-
ate the most favorable scores are se-
lected for the final form of the scale.
A computer program has been de-
veloped by Kohr (1971) for Likert type
scale analysis. This program incorpo-
rates both of the item analysis pro-
cedures previously noted, and it com-
putes Henrysson's (1963) adjusted item
total correlation (R), another index of
discriminating power. The Kohr pro-
gram also computes two figures of reli-
ability, Cronbach's (1951) coefficient
alpha and Guttman's (1945) Lambda-3;
and it provides a projected estimate of
the number of items required of a final
scale to reach reliability coefficients of
.60, .70, .80, and .90. Ideally, a final scale
should have a reliability coefficient of at
least .78 (Borhonstedt, 1970, p. 87).
The last procedure in the Likert
method is to select the most suitable
items for inclusion in the final form of
the scale. After these final items are
compiled, they are randomly selected
for order of presentation. The final form
is then administered in the designated
research setting.
Results and Discussion
To present and analyze the data ob-
tained from the reported scale, the re-
searcher compiled data items into one
of four categories: (a) strategies for
valuing art, (b) strategies for producing
art, (c) strategies for perceiving and
responding to art, and (d) strategies for
teaching art. Why this step was taken
still remains a question to this reviewer.
Perhaps, the procedure would be ac-
ceptable if it reflected some attempt to
deal with the scale's validity, but this
does not appear to be the case. At least
no such explanation or rationale is pre-
sented. It is interesting to note that when
categorized into four major headings,
the scale assumes a profile which is no
longer one-dimensional; rather, the
scale becomes a series of four sub-
scales, none of which possess a suitable
number of items required to produce
high reliability coefficients (Seller &
Hough, 1970, p. 171). Hall never con-
siders the categories of items as sub-
scales, and confusion remains as to why
the categories were employed.
To present data, draw conclusions,
and offer recommendations, the re-
searcher compiled means and standard
deviations of item responses in each
"category." These data were first pre-
sented and discussed by institution and
secondly by total sample. After con-
cluding that the elementary education
majors' attitude toward the teaching of
art — in all "categories" — was nega-
tive, recommendations for improve-
ment of elementary teacher preparation
were presented. Evidently, data and dis-
cussion were handled and presented in
this manner to accomplish stated pur-
poses of the study (i.e., to assess atti-
tudes and make recommendations).
However, the result is a misuse of an at-
titude scale as a research instrument.
Several examples can be noted.
First, the researcher compared group
means to the Likert five-step con-
tinuum. Scores greater than 3.0 were
interpreted as an indication of a positive
attitude because they were greater than
the neutral point on the Likert scale.
Scores less than 3.0 were interpreted as
a negative attitude. However, it cannot
be assumed that the neutral point on an
attitude scale corresponds with the mid-
point of the range of possible scores
from a group. Instead, the acceptable
point of comparison is the group mean
score, and this point of comparison
varies from group to group (Edwards,
1957). Whether an attitude held by a
group is positive or negative is a relative
matter. To establish the degree of
favorability or unfavorability of an atti-
tude, it is common practice to compare
mean scale scores for dissimilar groups
or to compare mean scale scores for the
same group prior to and after some
treatment (Edwards, 1957, p. 157;
Stuckhardt, 1976). Also, in some cases it
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may be beneficial to compare the score
of an individual to the mean established
for the group with which the individual
is identified (Stuckhardt, 1976, p. 63). In
each of these conditions, the group
mean is the point of origin for score
comparison — not an arbitrary neutral
point on the Likert continuum, as was
used by Hall.
It is interesting to note that there was
no known group comparison presented
in the study. If the researcher sought to
assess whether elementary education
majors' attitude toward the teaching of
art is favorable or unfavorable (and if
favorability or unfavorability is a relative
matter which is dependent upon group
comparison), then it would appear that
an appropriate step for the researcher
would have been to use a dissimilar
group for scale score comparison. As
the study now exists, the results only
indicate that elementary teachers tend
to share similar views on certain items.
In concluding the dissertation, the
researcher compiled a list of all scale
items which were favorably agreed
upon by the subjects and presented
them as "major findings." This is, in-
deed, an unorthodox use of an attitude
scale. One point might be noted with
regard to this step: the purpose of an at-
titude scale is to discriminate between
subjects who hold a positive and a nega-
tive attitude — not to seek items with
which the group favorably agrees. To do
so relegates the nature of an attitude
scale to that of an opinion survey, and
these are two distinctly different de-
vices.
Ten recommendations terminate the
dissertation. These appear to be totally
unrelated to — and unsubstantiated by
— the research presented.
Reviewer's Commentary
When a research effort of quality is ini-
tiated, it is incumbent upon the re-
searcher to be thoroughly familiar with
the phenomenon or phenomena being
investigated, with prescribed or appro-
priate methodology, and with how best
to use results generated from the study.
Without proper familiarization the entire
piece of research runs the risk of being
misguided, of fumbling through a series
of confusing procedures, and of having
a negligible impact. An extensive
review of related literature and presen-
tation are basic steps to take for guard-
ing against these deficiencies. Such a
review and presentation operates to
ground and support the entire research
effort, and its importance cannot be
overlooked. Unfortunately, this disser-
tation does not present even an ade-
quate survey of literature — much less
an extensive one. It is little wonder that
the study contains the gross deficien-
cies which have been noted.
This condition is especially tragic in a
doctoral study where the process of
learning correctly how to conduct re-
search is a primary objective. It is the
responsibility of the candidate to be
thoroughly familiar with his or her re-
search topic, and it is the responsibility
of the candidate's adviser and commit-
tee to challenge the candidate to always
"know more." If the basics of research
are not instilled in the "dissertation
stage" of a professional career, it is
highly unlikely that they will appear at
some later point in time.
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AN EXAMINATION OF ART EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN COMPREHENSIVE
SENIOR HIGH SCHOOLS: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
Harry A. Garton
Temple University, 1978
Abstract
The primary focus of this descriptive
study was an examination of the basis of
program adoption and/or program
development in art education in the
twenty-one comprehensive senior high
schools in the School District of Phila-
delphia (1966-76). Personal, structured,
executive interviews, conducted in the
work setting with art teachers respon-
sible for art programs, were the source
of data for this study.
One significant finding was that pro-
gram adoption and/or development was
random, and not based in a rationale.
Three possible courses of action are
presented; one is recommended:
secondary art teachers must be pre-
pared to examine and apply alternative
rationales for program development.
It is hypothesized that theoreticians
and philosophers of art provide the
premises from which art education de-
rives its substance. It is hypothesized
that Curricularists develop the criteria
for selecting and ordering that content.
It is further hypothesized that art edu-
cators translate that content to students
in secondary schooling. Program de-
velopment necessitates collaboration.
Review
Richard R. Doornek
Milwaukee Public Schools
Statement of the Problem
Kerlinger (1973, p. 16) provides three
criteria of good problems and problem
statements. One, the problem should
express a relationship between two or
more variables. Two, the problem
should be stated clearly and unam-
biguously in question form. Three, the
problem and problem statement should
be such as to imply possibility of em-
pirical testing. A problem, then, is an
interrogative sentence that asks: What
relation exists between two or more
variables? The answer is what is being
sought in the research.
"The basic problem of this study was
to describe the current status of pro-
gram development in Art Education in
the comprehensive senior high schools
of the School District of Philadelphia."
(p. 1). The real problem in this paper is
that there is no problem. "To describe"
fails the test of a good problem in at
least two categories. No relationship
between variables is expressed and no
question is asked. Empirical data might
be part of the descriptive act, but when
no question is asked, to what might the
data be applied? Garton suggests that
the descriptive act would provide basis
for implications for program develop-
ment for art education in secondary
schooling (p. 1). This aim is quickly
countered when he states, "No claim is
made, or can be made, in this study, to
relate findings to any other population"
(p. 30). (The population supposedly
identified as the art departments of "the
comprehensive senior high schools of
the School District of Philadelphia. . . .")
"To describe the status of program
development" is a legitimate purpose.
However, when no relationship is stated
or hypothesized between the "status"
and another variable, any further dis-
cussion lacks substance or direction.
The reviewer wonders whether Garton
intended to investigate the relationship
between the status of program de-
velopment and art education theory, or
effective art instruction, or teacher
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training. Ambiguity in stating a problem
leads to ambiguity in interpretation.
In establishing the importance of the
study, the investigator provides a brief
review of historical developments which
preceded the present situation in the
Philadelphia Public Schools. This over-
view, while interesting, might have been
more appropriately placed in the Re-
lated Research Section since it did not
establish a credible need for the study
nor did the review enhance the impor-
tance of the study to the field. The moti-
vation for the study is stated as a
recommendation, made by Tobye Pell-
man Polk, to secure "nominal data rela-
tive to program development." (p. 9).
Polk is the author of "An Examination of
Elective English Programs in Compre-
hensive Senior High Schools: Implica-
tions for Program Development," an
Ed.D. dissertation completed at Temple
University in 1976.
Ziegfeld (1959, p. 153) provided a list
of five generalizations relating to the
need for survey and descriptive re-
search in art education. In addition, he
provided four characteristics of good
surveys. One of the first statements en-
countered is, "The right questions must
be asked." The hazards of providing
answers to the wrong questions or pro-
viding answers without asking ques-
tions are revealed in the subsequent
chapters of this paper.
Related Research
The section typically identified as Re-
lated Research was entitled "Art Edu-
cation: A Perspective." An insightful
comment in the first paragraph indi-
cated that "... it becomes apparent that
art education has been fraught with
many of the same conflicts and prob-
lems concerning program development
and content selection as many other
subject matter areas in schooling." (p.
10). This observation raised the hope
that a thorough investigation into the
ways which researchers in "other sub-
ject matter" have analyzed the "ap-
parent" problems would lend insights
for the field of art education. This an-
ticipation was quickly dashed. The total
of twenty-seven citations in the section
included, at the most, only three primary
sources, none from outside the field of
art education. Four of the contributing
authors to Programs of Prom/se — Art in
the Schools were cited, all respected
writers in the field, yet, in this case, lack-
ing the credibility of primary literature
sources. Many conflicting opinions
were offered as to the state of program
development in art education, but little
evidence from other program de-
velopers or practitioners. The conclu-
sion offered, ". . . that program develop-
ment in art education is unguided and
lacking in systematic approaches," is
based upon selected opinions rather
than any attempt to assess and synthe-
size the state of program development.
Studies should account and build
upon what has transpired. The related
research section has not described
what has transpired in program de-
velopment in art education nor has the
author reported related research in any
other field of education. Further de-
velopment of the questionable problem
must, therefore, be built upon the shift-
ing sands of opinion.
This review of the literature was a brief
summary of selected authors in the field
who have contributed to art education
theory during the period 1966 to 1976.
The review was intended to provide a
basis for understanding the "major con-
flict" in art education in the preceding
decade. The major conflict was "be-
tween those who believed that ac-
countability could be attained only
through structured approaches to
courses . .
.
, and those who believed that
only courses which fostered students'
self-expression could protect the crea-
tive climate essential to appreciating
and/or producing art." (p. 10). Authors
included in the review were "behavior-
ists" (p. 13) Eisner, Ecker, Hubbard and
Rouse and "experimentalist" Schwartz.
Feldman's writing was summarized as a
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problem-solving approach. Other In-
fluential behaviorially oriented sources
the author includes are the Central Mid-
west Regional Educational Laboratory
and the Northwest Regional Educa-
tional Laboratory.
A separate section is given to explor-
ing opinions on the content of art. In-
cluded in this sampling are Stevini,
Hausman, Kaufman, Burgess, Mittler,
Paston and Dimondstein. The conclu-
sion offered from these authors is "that
program development in art education
is unguided and lacking in systematic
approaches." (p. 27). The nexus be-
tween this conclusion and the state of
program development in art in Phila-
delphia illustrates a popular fallacy
which represents a danger to educa-
tional theory. Post hoc, ergo propter
hoc: after this, therefore, caused by this.
The implicit assumption underlying the
review section is that the state of the
literature reviewed had some causal re-
lationship with the state of program
development in Philadelphia as re-
vealed in the proposed survey.
Research Objectives
"An examination of the present status
could enable the derivation of implica-
tion and recommendations for syste-
matic program development in the fu-
ture." (p. 9). If the primary objective of
this study was "an examination of the
present status of art programs in Phila-
delphia," that objective was fulfilled.
However, since no problem or a conflict
capable of resolution was previously
stated, there could be no hypotheses
and, indeed, there were none.
A key to understanding this paper can
be found in the last paragraph wherein
Garton states, "Informal observations
by administrative and/or supervisory
personnel, without stated criteria, are
'ad hoc' judgments." (p. 72). Lack of
problem definition, coupled with the
absence of directional predictions or
hypotheses as criteria must, by logic,
make this an "ad hoc" paper. The re-
viewer experienced resultant difficulty
in determining whether this was a de-
scriptive study, an ex post facto study,
an observational or historical study or a
combination of the above. Although a
survey was used, the information
sought made classification difficult.
Many of the questions were of an ex post
facto nature. According to Kerlinger, ex
post facto research that is conducted
without hypotheses, without predic-
tions — research in which data are col-
lected and then interpreted — should be
considered dangerous in its power to
mislead. Without hypothetical relation-
ships to guide data evaluation, explana-
tions or predictions do not lend them-
selves to nullifiability. Whatever the ob-
servations, new interpretations can be
found to "fit the facts." Kerlinger (p.
392) suggests a good rule to follow
would be to ignore the results of any ex
post facto study that does not test hy-
potheses.
The essential steps of survey, obser-
vational or historical research are much
the same as those involved in other
types of research. The problem must be
defined; the data gathered, evaluated
and synthesized; and an accurate ac-
count of the subject must be presented.
Borg and Gall (1971) state that it is es-
pecially important that the writer care-
fully defines his problem and appraises
its appropriateness before committing
himself. Some problems have little or no
chance of producing significant results
because the problem is poorly defined
or trivial in nature (p. 261).
Methodology
The section subtitled, "Research De-
sign," indicates that there were two dis-
tinct but interrelated aspects addressed
by the study. First, formal interviews
were conducted in twenty-one compre-
hensive senior high schools to deter-
mine the basis for adoption and/or de-
velopment of art programs. Second,
from the interviews, attempts were
made to identify implications for pro-
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gram development in secondary school-
ing, implications for the preparation of
secondary art teachers and implications
for further study.
The survey interviews were adminis-
tered to the entire population — twenty-
one individuals with some responsibility
for the art program in their high school.
The interviews were conducted A) in the
classroom while students worked, B)
before school, C) after school, D) during
the teacher's preparation hour, E)
during the teacher's lunch period, and
F) over the phone. Difficulty would be
experienced creating any more vari-
ables for twenty-one respondents. In ad-
dition, ambiguity in questions and termi-
nology provided a resultant confusion
in distribution of answers. A question
and discussion on page 63, illustrates
the lack of clarity and resultant ambi-
guity of response.
Question: B. Implementation of Program
1. Steps in Implementation
2. Breadth of Implication
Discussion of Responses: ... of those
five who claimed the art program was
implemented in its entirety, four also
reported the apparently conflicting
claim that the program was imple-
mented in stages.
Had a good problem been stated and
research objectives refined, well con-
structed survey questions might have
provided information of value to the
field. Unfortunately, the information
represents useless answers to vague
questions.
Results and Discussion
Despite the lack of direction or form in
the beginning chapters of the paper,
Garton provides an interesting picture
of the state of a large city art program.
However, because of the questionable
research design and methodology,
many of the conclusions must also be
questionable. Garton states that "with-
out a consistent set of statements that
describe and explain an approach to
program development, there is no con-
nection between and among the
courses that are compiled." The re-
viewer's question to this logic is,
"Would the existence of a set of state-
ments describing an approach, there-
fore, make a compilation of courses a
program?" The reviewer also questions
the scope of the implied recommenda-
tion. If a "consistent set of statements"
is appropriate for a system, then shall
we be consistent statewide? Nation-
wide?
Reviewer's Commentary
One can only speculate whether Gar-
ton's efforts could have made a contri-
bution to program development in art
education. Lack of scholarly responsi-
bility on the part of his committee must
certainly be mentioned. Guidance in
problem definition, problem signifi-
cance, problem clarity and potential for
resolution should be the responsibility
of the doctoral advisor and the disserta-
tion committee.
A minor, yet perplexing issue is raised
in reviewing the first two pages of the
dissertation, the title page and the ap-
proval page. The title page indicates the
paper was submitted in partial fulfill-
ment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Education. Yet the approval
page indicates that the paper was ap-
proved and accepted in partial fulfill-
ment for the degree of Doctor of Phi-
losophy. The reviewer resents the im-
plications of this "oversight" for both
art education and the degree granting
process.
The results and implications of this
study should not be taken seriously.
Lack of form made understanding of
content very difficult and determination
of validity impossible. If doctoral dis-
sertations are to be a means for examin-
ing problems and issues in the field,
then the candidate and the committee
have a responsibility to present their
work in comprehensible form. This re-
viewer experienced feelings of ani-
mosity and chagrin upon the initial
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reading of the paper and this made ob-
jective analysis of Garten's efforts very
difficult. Those who are attempting to
provide a sense of direction to research
in art education deserve better attention
to acceptable form to enable conscien-
tious attention to content.
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YOUNG CHILDREN'S ACQUISITION OF SELECTED CONCEPTS RELATED TO ART,
READING READINESS AND MATHEMATICS THROUGH ART EXPERIENCES
Cynthia Monique Manet, Ph.D.
The Florida State University, 1978
Abstract
The purpose of this study was to de-
termine whether concepts related to art,
reading readiness and mathematics
could be taught to three and five-year-
old children through art experiences
and whether there would be an observ-
able difference and progressive change
in the art products.
Concepts identified by professionals
were described and identified as the
children viewed and talked about the art
prints and the collage they were con-
structing.
Eight private, middle class day care
centers in Leon County, Florida were
randomly selected to participate in this
study. From these schools, 29 three-
year-old and 30 five-year-old children
were randomly selected as subjects.
Two instruments were designed by
the investigator. One measured concept
acquisition and one rated the collages
and their changes over the four ses-
sions.
A list of concepts was presented to
one professor and three graduate stu-
dents in each area of: Art Education,
Language Arts, and Mathematics Edu-
cation, with a request that those con-
cepts in their area, applicable to pre-
school and kindergarten children be
underlined. Early Childhood graduate
students also submitted a list for cross
validation. Concepts identified by three
out of four were selected and were vali-
dated in a reliability study with four-
year-old children. A final list of twelve
concepts was obtained by deletion of
easy and ambiguous concepts.
In this study pre- and posttests were
administered. At each of four treatment
sessions for the experimental group,
concepts were presented. A reproduc-
tion of an abstract painting, having
salient concepts for that session was
presented as a stimulus.
These concepts were identified and
described in the prints as they worked
on the construction of collage from
precut paper in differing colors and
shapes. The control groups were given
the same art materials but no treat-
ments.
Data revealed statistical significance
for both ages in favor of the experi- ,
mental groups in the acquisition of the '
concepts.
No significant difference was found in
the control groups on the pre/posttest
comparison in acquisition of the con-
cepts. Both five-year-old groups of chil-
,
dren did significantly better on the post-
test than either of the three-year-old
groups.
Collage scores were judged on the art
criteria of: focus, unity and direction.
Data indicated that both experimental
groups as a whole were above both
control groups as a whole after the final
treatment. The three-year-old experi-
mental group scored higher than both
the three- and five-year-old control
groups. Scores for both experimental
groups increased as the treatment
sessions progressed. Three-year-old
control subjects lost points while five-
year-old control subjects gained in the
beginning but leveled on the last three
sessions.
In this study where concepts were
presented within context of the art
experience, acquisition was accom-
plished. The children's art products
also improved as they mastered them.
Further research is recommended.
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Review
Sonia M. Forseth
University of South Florida at Tampa
Statement of the Problem
The purpose of the study was to deter-
mine whether concepts related to art,
reading readiness, and mathematics
could be taught to three- and five-year-
old children through an art medium. It
was hypothesized that introducing and
talking about these concepts while chil-
dren viewed art prints, and manipulated
and used art materials would not only
facilitate the learning of concepts, but
would change the art product they pro-
duced as the concepts were acquired.
Related Research
Manet conducted a comprehensive and
sound review of literature. The literature
was related to the following areas: (a)
Developmental Studies in Art and Inter-
vention, (b) Values in Art; (c) Art and
Language as Communication, (d) Prob-
lems in Product Evaluation, and (e) Con-
cept Formation and Transfer.
Manet indicates that (a) the more
elaborate verbal and visual concepts
helped children develop more complex
art expressions. The art expressions as
form of communication are reflecting
an extension of the verbal and visual
concepts presented. This shows the
importance of art in relation to young
children and learning, (b) The value of
art in teaching concepts stimulates
communication, cognition, and adjust-
ment without neglecting or interferring
with development of the sensitivities to
art values and skills in art techniques,
(c) Communication through and about
graphic expression is the beginning of
academic learning, (d) Preschool
teachers can judge cognitive content in
the drawings (art products) by relatively
simple techniques, i.e., by assigning a
familiar subject to be drawn and by
counting the number of features of the
subject. These evaluations are needed
in a program of fostering cognitive
development through drawing, (e)
Learning a concept means learning to
classify stimulus situations in terms of
abstracted properties like color, shape,
position, number and others. Based
upon the review of the literature Manet
states that the study was developed to
measure the acquisition of selected
concepts through the use of art experi-
ences as a valuable means of relating
the divergence or open-endedness of
art, to the convergent areas of reading
readiness and mathematics, thereby
facilitating the transfer of these con-
cepts through the medium of art.
Methodology
Subjects: The sample consisted of fifty-
nine children, ages three and five years
old. Twenty-nine three-year-old and
thirty five-year-old children were ran-
domly selected from eight randomly se-
lected middle-class day care centers.
Dependent Variables: Two instru-
ments were used in the study. (1) The
SMART Test (Survey of Math, Art and
Reading Readiness Trials) designed by
the investigator to measure the acquisi-
tion of four concepts broken down into
twelve subconcepts. (2) The Rating
Scale for Collage Evaluation designed
by the investigator and two knowl-
edgeable professors to visually and
verbally measure the art criteria of
focus, unity, and direction in the chil-
dren's art collages produced during the
treatment sessions.
Independent Variables: Eight stu-
dent volunteers from upper level under-
graduate and graduate education
courses were trained as testers. Con-
trols were placed on the use of the room
at the day care center where treatments
were being administrated. There was a
control and an experimental group.
Procedures in preparation for the study
were as follows: identification of related
concepts to be used with the children
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were the result of Manet's efforts; com-
posite lists of terms were given to one
professor each in Art Education, Lan-
guage Arts-Reading Readiness and
Mathematics; final test yielding a total of
50 concepts and a pilot study narrowed
the original fifty concepts to twenty-
eight. All four treatment sessions were
administered by the investigator.
Treatments
There were four treatment sessions in
which a child was exposed to an art print
and a collage exercise. Each one was
designed with a general category for the
purpose of identification — Session
One: Color; Session Two: Line; Session
Three: Shape; and Session Four:
Space. Each category had three sub-
concepts affiliated with it. The control
group only participated in the collage
exercise.
After the discussion children were
given art materials to make a collage.
Randomly selected collages from the
control and experimental groups were
rated on unity, focus, and direction by
three judges.
Results and Discussion
Four hypotheses were tested. The first
two hypotheses indicated an analysis of
variance and computed on two main
effects, age and treatments. The critical
level of acceptance was set at .01.
Significant differences were found on
both variables favoring the treatment
group, and age was a significant factor
in learning the twelve subconcepts.
The last two hypotheses were stated
examining observable differences be-
tween treatment groups on art prod-
ucts. Manet concluded that treatments
did make a difference on the collage
products, and this effect did effect a
definite change in overall collage art
products as the children acquired the
concepts in the context of the treat-
ment. Manet concludes that art is a
viable means of learning common con-
cepts by manipulating the art materials
and being reinforced by the teacher
when the child verbalizes the concept.
Further evidence indicated that children
are able to learn concepts about art,
reading readiness, and mathematics,
and that there will be a difference in
products through art experience which
includes viewing art prints, manipulat-
ing materials, and talking about the
concepts presented by the teacher.
Manet suggests further research to be
designed to examine the evaluation of
young children's art. This study used
only three art criteria in determining
changes in art products. Manet sug-
gests that others be explored.
Reviewers Commentary
The reviewer found the dissertation re-
search a worthwhile topic, but difficult
to follow. The organization of the writ-
ten work lacked logic, and inappro-
priate test statistics were used to ana-
lyze data. However, this is not indicative
of a poorly designed study. On the con-
trary, this study was well designed and
well executed, but fell short in the analy-
sis of the data and reported results.
A major criticism concerns the han-
dling of the test statistics. An analysis of
variance was reported on two hypothe-
ses indicating significant differences on
two main effects. Pretest results on one
hypothesis indicated a significant dif-
ference between ages at the .01 critical
level. The age difference favored the
five-year-old group. Manet stated that
this indicates this age group was more
familiar with some of the concepts.
Manet further stated that although the
five-year-old subjects showed a signifi-
cant difference in comparison with the
three-year-old subjects, the individual
experimental and control groups were
evenly matched and started at approxi-
mately the same level of knowledge of
the concepts presented on the SMART
Test. No statistical correction was used
to adjust this difference on posttest
results.
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The reviewer questions the validity of
the conclusions on the first two hy-
potheses which state that there will be
no significant difference in conceptual
acquisition of these concepts between
age groups of three- and five-year-old
children, and no significant difference
occurring between treatment groups.
The treatments tested four concepts:
color, line, shape, and space. No analy-
sis of variance was done on each of
these variables in respect to the main
effects: to conclude that there was a
significant difference in concept attain-
ment by comparing treatment groups
and age is not sufficient evidence that
concept attainment took place. The re-
viewer questions to what extent was
each acquired, and which concept ac-
tually affected the art product.
The evaluation of children's art prod-
ucts is the most important outcome of
this study. Manet has opened some
fresh insights in art evaluation. The
approach in this study should be further
explored and developed. However, the
handling of the analysis of raw data on
this is questionable. Manet did not com-
plete the analysis. The evaluation scores
were given and compared between
treatments. The high scores favored the
experimental group. Cumulative scores
which were the results of judges were
totaled and compared. No test statistic
was used on the raw data. Some test
statistic for significance should have
been used on such data.
In conclusion, this reviewer believes
that this study has contributed evidence
that the use of art has interdisciplinary
effects on young children's concept at-
tainment. It supports the notion that art
is a necessary basic learning experience
for children, and is required in helping
children develop concepts fundamental
to the learning of reading and geometric
and topological spatial notions in
mathematics. Manet should be encour-
aged to further explore evaluation
methods of young children's art as this
appeared to be the strength and contri-
bution of this study.
Sonia M. Forseth
University of South Florida
Office of the President
Tampa, Florida 33620
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THE USE OF AN OBSERVATIONAL SYSTEM FOR INSTRUCTIONAL ANALYSIS
(O.S.I.A.) AND SOME ETHNOGRAPHIC METHODS FOR THE DESCRIPTION OF
AN "ARTISTS-IN-SCHOOLS" PROGRAM-MODEL
Stephen Orise Oru, Ph.D.
The Ohio State University, 1978
Abstract
In recent years, the evaluation of the ef-
fectiveness of the Artists-in-Schools
Program Models has come to be of tre-
mendous concern. But in spite of the
importance attached to the systematic
investigation of these programs little
has been done to provide useful and
reliable information on the outcomes of
such programs.
The purpose of this study was to ex-
plore the use of the "Observational
System for Instructional Analysis"
(O.S.I.A.) by Hough, etal., 1972, and cer-
tain ethnographic methods in describ-
ing the program process of an "Artists-
in-Schools" (A.I.S.) model in which this
author was the artist. The focus of the
investigation was on a local situation
and the primary purpose was to de-
scribe the instructional behaviors of
program participants. The major ques-
tion for the study is as follows:
What was the nature of the immediate
and descriptive information provided
through "The Observational System for
instructional Analysis" and ethno-
graphical methods about the first, third
and fifth days of the program-model
studied?
The need for the facilitation of data
relevant to the major question led to
the formulation of the following five
subquestions:
1
.
Which were the behaviors most prac-
ticed and what was the nature of
moves from one behavior to another
by program participants?
2. What were the strategy patterns,
mean percentages and frequencies
by five-second intervals of behaviors
manifested by teachers, students
and artist?
3. How were manifested program be-
haviors functionally distributed —
that is, what were the mean percent-
ages and frequencies of behaviors
that were substantive, managerial,
appraisal and instructionally non-
functional?
4. Which were the program objectives
promoted and practiced during the
program process?
5. What was the nature of ethnographic
information provided through enum-
eration-samples and participant-
observation about the number of
students that participated in the pro-
gram, the actual length of the pro-
gram and some participants' be-
haviors that were not recorded
through O.S.I.A.?
The dissertation consisted of five
chapters. The first chapter presented
the need for an objective study of the
A.I.S. It also stated the problem, pur-
pose and significance of study. The
chapter ended with the definition of
terms used in the study.
The second chapter presented an
overview of literature in two areas:
(1) Statements by proponents of the
A.I.S. P., and 2) Criticisms of the A.I.S. P.
The third chapter presented the design
of the study. It described the instrument
used for the investigation, rationales
for using O.S.I.A., the development
of program objectives and the proce-
dures used to gather data "live" during
the program process. It concluded with
a description of data analysis proce-
dures.
The fourth chapter presented the data
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analysis and the findings of the investi-
gation. It contained the description
of the program behavior patterns. The
findings portrayed that the O.S.I. A. in-
strument was able to pick up shifts in
the behaviors of program participants
and indicate that the artist in the class-
room played the role of a teacher.
The fifth chapter summarized the
study. This included the conclusion
that the O.S.I. A. could be considered
an adequate observational instrument
for gathering A.I.S.P. behavioral data
and data on the program character-
istics through both live and video taped
observations of the particular program
investigated. In addition, it was in-
dicated in the chapter that the O.S.I.A.
and the ethnographic methods em-
ployed could be tested and used by
art educators and the Endowment to
describe and evaluate the process
aspects of A.I.S.P., based on the fact
that the study revealed them to be valid
and feasible for such purposes.
Review
Robert J. Saunders
ConnecticutState Department of Educa-
tion
Statement of the Problem
For his major problem for investiga-
tion, Oru asks, "What kind of immediate
and descriptive information will The
Observational System for Instructional
Analysis' and ethnographical methods
provide about the first, third, and fifth
days of the program — model studied?"
(Oru, p. 17). The question seems sec-
ondary to problems treated in the "In-
troduction and Review of Related Liter-
ature."
Oru provides a brief historical intro-
duction on the origins and purposes of
the National Foundation for the Arts
and Humanities, the National Endow-
ment for the Arts, the Artists-in-Schools
programs and the intent of Congress
in their formation. He describes the
Greater Columbus Arts Council Artists-
in-Schools program as a model for A.I. S.
programs. Their director of A.I.S. pro-
grams mentioned by Oru included over
72 programs in the following sections:
dance — 3, drama — 2, film — 12, liter-
ature — 21, and music — 34. Only one
in the visual arts was mentioned, that
one taught by Oru and used in his
study. As an A.I.S. artist, trained in
O.S.I.A. techniques, he used himself as
the experimental program model. Each
of the programs described by Oru used
some degree of performance, demon-
stration, interaction between the artists,
students and teachers, and frequently
resulted in student made examples or
performances which were discussed
and critiqued by the artist.
Oru describes two previous attempts
to evaluate A.I.S. programs. One by
CEMREL, Inc., /A Report on the Training
of Evaluators, Artist in Residence Proj-
ect 1970-71, and the other of the West-
ern Arts Foundation program for the
National Endowment for the Arts. He
criticized both, using articles by Eisner
(1974), Day (1978), and Smith (1978).
Their argument is directed more at at-
tempts to gloss over negative factors
and over generalize the successes of the
programs, avoid the issue of evaluation,
or faij to set a definite policy for A.I.S.
programs, than towards specific
methods of evaluation such as student
attitude surveys, pre-posttest proce-
dures, questionnaires to adult partici-
pants, narratives, interviews, visita-
tions, follow-up activities, and so forth.
The authors make excellent cases for
their criticism, but are not addressing
the problem addressed by the study
program. Eisner suggests six positive
criteria for evaluating artist-in-schools
programs which Oru quotes in full.
Briefly stated, they are: 1) How many
students are in the program, what per-
centage of the school population are
they, and for how long are they in the
program? 2) What are the satisfactions
and dissatisfactions of the relevant par-
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ticipating populations, i.e., students,
teachers, administrators, and parents?
(We might add, artists.) 3) What are the
program's goals and the extent to which
they should be realized? 4) How long
should the funding last? 5) What factors
led to the successes and the failures
within the program, and 6) What is
unique about what the artist offers that
cannot be obtained elsewhere?
Written in 1974, such criteria have
been somewhat standard in many State
Department of Education evaluation
procedures since the late 1960's,
whether dealing with art or non-art pro-
grams. They have probably been used
by some state and local arts councils as
well. These criteria lend themselves to
questionnaires, interviews and visita-
tions.
Criteria 6, the uniqueness of the art-
ists' offerings is perhaps not considered
as often as it could be, and might be the
heart of the evaluation. If anything, the
interaction analysis methods may ad-
dress this criteria very well. This pos-
sibility is overlooked in the current
study. That CEMREL, Inc. and the NEA
used evaluation techniques reliable
enough to reveal weaknesses and nega-
tive factors, even though they did not
publicize them, does not seem to have
entered into the discourse. The need
felt by the agencies to gloss over weak-
nesses, dissatisfactions, and negative
factors through generalized reportage,
or their failure to set policies for A.I.S.
programs, raise ethical and political
questions which need answers. It
is not within the purview of this review
to do so.
Oru's Review of Related Literature
continues a similar argument with
similar references. It focuses more on
the same issues than to review liter-
ature about various methods to evaluate
A.I.S. programs, such as Robert Stake
(1975), a publication sponsored by the
John D. Rockefeller III Fund. Nor does
Oru's review of literature include de-
tailed discussion of other methods of
interaction analysis, except for broad
references and generalizations of his
own. Why, for instance, is the O.S.I.A.
more appropriate than the system of
Flanders and Amidon, which he men-
tions in passing, or others? He also
provides no justification for using
O.S.I. A. methods instead of surveys,
questionnaires, visitations and inter-
views.
Oru does say about the O.S.I. A., "the
system has been utilized effectively
in research by Hough, et al. (1973),
Sevigny (1977), Hansra (1978), Kaiser
(1974), Layne (1974), and Feldens
(1976) " (p. 40). He did cite the O.S.I.A.
system as being used in an in-service
training program for a school district,
a Title III training program for E.M.E.
(?) students, and in-service training
courses taught at Ohio State University.
He does not describe the programs or
discuss them, besides which there are
problems in checking his sources.
Of the six references mentioned above,
Hansra is not listed in the bibliography,
and sources for Kaiser, Layne, and
Feldens are Dissertation Abstracts.
Oru states further, "After a review
of these studies and many others in-
volving the use of interaction analysis
systems (Flanders, 1963, 1965-67;
American Association for College for
Teacher Education, 1966; Anderson,
1965; Hoffman, 1961-63; and Belan-
ger, 1965), it became evident that if
there is an approach which has been
most persistently used in recent years,
it is interaction analysis" (pp. 40-41).
This seems like an over-generalization
since descriptions of the research are
not provided. Again, four of the six
references are not listed in the bibli-
ography; Flanders 1963, and Berlanger
1965 are the exceptions. Too frequently,
it seems, his references for O.S.I.A. ma-
terials are unpublished papers, mimeo-
graphed documents, or speeches given
at American Education Research As-
sociation (A.E.R.A.) conferences —
sources not easily accessible to the
readers who are not at Ohio State Uni-
versity.
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Methodology
For this study, Oru taught a five-day
sculpture demonstration to groups
of fifth and sixth graders in a local ele-
mentary school. He used a trained
O.S.I.A. observer, not affiliated with the
Greater Columbus Arts Council, and
afilmmakerfrom theO.S.U. campuswho
operated a video tape recorder. The
O.S.I.A. observer sat in the room with
a cassette audio recorder, and an
O.S.I. A. check sheet on which she
marked the moves or behavior of the
participants at five second intervals.
The audio cassette and the video tape
recorders were support aids if needed
later during the analysis of data. The
demonstration took place in the center
of the room with the students and
teachers standing around the artist
in a circle. The artist demonstrated
how to make a life size plaster sculp-
ture of a student model from the arma-
ture through the finished piece. The
demonstrations covered five days, and
the observations were made on the first,
third and fifth days. They began at
9:00 A.M. and lasted three hours, each
a full day demonstration of about four
sessions of thirty minutes each. There
were 49 fifth graders (18-girls, 31 -boys),
and 48 sixth graders (28-girls, 20-boys),
a total of 97 students, four classroom
teachers, and one art teacher.
The Observational System for Instruc-
tional Analysis (O.S.I. A.) was used. It
consists of a trained observer using
a check sheet and special coding and
every five seconds entering the code
notation for the behavior, interaction
or move taking place at the time. The
O.S.I.A. system has two types of behavior
with sub-categories: (Figure 2, p. 43)
I. Instructionally functional behavior.
A. Appraisal behavior that— "judges
or acknowledges a person, a be-
havior, or a product of a person's
behavior,"
B. Substantive behavior that "is di-
rectly associated with achieving
learning outcomes, (which are)
a legitimate part of the subject
matter of the field under study,
and
C. Managerial behavior that "is di-
rectly associated with nonsub-
stantive conditions . . . (that) help
influence the achievement of sub-
stantive learning outcomes."
II. Instructionally, nonfunctional be-
havior:
"does clearly or apparently inter-
feres with either the creation of the
nonsubstantive conditions for
learning or with the achievement
of substantive learning outcomes."
(p. 43).
Example 1. (below) shows the cate-
gories of O.S.I. A. functions and code
symbols (p. 44):
Code
Function Category Symbol
m Thinking 1
> Sensing 2
1-
Manipulating Artifacts 3
< Initiating 4
CD
m Responding 53
CO
Soliciting Clarification 6
Soliciting 7
_l
Thinking 01
< Sensing 02
DC
LU
Manipulating Artifacts 03
<
Z
Initiating 04
Responding 05
Soliciting Clarification 06
Soliciting 07
_l
<
U3
Judging Correctness 8
Personal Positive Judgirig 9
<
cc
Acknowledging 10
Q. Judging Incorrectness 11
< Personal Negative Judging 12
Instructionally Non-
functional 13
External Instructionally
Nonfunctional Source x
Interaction Separation v
Serial Behavior Separation z
Figure 3. Categories of O.S.I. A.; Their
Functions and Code Symbols, (p. 44)
EXAMPLE NO. 1
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Goals and objectives set for the
demonstration were based on those of
Greater Columbus Arts Council, Artists-
in-Schools Guidelines, and the Guide-
lines for Planning Art Instruction in the
Elementary Schools of Ohio. Three
goals and seventeen objectives were
identified: 1) Personal fulfillment
through art — six objectives, 2) Aware-
ness of Art in Society — five objectives,
and 3) Awareness of Artistic Heritage —
six objectives. The seventeen objec-
tives dealt with children learning to
understand and use terms and equip-
ment of making sculpture, develop
perceptual powers, describe qualities
in works of sculpture, judge and explain
significance of works of art, interpret
art, develop criteria for art judgments,
understand social and cultural dif-
ferences in American and Nigerian art,
talk about Nigerian art and culture,
and realistic and abstract sculpture,
understand differences from artists
and themselves in sources, develop-
ment and presentation of ideas in
visual form, personal expression, and
control of media.
Oru developed eleven coded sub-
scripts and assigned them to the seven-
teen objectives. For example:
Goal I Personal Fulfillment Through Art:
Obj. 1. "develop (children's)
understanding of terms and equip-
ment used to make sculpture"
(p. 50), was assigned subscript
B, which used categories of "initi-
ating, responding, soliciting clari-
fication, and soliciting" (p. 52).
The code numbers for these be-
haviors are, respectively: 5, 6, 7.
Subscript B was also assigned to
Goal III, Objective 6.
Obj. 2. "develop (children's)
powers of perception by taking
note of visual qualities in the art
work as it is produced by the
sculptor," (p. 50), was assigned
subscript H, and "only coded
when, as the artist demonstrates,
students watch with rapt atten-
tion and willingness to experience
program." (p. 54). The code for
subscript H is "H." j
Obj. 3. "voice descriptions of
the qualities (the children) see
in the work being made by the
sculptor" (p. 50), was assigned
subscript E, "initiating, respond-
ing, soliciting clarification and
soliciting" (p. 53). The code
numbers are 4, 5, 6 and 7. Sub-
script E was also assigned to
Goal I, objective 5, Goal II,
objective 5, and Goal III, objec-
tives 3 and 5.
Other coding was also used: i.e., T —
Teacher, S — Student, and — Other,
which in this case is the Artist (p. 63).
The goals and objectives were dis-
cussed with the teachers and principal
of the school. It is not clear if the
demonstration of a life size plaster
sculpture of a student had any direct
relationship with an on-going part
of the art program for fifth and sixth
grade students. Nor is it clear why Ni-
gerian art and culture were included in
the objectives and subject matter,
except for the nationality of the artist,
who is Nigerian. Were the students
studying Nigeria? What relationship
has Nigerian art to sculpting in plaster
with an armature? One of the criteria
in evaluating an A.I.S. program not
mentioned by Eisner is its relationship
to the on-going curriculum. There is no
evidence in Oru's ethnographic in-
formation about the demonstration
that any examples or materials dealing
with Nigerian culture and art were used
to support those particular objectives.
Results and Discussion
Following each of the observations,
the O.S.I. A. data on frequencies of
behavior, categories, and subscripts
were keypunched on computer cards
and processed on a specially designed
O.S.I.A. computer program. The major
question (quoted above) was given five
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subquestions, and each was answered
for each of the three days. The data
analysis produced thirty-seven tables
and nine figures of information on
rank order of frequency, strategy pat-
terns, functional distributions of be-
haviors, printouts of O.S.I.A. 1,849 item
cell-matrices, and ethnographic data.
All of which describe the interaction
of the participants in each of their pos-
sible relationships for each of the three
observation days. A composite of the
three days observation in answer to
the five subquestions is provided in
the summary.
As an example, the frequency of
those behaviors assigned to objectives
1 and 3, described above for Goal I, for
the first day, would be within the fol-
lowing data: (Table 1, p. 71)
Student substantive
solicitation — 154 times
Student substantive
response — 77 times
Student substantive
solicitation for
clarification
Student substantive
initiating
— 29 times
— 18 times
However, since solicitation, for ex-
ample, was assigned to sixteen of the
seventeen objectives, the 154 times
includes each of them. Since each ob-
jective has more than one behavior
category assigned to it, the actual
process of finding out how many
frequencies of behavior for a single
objective was not provided. Conse-
quently, a 1 to 1 ratio of behavior to
objective does not seem feasible. It
may be in the data that is provided in
the "Subscript Analysis of Behavior
Tables," but as simple as they look
this reviewer still cannot figure out
what they mean.
A section of Table 2, "Rank order of
major moves by program participants
on the first day . . ." (pp. 72-75), is
TABLE 2
Rank Order of Major Moves by Program Participants on the First Day of Program
Activities Obtained from Quadrants 1-9, Figure 7
Program Participants
Major Numbers of Moves from One Behavior
to Another in Rank Order
Move from Teacher to
Teacher
Move from Student to
Teacher
From Student to
Teachers
From Artist to Teachers
(T4-T7) from teacher substantive initiation to teacher substantive
solicitation (4 times), (T04-T4) from teacher managerial initiation
to teacher initiation of the substantive type (2 times).
(S5-T7) from student substantive response to teacher substantive
solicitation (occurred 10 times), (S5-T6) from student substantive
response to teacher substantive solicitation for clarification (7
times).
(S7-T5) from student substantive solicitation to teacher substan-
tive response (5 times), (S5-T4) from student substantive response
to teacher substantive initiation (3 times), (S6-T5) from student
substantive solicitation for clarification to teacher substantive
response (3 times).
(Q5-T7) from artist substantive response to teacher substantive
solicitation (14 times), (Q5-T6) from artist response to teacher
solicitation for clarification (11 times), (Q5-T4) from artist substan-
tive response to teacher substantive initiation (6 times), (Q4-T4)
from artist substantive initiation to teacher substantive initiation
(4 times), (Q4-T7) from artist substantive initiation to teacher sub-
stantive solicitation (4 times), (Q04-T04) from artist managerial
initiation to teacher managerial initiation (3 times).
EXAMPLE NO. 2 (p. 72)
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printed below (see: Example 2). Inter-
action relationships on Table 2, not
included on the example are: from
teacher to students, artist to students,
teacher to artist, student to artist, stu-
dent to student, and artist to artist.
There are three such tables (2, 12, and
20), totalling ten pages. After awhile
it was like reading Gertrude Stein
without the poetry.
In conclusion, it was found that the
"study objectively presented the facts
about the characteristics of the pro-
gram-model the way they really were
. .
." (p. 148). The program-model
picked up shifts of behavior between
participants, indicated that the artist
also plays the role of teacher; thus,
putting two or more teachers in the
room at the same time (a fact long rec-
ognized by elementary art teachers
who push an art cart), showed that
some "program objectives were over-
emphasized at the expense of others"
(p. 148), indicated where the greatest
degree of interaction exists between
program participants (in this case, be-
tween artist and students), was "ade-
quate" (p. 149) for obtaining data about
A.I.S. programs, and along with ethno-
graphic methods was considered "valid
and feasible" (p. 149) for use by art
educators and staff members of the
N.E.A. to describe and evaluate A.I.S.
processes.
Reviewer's Commentary
It may seem pedantic and picayune,
but comment should be made about
the stylistic and grammatical errors in
this dissertation. A few errors in co-
ordinating reference and bibliographi-
cal listing have been noted above.
Perhaps the most complex error oc-
curs on page twelve, where the word
".
. . buried" is quoted and attributed
to "Smith, ed. p. 9, 1978." There is no
supporting data in the bibliography.
Also, the word "buried" was on page
9 of an article by Eisner first published
in 1974 (1978), reprinted in a publica-
tion, Artist-in-Schools: Analysis and
Criticism, edited by Ralph Smith (1978).
The same publication is listed in the
bibliography, under two other authors
printed in it, "Jones, R. L., Jr." (p. 210)
and "Marantz, Kenneth" (p. 212). The
Eisner article, having been used pre-
viously, was listed under its first pub-
lishing date (p. 207), and "buried"
could have been referred to in that
article instead of to Smith.
In his referencing, there are stylis-
tic misuses of "et al.," and inconsis-
tencies in the use of first names and/or
initials. A few other errors are: "ac-
cronym" has only one "c" and is mis-
used to define the initial abbreviations
A.I.S.P. and O.I.S.A., neither of which
spell words (pp. 23, 24). In "model pro-
grams for E.M.E. Students" (p. 40),
E.M.E. should be spelled out, unless
it is EMR for Educable Mentally Re-
tarded, in which case it should have
been noted and corrected.
We do not know the constraints
under which this dissertation was ap-
proved. Oru may be unfamiliar with
some aspects of the English language.
Using the dissertation style is never
easy, but most of these errors could
have been corrected through concen-
trated proofreading.
Stephen Orise Oru has done a con-
scientious and thorough job in data
analysis and reports using the O.S.I. A.
method. He successfully demonstrates
that interaction analysis can be used
to evaluate artists in the classroom,
but within the limits of the interaction
analysis context. Is it practical to do
so for A.I.S. programs? I think not. Does
the O.S.I.A. satisfy the need for honest
evaluation reportage? No. This disser-
tation raised issues which it did not
answer. In spite of the efforts by Eisner,
Day, Smith and others, A.I.S. funding
organizations still see evaluations as
threats instead of the means to im-
prove their programs. They may also
look on educators as so many mis-
guided academia nuts. They often
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seem self-righteous in their support
of artists-in-schools, instead of sup-
porting art teachers in schools, yet it
is the art teacher-in-place who sus-
tains the continuous learning of chil-
dren in art.
I suspect the O.S.I. A. and other in-
teraction analysis methods would turn
off governmental and other AIS fund-
ing agencies to any serious evalua-
tions for the following reasons:
1. The terminology and charts are in-
comprehensible without special train-
ing in O.S.I. A., and the process of de-
ciphering is too cumbersome for easy
report reading. If translated into read-
able language, it could be gathered by
other means. The congressman, state
advisory representative, funding agency's
board of directors, school administra-
tors, or others for whom evaluation
reports are written, would not care how
many "solicitations for clarifications"
take place every five seconds.
2. The cost of such an evaluation for
one day of an A.I.S. demonstration, by a
trained observer, a video tape recorder
technician, and the processing of com-
puter data with printouts would be
considerably more than the $75.00 or
so for the artist. As a rule of thumb, five
percent (5%) of the total cost of an A.I.S.
or other state or federally funded arts
program can be allocated for evalua-
tion. Five percent of $75.00 is $3.75. To
offset this, a special grant would be
necessary to evaluate the 72 or so pro-
grams in the Greater Columbus Arts
Council Directory using O.S.I. A. meth-
ods.
3. The O.S.I. A. method provided only
cognitive quantitative data, nothing was
revealed about the quality of the pro-
gram, the final work of art (was Oru's
sculpture worth watching for five days),
or follow-up and spin-off activities in
the art or classroom. On the affective
domain level, it only revealed data in
the 1.0 Receiving (awareness) and 2.0
Responding — to the 2.2 Willingness to
Respond level. There is no evidence of
2.3 Satisfaction or Response or 3.0
Valuing, Commitment, or 4.0 Concep-
tualization of a Value System.
4. O.S.I. A. does not provide the type
of information available through ques-
tionnaires, surveys, visitations, teachers,
students' journals, project newsletters,
narratives, interviews, quality of student
products and performances, and other
devices. They provide the qualitative
data that balances the interaction anal-
ysis methods.
What is eminently clear from this dis-
sertation is that regardless of the evalu-
ation methods, the report should have
integrity, be honest, and communicate
the type of information which can im-
prove the weaknesses of the program
and presumably continue it.
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